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Abstra ct
There are many different ways of thinking about reflective practice in social work
education in Australia. This research utilises a musical metaphor to illustrate this
diversity. Written as a piece of music with album notes, the study utilises a reflexive
methodology with a qualitative mixed method approach. Three studies were
conducted to explore how reflective practice is understood in social work education
and practice in Australia. The first study examined my own learning and teaching of
reflective practice through an autoethnographic process. The findings indicated a range
of models of reflective practice potentially available to the educator. Also explored in
this study were the kinds of reflection these models make possible and visible to
educators and students. The second study traced the emergence of reflective practice
within Australian social work education by conducting a Foucauldian inspired
archaeology. This study demonstrated the emergence of specific models in social work
education and how their adoption has transformed the language and discourse of
problem-solving within the discipline through the use of specific kinds of social theory.
In the final study qualitative interviews with social work students, practitioners and
educators were undertaken. This study explored the beliefs, attitudes and values held
by participants about reflective practice. The final study illustrated the social and oral
nature of reflective practice within the discipline. Participant interviews also indicated
that reflective practice is a significant means for solving problems and building
understanding for learning and practice for social workers. Overall, the study
establishes that current models of reflective practice could be enhanced if more
attention was paid to instructing students in critical reflection skills such as
deconstruction, evaluation, critique, problematisation and interpretation. This would
contribute greatly to the ability of social workers to effectively test the limits of their
knowledge and practice in the interests of the people they serve.
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Pre lude 1
Note to the reader
There are many different ways of thinking about and discussing reflective practice.
This research has utilised a musical metaphor to illustrate this diversity. What is
presented in the following pages is a thesis written as a concept album2 featuring a
piece of music known as a rhapsody. Rhapsodies are typically quite epic. Two famous
examples are Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue3 and Queen’s Bohemian Rhapsody4.
Rhapsodies are usually presented in one movement, although they can incorporate
different sections, and they combine a range of musical elements (Thompson &
Bellingham, 2015). The inspiration for this format and the creation of a reflective
rhapsody came from an interview I saw featuring Freddie Mercury discussing
Bohemian Rhapsody where he suggested that ‚ ... it was basically like three songs I
wanted to put out and I just put the three together<‛ (Queen, 2014: 23). The thesis
incorporates ‘album notes’ as background and orientation to the ‘music’ of the research.
These can be found in chapters one, two, three and four. The ‘album’ itself can be
found in chapters five, six, seven and eight. These chapters have been written as the
parts of the rhapsody ‘music’ taking on a verse, chorus and bridge structure. The only
exception is chapter six which is written in two parts with three bridges and a finale.
Across the whole work I have included interludes also in a musical sense. In a literary
sense, however, these interludes serve as exegeses intended as reflections and
explanatory notes as the work progresses.
Prelude can have two meanings. The first is as the opening before a larger piece of music and the second
is as a preliminary action or event that is leading to a more important aspect ("prelude
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prelude," n. d. ). In this case the prelude is meant to orient
the reader/listener to what is in store.
2 Concept albums typically include linked songs on a long-playing record and were prevalent in popular
music from 1967 to 1982 (Montgomery, 2002). Moreover, Montgomery suggests that the ‚<concept album,
in addition to musical material, used words or lyrics to communicate that theme to listeners
(consumers)‛(p. 34).
3 Rhapsody in Blue was written by George Gershwin in 1924 and is a combination of jazz, pop and classical
elements which has meant that it has always remained difficult to classify (Gutmann, 2003). An example of
the piece performed by the Libor Pesek (Conductor) and the Slovak Philharmonic Orchestra may be
accessed here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ynEOo28lsbc
4 Queen’s track Bohemian Rhapsody was released in 1975 as a track on their A night at the opera album
(BBC, 2015). The official video released by Queen in 1975 may be accessed at the official Queen channel on
Youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJ9rUzIMcZQ
1
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Cha pter 1
A l b u m n o t e s 1 - Or i e n t a t i o n
Introduction
This chapter sets out a brief survey of how reflective practice is discussed in the social
work literature. The chapter also explains how I became interested in understanding
reflective practice through my experience as a social work student and later as a
lecturer in social work. The chapter serves as an introduction to the research questions
and approach and as an aid to reading. I conclude the chapter with a description of
how the thesis has been constructed.

A brief survey of reflective practice
Who isn’t reflective? Archer (2010) suggests that the human capacity to reflect is
indispensible to human life in at least three main ways. The first is to provide a sense of
self ‚< necessary for the correct appropriation of rights and duties by those to whom
they are ascribed‛ (Archer, 2010, p. 281). The second is the way it enables monitoring
of human performance. Lastly, and somewhat crucially, reflection enables human
beings to consider the gap between the actual conditions and those of the ideal as they
move through society (Archer, 2010, p. 281). Archer goes further to sum up and offer a
working definition of human reflective/reflexive capacity as ‚<The mental capacity
that all normal people [possess] to consider themselves in relation to their social
contexts; and their social contexts in relation to themselves‛(Johnson, 2011, 12:31).

Given the stated ubiquity of reflective capacity how then did reflection/reflexivity
become such a thing in higher education and in professional social work education
particularly? Reflective skills are now considered to be a core element of practice for
social workers (Gursansky, Quinn, & Le Sueur, 2010; Thompson, 1995). Moreover it
has become an important part of the landscape of social work education in Australia
(Connolly & Harms, 2012; Fook, 1996a; Healy, 2014; Pawar & Anscombe, 2015). There
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has also been a proliferation of models and processes for conducting, teaching and
considering reflective practice in higher education and in social work specifically.
Nevertheless, in 1999 Ixer raised a question about reflection from an assessment point
of view by suggesting that:
If reflection is to be regarded as a core facet of individual professional
competence, then we need to know far more about its structure, substance and
nature before we can safely assess it in professional social work training (1999, p.
521).
This question still has relevance for contemporary social work educators as some of
these issues are still to be addressed.

Originally based on the work of Dewey (1910 see also; Redmond, 2004) reflective
practice was introduced to social workers through a range of different educational
sources (Gould & Taylor, 1996; Yelloly & Henkel, 1995). The earliest influence in the
social work discipline appears to have come from the work of Donald Schon (1983;
1987) and his collaboration with Argyris (1974;1978). Schon’s model of reflective
practice actually owes a debt to educational philosopher John Dewey and particularly
Dewey’s work in How we think (1910). Schon’s model may be read as being primarily
about the use of reflection for the development of practical judgement5 in professional
life. Schon considered reflection as an important route to the avoidance of routine

I am using the term practical judgement with a considerable debt to Aristotle’s notion of phronesis
(Kinsella & Pitman, 2012). Kinsella and Pitman suggest that phronesis is a species of rationality which is
pragmatic, oriented to action, developed in situ or is considered as context dependent (Flyvbjerg, 2001;
Kinsella & Pitman, 2012). Phronesis has been discussed by Flyvbjerg as different from techne and episteme
where techne is understood as craft knowledge based on the implementation of procedures in a context
dependent way in order to accomplish a specified goal. This rationality is sometimes also referred to as
instrumental rationality. Episteme in contrast to both techne and phronesis is rationality that is universal
and thus context independent. Modern usage of these terms would be technical, technician and
technology while episteme has come to be used in relation to debates about knowledge known as
epistemology.
5
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applications of learnt theories or procedures, so-called technical solutions or technical
rationality6, to ill-structured problems which arise in practice.
However reflection in education theory has a much longer pedigree. Redmond
suggests that Schon’s primary achievement was to take an educational notion such as
reflection, and through his earlier collaboration with Argryis, apply it to professional
practice beyond the academy (Redmond, 2004, pp. 31-33). This was of great interest to
social work as a minor or semi-profession (McDonald, 2006) where the links between
the practical work of the discipline are often experienced as occurring at a distance
from the theories developed to explain the work (Ryan, Fook, & Hawkins, 1995). Social
work educators saw reflection as a way to bridge the gap between practice and theory
(Fook, 1996a; Thompson, 1995). Social work educators in Australia also utilise the idea
of reflection to develop ways to build practice theories within an Australian context
(D'Cruz, Gillingham, & Melendez, 2007; Fook, 1993; Healy, 2000), a point that is
described in detail in chapter six where I examine the emergence of the concept
through the method of Foucauldian archaeology.

Schon’s work started to emerge into Australian social work from the mid to late 1980s
(Scott, 1989) and began to be adopted into social work texts from the 1990s (Fook, 1999;
Gould & Taylor, 1996; Sheppard, 1998). The concept reflective practice was also
undergoing something of a transformation within the wider adult education literature.
The works of Paulo Freire (1972), Jack Mezirow (1990; 1991), Stephen Brookfield (1993;
Brookfield & Preskill, 1999), and Australian David Boud (Boud, Cohen, & Walker,
1993; Boud & Knights, 1996) were particularly influential as these works introduced
ideas about education as a means for achieving emancipation. Of these educational
theorists only Mezirow and Brookfield acknowledge the role of Dewey in influencing
their particular models (Redmond, 2004). Freire, in contrast, developed his pedagogical
approach out of his experiences in his native Brazil, where he worked with oppressed

Technical rationality, also sometimes used interchangeably with instrumental rationality and is
understood here as the application of processes and procedures to a problem for the purposes of
accomplishing a goal (Schon, 1983). An example of this in social work may be the application of an
assessment tool for enabling intake and referral to a service. The purpose of the assessment tool is to assess
whether the client’s situation meets already determined criteria.
6
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groups in an education system unresponsive to local contextual knowledge (Freire,
1972). For Freire, reflection is seen as an important component of achieving
conscientisation7 and thus a route to achieving freedom from oppression.

These ideas about emancipation resonated strongly with social work educators
working within an academy which was increasingly being transformed by managerial
ideas (Fredman & Doughney, 2012) that were implemented through the adoption in
Australia of widespread neo-liberal8 practices. These practices were locally described
as economic rationalism9 (Ife, 1988, 1997; Pusey, 1991). Critiques of economic rationalist
practices encountered in higher education resonated with social work practitioners
who confronted similar imposts in the delivery of welfare across Australia during this
period. The parallels between the academic experience and that of practitioners’
practice emerged through conference discussions and connections were made between
reflection and consciousness raising in both settings (Bainbridge & Williams, 1995). It
was felt that students should be enabled to challenge these economic and managerialist
practices both for themselves as workers likely to be affected, but more broadly for the
people social work serves in its social justice mission. Education was considered a key
way for this process to occur. Educators of a critical persuasion would link these
processes together: becoming educated and working for the liberation of others.

One of the links between Brookfield and Mezirow is the work of Freire according to
Redmond (2004). Work inspired by Freire has since come to be known under the broad

Conscientisation is developing ‚< critical awareness of one’s social reality through reflection and action
(The Freire Institute, 2015).
8 According to Centeno and Cohen the term neo-liberalism can be defined in at least three ways (Centeno
& Cohen, 2012). The first is in policy terms about operating an economy; second as a response to crisis in
politics and the uses of power; and third as an ideology (Centeno & Cohen, 2012). Social work
commentators (Dominelli, 1999; McDonald & Chenoweth, 2009) have focussed on how neo-liberal
practices have affected welfare delivery in various states thus focussing on both economic and ideological
definitions of neo-liberalism.
9 Economic rationalism was a term first coined by Michael Pusey to describe a certain type of approach to
government, which saw the implementation of ways of delivering services modelled on market context
(Pusey, 1991).
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heading of critical pedagogy10. This work sees education as a process of liberation and
freedom and critical pedagogy has adopted ideas from feminist, Marxist, post-colonial
and post-structural social theory (Kincheloe, 2004). As a result the original Schon
model has since been elaborated by social work educators in Australia (Fook &
Askeland, 2007; Fook & Gardner, 2007; Morley, 2004; Morley & Dunstan, 2012) and
beyond (Redmond, 2004; Ruch, 2007, 2009; Thompson & Thompson, 2008). These
elaborations have incorporated existing concepts and ideas from within the social work
profession in addition to those offered within the education theory of critical pedagogy
itself. The result has been the creation of a range of reflective practice models with a
unique social work disciplinary flavour.

One result of this transformation in a disciplinary sense is that it has become more
common for Australian social work texts and authors to use the term critical reflection in
contrast to the older term reflective practice. This combination picks up the influence of
critical theory inspired critique and combines it with a focus on the development of a
practice epistemology. This can be seen, for example, in the Australian Association of
Social Workers Practice Standards (Australian Association of Social Workers, 2003,
2013b) where the term critical reflection is the only term utilised within the document
to indicate the ability to reflect on practice, attitudes, skills or values.

The adoption of the term critical reflection may not be a particular issue where there is
broad agreement about its meaning. Whether such agreement has been achieved since
its introduction into Australian social work education is far from certain, despite its
adoption into the Australian Code of Ethics (Australian Association of Social Workers,
2010a), the Practice Standards (Australian Association of Social Workers, 2013b) and
the education and accreditation standards of the profession (Australian Association of
Social Work, 2013a). There are many different ways in which social work educators

Critical pedagogy here is understood as the recognition that educational practices never occur in
ideological and politically neutral spaces. Thus critical pedagogy is oriented to naming the political and
ideological factors that are present and working to end the forms of oppression that result through the
practice of dialogue and conscientisation (Kincheloe, 2004).
10
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utilise terms like reflection, reflexivity, and reflectivity even without the addition of the
term critical. In their survey of the way in which social work utilises the various terms
D’Cruz, Gillingham and Melendez (2007) suggest there are three different ways in
which they might be conceptualised. The first is broadly sociological derived from
work by Beck and Giddens (Beck, Lash, & Giddens, 1994). This kind relates to
theorising about how humans relate to the social contexts they find themselves
contending with. The second kind of reflexivity described by D’Cruz et al (2007, p. 77)
is one concerned with ‚ < questions how knowledge is generated and, further, how
relations of power influence the processes of knowledge generation‛. Thus,
practitioners and educators must subject their own knowing to analysis and reflection.
In this schema this kind of reflexivity is seen as closer to that of social scientific
practices of reflexivity. Lastly, a third form is described by D’Cruz et al, which
incorporates earlier social work approaches to the ‘use of self’ derived to some degree
from psychodynamic understandings (Ruch, Turney, & Ward, 2010) but which include
explicit attention to anxiety and emotion (Rai, 2012; Ruch, 2009) more generally. The
upshot to the range of diversity with regard to these terms is that ‚< there is a lack of
clarity about the concept in terms of who is being exhorted to be ‘reflexive’, when and
how‛ (p. 73).

Just as there is a range of different conceptions of reflexivity there is also some
confusion about the term critical. It can have a range of meanings in social science
generally (Hammersley, 2005) depending on its purpose in being utilised. For example,
it can mean ‚assessment of knowledge claims in terms of their likely validity‛
(Hammersley, 2005, p. 176) or it can be taken much further inspired by the theorising
for the Marxist, feminist or poststructural schools of social theory to mean a
thoroughgoing critique of all claims to knowledge (Hammersley, 2005). Similar
elements can be found in both, suggesting a common theme that relates to the attention
paid to knowledge creation and claims about knowledge.
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The term critical is also debated within wider education circles and can have widely
differing meanings, depending on particular academic tribal orientations and their
approaches to knowledge (Ylijoki, 2000). Within the social work field critical has come
to denote the relation between individuals and societal structures (Fook, 2002; Fook &
Askeland, 2006) and perspectives on how these might be contested and changed (Fook,
2002; Healy, 2005; Rossiter, 1996). Yet in education circles critical may mean critical
analyses, which involve processes of hypothesis testing, compare and contrast,
deductive and inductive thinking processes through which beliefs and ideas are tested
(Halpern, 1992; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). In social work the processes of have become
tied up with perspectives emanating from critical theory (Tilbury, Osmond, & Scott,
2009).

For students and instructors this lack of clarity about concepts and their terms is
problematic. It also raises questions about how concepts can come to indicate
something specific beyond their face value, which is related to disciplinary knowledge.
For example, do these terms signal, in a disciplinary sense, a particular type of
reflective action, and if this is so, what is this action? Does this term prescribe certain
ways of considering the problems of practice? If so, what are the implications for
teaching students what social work means when it discusses being critical in the
context of analysis and reflection? Does the incorporation of critical perspectives, derived
from various social theories, introduce a particular theoretical stance towards practice?
And are we as a discipline clear about what this stance is? What kinds of critical
analysis do these theoretical stances pre-impose for students as they learn the practices
of being critical? Does the adoption of sanctioned approaches to theory and thinking
foreclose other kinds of reflective thinking? Are we, as a profession, turning the wicked
problems that characterise social work practice into structured problems by introducing
theoretical solutions? And will this perhaps foreclose the development of the ‚complex
monitoring<involved<when adults are faced with ill-structured problems‛ (King &
Kitchener, 2002, p. 37), which characterises the development of reflective judgement
(King & Kitchener, 2004). In light of these questions I turn now to consider the reason
for examining reflective practice in this study.
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Why examine reflective practice?
This study has set out to examine the practice of reflection within the context of social
work education and practice in Australia. Given the discussion above, the aim was to
consider how reflective practice emerged as a core skill required for social workers and
to examine the various models that might be utilised to teach it to students. My initial
interest in the topic arose from two distinct but related experiences. The first was my
experience of learning social work in a school whose broad ethos was one of a critical
pedagogical approach during the late 1990s and early 2000s. I found the experience of
learning to be a social worker within this environment both exhilarating and very
challenging. I learnt my critical reflection lessons well and had by the time of
graduating adopted, fairly uncritically as it turns out, the broad tenets of a critical
reflection largely underpinned by feminist and Marxist explanations of oppression and
marginalisation (Griffiths, 1995; Young, 1990) and the uses and abuses of power
(Grosz, 1990). I learned that no space was free or neutral from the effects of structures
and power.

My practice experiences subsequently neatly demonstrated both the extent and the
limits of this particular way of using reflection in order to understand the problems of
my practice within the organisation and with my work with service-users. I found
many of my assumptions about power challenged by moving through various
organisational and practice settings. Nevertheless being able to engage in an analysis of
power offered significant benefits. At the same time it seemed to me that the challenge
to power that came with a critical stance could be difficult to enact as it was not so easy
to see who the decision makers were and the various markers of power shifted with
every context. Further, significant parts of my practice became routine, which I
experienced as a sense of competence and not as a cause for concern. I settled into
understandings about my practice context that started to serve me fairly efficiently in
navigating the ‚swampy lowlands‛ (Schon, 1983, p. 42) of practice. I preferred to see
myself this way rather than accept that I had adopted too easily the practice of a
technical bureaucrat. I found that I quite liked having clear processes and procedures
to follow, even if they were constructed by me. They were comforting to both myself
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and my clients. Having learnt my critical reflection lessons well I admit to feeling
concerned about this sense of settling in or selling out. I was not challenging much in the
way of the status quo. I wondered about having sold out. I found myself concerned at
how quickly that might have occurred. I worried about my moral character and my
credentials as a critically reflective social worker. I could if pushed still offer a fairly
robust analysis of power, however, my experience was that it often precluded the very
outcomes I was trying to achieve for service-users I was working with. I wondered if
this was the gap the literature talked about between theory and practice.

The second was my experience of taking up a lecturing position, returning to the same
social work school where I had undertaken my undergraduate studies in social work.
The school was still broadly committed to a critical pedagogy in terms of the kinds of
theories it taught and the practices within individual units11. Things had changed
though in that the university instituted a range of quality assurance mechanisms,
which constrained the ways in which assessment were negotiated with students. My
first teaching foray was in field education units with a focus on integration of theory
and practice and by teaching a unit on social work practice within the field of alcohol
and other drugs. In both units there were significant reflective assessments
requirements. These assessments seemed to generate enormous angst between the
students and myself. Students worried about these assessments more than any others. I
seemed to spend more time explaining how to approach these papers than any other
kinds of assessments. This reignited my doubts from my social work practice
experiences and it sent me to the social work literature to try to find some clarity about
the role and purpose of reflective practice within social work particularly. What I
found was a bewildering array of models (Fook, 1996a; Gould & Taylor, 1996; Taylor,
1996; Yelloly & Henkel, 1995) and many different ways it could be taught across not
just social work but also in other disciplines (Boud & Middleton, 2003; Gibbs, 1987). As

At this institution the term unit describes a course or subject within the social work curriculum. A unit
typically runs for a semester and includes designated learning outcomes, content and assessment that can
be delivered in various modes including online, on-campus, block or intensive. These can also be referred
to as courses, subjects, modules depending on the institution.
11
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a result of these experiences a number of questions presented themselves about the
issue of learning, teaching and using critical reflection.

The intention of this chapter, so far has been to introduce the topic of reflective practice
in social work education and how I came to be interested in researching it. In the next
half of the chapter I introduce the research problem and conclude with a description of
the aims and research questions of the study. The final section of this chapter will
outline how the thesis has been conceptualised as an album and piece of music. The
specific content of each chapter is included as an aid to the reader.

Formulating a question
Alvesson and Sandberg (2013) propose the idea that there are many different
approaches to arriving at the parameters of a research problem. Most commonly,
researchers build their research problem by examining the way in which the topic is
understood through the various bodies of knowledge that surround it and which have
contributed to its current status or development. This approach is called gap-spotting.
There are different strategies involved in gap-spotting including where there is
confusion about the issue or problem; neglect of significant aspects; locating underresearched areas or where problems might have been overlooked and lastly areas that
could be enhanced by empirical studies or extensions of existing models (Sandberg &
Alvesson, 2011). Sandberg and Alvesson suggest that this is the main way in which
researchers approach the development of research topics or problems. The underlying
assumption of their claim is that researchers develop research problems as these are
generally not lying around waiting for a smart analyst to find them (Stone, 2002).
Sandberg and Alvesson suggest that research problems are developed through distinct
strategies, which should, in an ideal sense, add to the knowledge base and ‚generate
interesting and significant theories‛ (p. 24).

A second way in which a research problem might be developed is through
problematisation. Problematisation is a process where the ground of the topic may be
developed through ‚the identification and challenging of assumptions underlying the
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perspectives and cultural ‘truths’ within which we are situated‛ (Alvesson & Sandberg,
2013, p. 22). There are also elements of problematisation in gap-spotting approaches;
however, problematising underlying assumptions is not generally the main focus in
gap-spotting. Within problematising approaches the purpose is to demonstrate deficits
in current conceptualisations of the topic. There are a number of ways this might be
undertaken. The first is to consider how complete the available knowledge on the topic
is. The second is to evaluate the kinds of approaches taken to the topic by previous
researchers. Thirdly, a researcher might canvass the existing approaches and suggest
that they are incommensurate and have therefore neglected to fully develop some or
all aspects of the topic. In this strategy researchers seek to add to the body of
knowledge by suggesting corrections to the way in which the topic is understood.

The main strategy in this study was to deploy a problematising approach. The way
each part of the study addresses problematisation is discussed below in chapter four.
The reason for this began with my curiosity about how reflective practice had become a
‘given’ within social work to such an extent so that it had become difficult to imagine
the possibility that one might practice effectively, or well, without being reflective. The
idea of reflection as a way of learning and improving practice has become so accepted
within the discipline of social work that questioning its use had become increasingly
unthinkable and unsayable (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).

This is not to say that there have been no questions raised about its wholesale adoption
into social work education and practice, but rather, that these critiques (Ixer, 1999;
McBeath & Webb, 2005) have found little purchase within social work in the face of the
overwhelming acceptance of reflective practice and critical reflection which reached a
peak in the early 2000s. I became interested in understanding what had been in its
place as ‚good‛ practice if it had only been ‚discovered‛ as a technique in the late
1990s. Moreover critical reflection had become problematised for me through the
experiences described above. In my brief survey of the literature it had also become
clear that there was a widespread acceptance of some kinds of reflection over others
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within social work and that the way in which it was discussed signalled a particular
disciplinary sense.

The research aim and questions
My ultimate goal is for this research to contribute to improving teaching and learning
for social work students. Therefore the aim of this research is to examine the ways in
which reflective practice is understood within the discipline of social work in
Australia. I recognise that social work in Australia has significant ties to the
international social work community through its participation in various peak bodies
and also through knowledge exchange across universities, journals, conferences and
organisations. These ties are important sources of history, knowledge exchange and
development for the discipline. Social work in Australia nonetheless has also
established its own distinctive flavour developed from within the Australian culture
and history. Consequently in developing my approach I became interested in
conducting a study that focussed particularly on the Antipodean12 experience of
reflective practice.
Research questions
This research has a primary question that has shaped the overall design and which
relates specifically to the aim outlined above. This question is:


In what ways can reflective practice be understood in social work education and
practice in Australia?

In order to address this question three lines of inquiry have been conducted, each
utilising a different method situated within an overarching reflexive methodology
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Each line of inquiry was pursued through a single study
that contributes to main research aim and question.

The first line of inquiry was an autoethnographic study of my experience of learning
and teaching reflective practice. The question addressed in this study was:

Antipodean refers to people from Australia and New Zealand and was first coined in the 17 th Century
(Oxford Dictionary, 2015)
12
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What was my experience of teaching and learning reflective practice?

The autoethnography utilised a range of data sources including an original
autoethnographic study conducted during my third year as an undergraduate student
about learning social work, student journal data, assorted class notes, lecture notes and
associated marginalia, a teaching journal, and various voice memos from the period
2002 -2012. The specific data sources and the process undertaken are outlined within
chapter four. The autoethnography is reported in chapter five.

The second line of inquiry utilised the method of archaeology (Foucault, 1972) in which
the following question was addressed:


How did reflective practice emerge in social work education in Australia?

This study outlines the emergence of reflective practice and was undertaken as a way
to problematise reflective practice. This is sometimes referred to as conducting a history
of the present (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). A history of the present is an inquiry that
examines the limits of the sayable within a specific field focussed particularly on
processes of subject-formation13 (Karakayali, 2015). Limits can mean a number of things
within this context but it has been taken here to mean:
< the characteristic forms of thought and action which are taken for granted and
not questioned or contested in a practice of subjectivity, thereby functioning as
the implicit or horizon of their questions and contests, or it can mean that a form
of subjectivity (its forms of reason, norms of conduct and so forth) is explicitly
claimed to be a limit that cannot be otherwise because it is universal, necessary or
obligatory (the standard form of legitimation since the Enlightenment). (Tully,
1999)

This was a focus of Foucault’s early work where ‚ < he studied the processes of subject-formation
mainly as forms of subjection, focusing primarily on the role of scientific discourses and technologies of
power in the constitution of subjects in western culture‛ (Karakayali, 2015, p. 105).
13
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In developing this analytic14 the purpose was to understand the taken-for-granted and
unquestioned aspects of reflective practice which can be characterised as a form of
subjectivisation (Tully, 1999). This kind of subjectivisation is where ‚ < subjects render
an aspect of their experience problematic, in response to difficulties and obstacles in
practice‛ (Foucault, 1988, cited in Tully, 1999, p. 97). The purpose of this stage of the
study was also to operate as an antidote to the highly interpretative autoethnographic
stage of the study, not least by using a method that does not situate discourses within
the consciousness of a single author (Foucault, 1992).

The third line of inquiry was the conduct of qualitative analysis of interviews with
social work educators, practitioners and students in order to answer the question:


How is reflective practice utilised in learning, teaching and practicing social
work?

This stage was designed to consider the ways in which social workers describe and
understand reflective practice in the contemporary period. The interviews were
conducted with practitioners, educators, and students. This study developed a line of
inquiry concerned with the cultural knowledge of social workers about the place of
reflective practices in contemporary social work education and practice. The analysis
explored the meaning of reflective practice for participants in addition to how it is
learnt, where and through what activities it takes place.

The research as a whole has been captured in figure 1 below. The study design has
been situated within an overarching reflexive methodology where the purpose of each
line of inquiry provided a mechanism for addressing four different kinds of
interpretations using an overarching hermeneutic movement between part and whole,
pre-understanding and understanding (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).

Koopman and Matza (2013, p. 822) suggest the use of the term analytic which in terms of Foucault’s work
refers to the way of ‚conducting an inquiry‛. Thus in this sense the term can be contrasted with theory
which ‚ < by contrast, needs do no work in order to be true. Analytics gain any being they have only by
doing.‛(ibid)
14
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Figure 1: Graphic depicting the study as a whole

The methodology is discussed at length below in chapter three. This figure is also
discussed in the final chapter which presents the findings in relation to the main
question of the research. I turn now to discuss my presentation of the thesis as a
concept album.

The structure of this thesis
Metaphors
As mentioned in the prelude the thesis is presented as a concept album that contains a
piece of music called a rhapsody. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe metaphors as
‚understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another‛ (p. 5). I am
using the idea of a concept album to give shape to seeing reflective practice in the same
way that music can be seen: as diverse and combinatorial. The concept album allows
room for including all the orientation, background explanation for choices of
methodology, method, ethics and themes that have gone into preparing to perform the
various lines of inquiry in the research. Metaphors can add to the exploration, and
analysis, and convey ideas in different ways in addition to the disciplined reporting of
the results. I am aware, however, that there is a tension between rigour and creativity
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that must be balanced. Metaphors may be taken too far or considered too literally.
Indeed Alvesson (2011, p. 64) cautions however that ‚even <lovers of metaphors must
balance creativity and imagination with discipline and carefulness in use of
metaphors‛ (2011, p. 65).

The need for rigour and discipline has been accomplished in a number of different
ways. Bridges15 have been incorporated into the thesis as forms of transition between
different parts of the thesis. These bridges appear in the form of exegeses throughout
the thesis and they serve a range of functions: as pauses, reframings, wonderings and
explanations of lines of inquiry sometimes taken or at other times not pursued. The
bridges are generally short so as to mimic an early jazz style where they were used to
‚separate strains of multi-thematic compositions‛ ("Bridge" 2015). These are indicated
between formal chapters by the title Interludes. Each bridge includes a subtitle to
indicate its respective focus. They generally pick up on an aspect of the chapter that
preceded them as they are research reflections. The purpose of the bridges is discussed
further in chapter three.

Chapters have different roles to play in the album. Each chapter denotes a particular
part of the album or music. As mentioned in the prelude, chapters one to four can be
likened to the notes included in an album that explain the thinking, rationale,
background and development of the album. Thus, in chapter two, I have charted the
theoretical ‘melodies’ that have informed the work here and related these to different
kinds of music. Next I have presented an examination of the philosophical basis of the
research and presented the methodology informing the design of the study in chapter
three. In chapter four the methods used to develop the three lines of inquiry are
described. I have also included the limitations and a section on the ethics of the study
overall in chapter four.

A bridge is a term for the formal transition between pieces of music where it can often incorporate other
themes, different key and musical contrasts ("Bridge", 2015).
15
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In chapters five, six, seven and eight the rhapsody is presented as album tracks. Each of
these chapters has a particular song to play within the rhapsody as a whole. In order to
illustrate this I have chosen specific musical genres to give readers with a sense of what
they might be ‘listening’ to as they read each chapter. In chapters five, six and seven
each of these lines of inquiry are presented as parts of the rhapsody: the
autoethnography is a track that includes a solo performance, the archaeology as an
instrumental track, and finally the interviews as a choir performance. Chapter eight
presents a finale track which brings the rhapsody to a conclusion by returning to the
main research question: In what ways can reflective practice be understood in social
work education and practice in Australia? I have included explanations in footnotes of
the kinds of music and have created a playlist to illustrate the kind of music16
discussed. Only the album track chapters utilise a verse, chorus and bridge structure to
indicate sections and changes in direction. The titles to these music chapters also
indicate the kind of music it is and what subject positions it is meant to capture within
the research. For example, the autoethnography in chapter five explores the experience
of a single subject but relates this to the social, cultural and professional context
surrounding that individual. Thus, this chapter is represented as a solo performance. In
contrast chapter six utilises forms of instrumental post-rock17 form of music as a way of
representing the archaeological line of inquiry. This form of music is suited well the
focus on the discursive landscape which shapes the limits and freedoms that people
might experience. Lastly, chapter seven presents the findings from qualitative
interviews and utilises a gospel choir song to represent the idea of people in a group
singing with and about their experience. Chapter eight is shorter than the others as this
represents a finale. It brings together the main melodies and ‘sounds’ from the rest of
the thesis together in order to summarising the research findings.

A Spotify playlist has been developed to enhance reader understanding of the chosen music genres – it
is recommended that readers listen to it in the order as this has been constructed deliberately to match the
order in which music genres and songs have been introduced
https://open.spotify.com/user/ljljwa0401/playlist/3j0C4rffO92tN5gXBGShSx
17 Post rock music is, according to Reddit users, the kind of music that ‚uses rock instrumentation but
disregards typical ‚rock‛ song structure (r/post-rock, n. d.). Mostly instrumental, a typical track features
quiet arpeggios around simple chord progressions that swell into rousing crescendos. Fans liken the style
to the avant-garde with soundscapes similar to that of classical music (Redwood FM, n. d. ).
16
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The reader might be reassured that despite this creative use of structure and style
(Sword, 2009) attention has also been paid to balancing this with meeting the
expectations of a thesis (Kamler & Thomson, 2006). Therefore, this thesis has all of the
usual sections that readers might expect to find in a dissertation: theoretical discussion,
methodology, methods and ethics, results and analysis, conclusions and
recommendations (Becker, 1986; Thomas, 2013). The only exception to this is exclusion
of a traditional literature review chapter. As the research incorporates three smaller
studies using a great deal of the same literature I have incorporated the literature
throughout the thesis rather than presenting it in a single chapter.

Closing notes
In summary, reflective practice has enjoyed a significant rise in status within social
work over the last 20 years and as such it has been elaborated into a range of
approaches that are the focus of this research. Three main lines of inquiry have been
pursued in this research using the methods of autoethnography, archaeology, and
qualitative interviews. The research has been written as a concept album within which
these lines of inquiry are represented as the album tracks. The idea of the concept
album and a piece of music called a rhapsody was intended as a way to bring disparate
elements together to address the aim of the study, which is to understand reflective
practice within the context of social work education in Australia.
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Inte rlude 1
W r e s t l i n g o c t o p i ( o r my mi s s i n g l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w
c h a p t e r ) 18
Like many doctoral students the literature review loomed as an overwhelming task (Kamler &
Thomson, 2006). Based on my initial review, conducted for my research proposal, four main
areas appeared to be important for understanding reflective practice in social work
education. These were psychology, education, sociology and social work itself. I set off and
ended up conducting a great deal of literature reading and searching. And, of course, if you
go far enough back in all of these disciplinary areas you start arriving at philosophy and
ideas stemming from the Enlightenment (Bristow, 2011). Eventually you realise that many of
these ideas have separated into various disciplinary approaches to knowledge (Becher &
Trowler, 2001). Take John Dewey as an example. Widely revered as the grandfather of
American pragmatism and also important to education scholars, Dewey’s work has enjoyed
a renaissance in philosophy in recent years (Festenstein, 2014; see also Koopman, 2013). Any
work that traces its understanding of reflective practice to Donald Schon (1987) is also
influenced by the work of Dewey (Redmond, 2004).
I had started the review in my home territory of social work but soon found many links to
the other disciplines as expected from a profession that explicitly uses interdisciplinary
knowledge (D'Cruz, Jacobs, & Schoo, 2009). I started a process of tracing reflective practice
from each discipline through various literatures starting with experimental or
philosophical/theoretical research and moving through these to more applied research and
then back to social work. I started to group the findings into themes. Three themes emerged
that related to reflective practice and which seemed to be common to all the disciplines I’d
considered: the development of judgement; importance of including emotion, and critical
thinking. The literature considered in this process is also represented in a graphic, which can
be found Appendix C. Some of this literature and the main conclusions of the review were
included in a paper submitted to Social Work Education – The International Journal (Appendix
B).
Once I’d considered this literature I wondered if it would connect to the many reflective
practice models I had already accumulated and which people had kindly sent to me when
they learned of my research topic. What I found was that all of these reflective practice
models had elements of judgement development, included a link to emotion and included
different kinds of critical thinking (Bain, Ballantyne, Mills, & Lester, 2002; Baxter Magolda,
2004; Fook, 1999; Gibbs, 1987; King & Kitchener, 1994; Moon, 1999; Redmond, 2004; Ryan,
2012; Schon, 1983). What differed were the emphases on these three main aspects. One thing
was clear - the consensus on the importance of reflection is pretty widespread.
The title of this exegesis is a play on a metaphor discussed in Kamler and Thompson (2006, p. 34). The original
metaphor was offered by a doctoral student on the issue of writing a review of literature within a study and
involved ‚persuading (selected arms of) an octopus into a glass‛ (Kamler & Thomson, 2006, p. 34). In this study I
felt more like the task was closer to wrestling than persuading, and possibly more than one octopus
(perspectives, theories, ontologies and critiques).
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Cha pter 2
A l b u m n o t e s 2 -T h e o r e t i c a l me l o d i e s
Introduction
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework as a form of background to the research.
This forms part of the album notes for the design of the rhapsody/research. The starting
point for this chapter is placing theory into the context of questions raised by my
engagement with students around reflective assignments. In this opening note I also
introduce the idea of thinking about theories as if they are melodies that combine and may
repeat and reappear throughout a piece of music. The next three sections of the chapter
present the different theoretical melodies of critical theory, post-structuralism and
interpretivism. The chapter concludes with a table summary of the main ideas taken
forward into different parts of the research.

This inquiry began with a number of questions about theory that arose from my engagement
with how social work students utilised (or not) theory or critical thinking in their
assessments, particularly reflective practice assessments. I wondered if it was possible for a
student to be reflective and not use ideas drawn from theory. Would the absence of theory
automatically render their account merely descriptive? Is it the incorporation of knowledge
that makes an account reflective as various reflective practice models (Fook & Gardner, 2007;
Gibbs, 1987; Ryan & Ryan, 2012) suggest? What theories or kinds of knowledge are we
talking about? Are all theoretical explanations in reflective accounts equal? For example,
would a social work educator recognise an account as reflective if it did not incorporate
dominant social work ideas about oppression, power, and structure? Given those ideas
about oppression, power and structure are also theoretical and contested; I wondered if I
would recognise different theoretical accounts of the same phenomena if they were
presented differently? I was not entirely convinced I would and this troubled me.
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Theory and knowledge use in social work is a contested notion (D'Cruz, 2012; Powell,
Lovelock, & Lyons, 2004). Nevertheless, theory and knowledge in a discipline can act like
the melody of a song or piece of music that makes something sensible or recognisable to
others. Some theories, like some melodies, have a long history while others are fairly new.
The musical genre of sampling19 demonstrates how melodies may be combined from wildly
different sources. In sampling, recognisable musical sequences are utilised to create new
music. Famous samples often utilise recognisable musical sequences in ways that capture
the attention of older audiences and in doing so introduce new sounds along the way. A
famous sample that demonstrates this is Vanilla Ice’s Ice Ice Baby (SiriusXM, 2013) which
utilised a Queen/Bowie sequence from Under Pressure (Mercury, May, Taylor, Deacon, &
Bowie, 1981) Theory has a similar quality as new theories often incorporate existing concepts
that may be familiar, applying these to new situations or extending them to create new
explanations of social phenomena. This phenomenon can also be seen in social work theory.

Social work is an applied profession and as such utilises theory from a range of other less
applied academic disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and political
science (Chenoweth & McAuliffe, 2012).The emphasis in the profession has always been on
theory that is relevant to social work practice with individuals, families, groups, and
communities. Thus, how social theory informs practice (Kreisberg & Marsh, 2015). How
theory should be incorporated into, or even resisted, has been the focus of a range of
longstanding debates since the beginning of the social work profession (Camillieri, 1996;
Cree, 2011; Parton, 2000; Sheppard, Newstead, Di Caccavo, & Ryan, 2000). Nevertheless,
theoretical thinking is seen as an important element in explaining the activities, processes
and purposes of social work practice (Healy, 2014; Payne, 1997, 2014; Trevithick, 2008).

Sampling is a form of music that uses portions of sounds and sequences found in other music and reusing it to
create a new piece of music. The form has been controversial due to the perception that it infringes on the
creativity of others and as a result sampling musicians have frequently been accused of copyright infringement
(Hesmondhalgh, 2006). Others see it as creatively using existing ideas with acknowledgement to create
something new (Andean, 2014). In academia using and extending the work of others is an accepted practise, as
long as due acknowledgement is made to the original source of work being utilised (Partington & Jenkins, 2007;
Wakefield, 2006).
19
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In my discussion of theory I am taking my lead from Chafetz (1987, p. 25, cited in Robbins,
Chatterjee, & Canda, 2006) where theory is considered to be ‚<a series of relatively abstract
and general statements which collectively purport to explain (answer the question ‚why?‛)
some aspect of the empirical world (the ‚reality‛ known to us directly or indirectly through
our senses)‛(p. 7). Setting aside for the moment the various debates about terms such as
empirical (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009), reality (Bhaskar, 1998b) and what might be known
by our senses, the explanation outlined by Chafetz serves a purpose in directing attention to
the purpose of theory generally and this chapter specifically.

Theory is generally utilised within the social work profession to direct attention to the
conditions that might prevent people from flourishing. Practice theory is generally utilised
to suggest interventions and is created from practice (Fook, 1996, cited in Healy &
Mulholland, 1998; Shannon & Young, 2004, p. 4). Interventions may be with individuals,
families, groups, communities and indeed at the level of societies. The International
Federation of Social Workers Global definition of social work embeds these kinds of foci
along with a professional notion of ‘the good’. For example:
Social work is a practice-based profession and an academic discipline that promotes
social change and development, social cohesion, and the empowerment and liberation
of people. Principles of social justice, human rights, collective responsibility and
respect for diversities are central to social work. Underpinned by theories of social
work, social sciences, humanities and indigenous knowledge, social work engages
people and structures to address life challenges and enhance wellbeing<
(International Federation of Social Workers, 2014)
In this chapter the focus is on the way social theory has assisted in the design of the study in
particular, and how this forms a combined melody that runs through and recurs at times
throughout this reflective rhapsody.

Three main theoretical perspectives have informed the study design. These perspectives
accomplish two main aims. The first aim was to use the perspectives to assist with situating
the research as a social work inquiry particularly. The second aim was to support the study
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design overall. The first perspective discussed is critical theory. The second theoretical
approach is interpretivism, in particular hermeneutics. The third is poststructuralism/postmodernism. These perspectives have different assumptions about reality
and the subject (Schwandt, 2000). Depending on the particular authors there can be links or
divisions between these different theoretical perspectives but it has been suggested they can
be combined by careful deployment at different levels of the inquiry (Alvesson & Sköldberg,
2009). Therefore it is in this sense that I wish to outline how each theoretical melody
contributes to the overall study and the choice of methods and analytical strategies.

Critical theory in social work refers to a range of theoretical perspectives rather than a single
theory, despite the use of the singular term ‘theory’ (Briskman, Pease, & Allan, 2009). As
mentioned above critical theory is a perspective that mostly assists in situating the study
within the professional sphere of social work as critical theory underpins a range of
approaches or perspectives within the discipline. These approaches are variously social
action models (Alinsky, 1969, cited in Hick et al., 2005, p. 3); radical social work (Bailey &
Brake, 1975; Healy, 2000); feminist perspectives (Thorpe & Petruchenia, 1990); antioppressive practice (Dominelli, 1998); and lastly critical social work practice (Healy, 2014).
Hick et al (2005) are worth quoting at length here as they provide a good synthesis of what
all these approaches have in common, which has become grouped within a critical social
work approach:


Larger social relations, whether we call them social structures, large scale social
processes or society, contribute to personal and social dislocation or personal
problems;



A self-reflexive and critical analysis of the social control functions of social work
practice and social policies;



Working with and for oppressed populations to achieve personal liberation and social
change;



Participatory rather than authoritarian practice relations between ‚worker‛ and
‚client‛; and
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Recognition that critical social work knowledge is itself socially produced and may
exclude the voices of those with the least power (p. 21).

It is possible to see the main tenets of a critical theoretical approach in this explanation,
which will be discussed more directly below. What social work has sought to do is
operationalise this body of social theory to make it amenable for practice purposes. This has
created a number of core principles for working with individuals, families, groups and
communities under the broad rubric of a critical social work approach (Healy, 2014). The
activities of self-reflexivity and critical analysis are central to this practice approach. These
are of interest to this study as they form a large part of the understanding of reflective
practice within social work education in Australia.
Theories as melodies
In my thinking about each of these perspectives as a kind of music critical theory would
have a strong protest melody20. My reason for this is the emphasis within critical theory on
oppressive social forces and the need and call for social change. Early critical theorists began
their protest by calling attention to positivism21 as the ‚most effective new form of capitalist
ideology‛ (Agger, 1991, p. 109) and how this ideology has served to prevent the socialist
revolution from occurring as predicted by Marx. Critical theorists are interested in using
critique as a way of changing social relations for the better. In contrast to the protest melody
of critical theory, interpretivist hermeneutics, somewhat obviously, could be likened to a
gospel22 melody where the music has a strong central harmony bringing together the parts
and the whole to reveal a range of truths about a phenomenon. One of the central aspects of

Protest music has no single melody and there are many different kinds of protest music much like there are
many different kinds of social movements (Eyerman & Jamison, 1998) and thus kinds of critical theory. Examples
from Australia would be blackfella/whitefella by the Warumpi Band; Yothu Yindi’s Treaty; Midnight Oil’s Beds are
burning and Archie Roach’s They took the children away (Rose, 2014)
21 Positivism refers to the movement within the social sciences to adopt methods developed in the study of the
natural sciences to study involving individuals and society. Objects for study must be observable and measurable
and this is the link to classical empiricism outlined above in the discussion of critical realist ontology. Growing
critique from the 1960s based on Marxist and humanist schools of thought saw this epistemology wane in use
across the social sciences according to Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009).
22 There are a number of genres within the term gospel music, however, the kind of gospel music I have in mind
here is that sometimes referred to as ‚gospel music‛ within the African-American community but others
sometimes refer to it as ‚*B+lack gospel music‛ (Shearon, Eskew, Downey, & Darden, 2015).
20
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gospel music relevant to thinking about this theory is the call-and-response23 aspect of the
music which could represent the social aspect of interpretivism especially in relation to the
co-creation of meaning and the intersubjective nature of human interpretation (Holmes,
2010; Schwandt, 1999) Lastly, post-structuralism is often characterised or discussed by what
it is not or what it is against as much as what it is or what it describes. Thus poststructuralism could be represented as a form of music that incorporates both older ideas and
which extends them using different sounds to create something new and different. The
music that exemplifies this idea for me is progressive rock. This kind of music is characterised
by longer songs (or epics); unexpected time changes; and complex instrumentation
including a range of instruments such as piano, strings, and wind instruments in addition to
the usual drums and guitars. Musicians in this genre often incorporate conceptual ideas into
their lyrics and arrangements, often developing concept albums to capture themes or
abstract lines of music over several songs (Prog Rock & Metal Internet Radio, 2015).

Just as there are subgenres of progressive rock it appears there are different forms of poststructuralism and postmodernism (Alvesson, 2002; Olssen, 2003). This study has not utilised
all aspects of critical theory, interpretivism or post-structuralism but has instead taken a lead
from Alvesson (Alvesson, 2002) and considered particular characteristics of each in
developing the study. With regard to post-structuralism the study has been particularly
influenced by the post-structuralism of Michel Foucault24.

This chapter will discuss each of these perspectives - critical theory, post-structuralism and
interpretive hermeneutics- in turn in order to outline the assumptions each contributes to
different levels of the inquiry. Lastly, the chapter will offer a brief discussion of how some
authors in social work have utilised these quite distinct perspectives within the broad rubric
of critical social work.
Call and response is ‚The performance of musical phrases or longer passages in alternation by different voices
or distinct groups, used in opposition in such a way as to suggest that they answer one another; it may involve
spatial separation of the groups, and contrasts of volume, pitch, timbre, etc‛ (Kernfeld, 2015, n. p.)
24 There is considerable debate about whether Foucault is a postmodern or post-structuralist author. According to
Agger (1991) Foucault joins Barthes, Lyotard and Baudrillard in the postmodern camp which is more concerned
with developing theories of society, history and culture. As Foucault himself disliked the term postmodernist I
have chosen to use the term post-structuralist after Alvesson (Alvesson, 2002).
23
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Melody 1: Protesting the state of the world - critical theory25
Critical social work is informed by a collection of critical theories that describe the way in
which structural conditions in society create problems for individuals and society. Thus
Palmer (2014) can assert that ‚*C+ritical theory is a collection of emancipatory theories
guiding action by exposing oppressive elements within structures and institutions in society
(such as in medicine, education, politics, religion and the media) which restrict and
constrain the human subject‛ (p. 62). Fay (1987, cited in Briskman et al., 2009, p. 5) suggests
that these theories offer a perspective on the sources of oppression that people experience in
society. Thus these theories are expected to act as guides to practice within the social work
discipline. There are a number of critical theories and they emerge from different traditions.
Critical theory can also come under a range of names within social theory and social
research (Agger, 2006). These are variously critical theory, critical perspective, criticalist
approaches, and critical inquiry (Gannon & Davies, 2012; Qualitative Research Guidelines
Project, 2006; Schwandt, 2007d). These terms may be different according to discipline. For
example in education the term criticalist perspective is often used. The term critical theory will
be utilised within the rest of this chapter to discuss the theory as that which is derived
primarily from a critique of positivism (Agger, 2006); and critical research will be utilised to
denote research that is informed by critical theory (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009).

Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009, p. 145) state that ‚critical theory is characterised by an
interpretative approach combined with a pronounced interest in critically disputing actual
social realities<its guiding principle is an emancipatory interest in knowledge<*and+ it
maintains a dialectical view of society, claiming that social phenomena must always be
viewed within their historical contexts‛. Many of the theoretical concepts about oppression
began with ideas developed in the 1930s by theorists who have become known as the
Frankfurt School (Briskman et al., 2009). Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009, pp. 144-145) also
suggest that critical theorists utilise methods of interpretation in research through which
these realities may be disputed. Accordingly, Kellner (1993) proposes that the early critical

I am grateful to Colleen Carlon, Rebecca Burn and Dr David Hodgson for discussions which contributed to my
thinking in this section.
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theorists looked to combine theory and practice together by ‚<attempting to articulate the
interconnections between the economy, state, society, culture, and individual experiences‛
(p. 47). Early critical theorists drew eclectically from economics, sociology, psychoanalysis
and philosophy and were influenced by Marx, Weber and Kant, as well as Freud and Hegel.
It is from the work of Hegel that critical theorists derive their emphasis on dialectical
processes where historical and social conditions are viewed within their social contexts
(Heywood, 2000). Indeed Kellner states that dialectics:
<for critical theorists, was the art of making connections and discerning
contradictions<opened the space for thought and action in the oppressively closed
totalitarian universes of fascism, Stalinism and<totally administered societies of
corporate capitalism. (p. 47)
Early critical theorists were generally pessimistic, influenced as they were by their contexts
in which fascism and totalitarian regimes had undermined the enlightenment ideals of social
development. These theories focus on the connections between the social, political (Leonard,
1997) and personal (Wearing & Marchant, 1986; Weedon, 1999). More important even than
describing and making connections between ‚ given, empirical social conditions and the
historical and social contexts in which they developed‛ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 145)
is the critical theory emphasis on social change.

The importance of this theoretical melody, this protest song against oppressive structural
forces, is two-fold. First, this body of knowledge has been, and continues to be cited heavily,
as central to notions of critical social work approaches (Fook & Kellehear, 2010; Fook &
Pease, 1999; Healy, 2014; Ife, 1997; Mullaly, 2007). Moreover, a key way the insights of
critical theory are translated into practice occurs through the mechanism of critical reflection
(Fook, 1996a, 2002; Fook & Gardner, 2007; Morley, 2004; Morley & Dunstan, 2012). These
models may be seen as a particular disciplinary response to neo-liberal programmes within
the welfare state (Bay & Macfarlane, 2010; Wallace & Pease, 2011). Hence, a thorough
understanding of this theory is necessary to aid the comprehension of the use of it within the
social work professions engagement of reflective practice models.
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Second, critical theory offers a sustained critique of objective social science as it has pointed
out that the ‚<ideological-political dimension of social research [that can] be made subject
to reflection‛ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 145). As mentioned previously the early
critical theorists saw positivism as the ideology that sustained capitalist modes of
production (Agger, 1991) and by extension fostered unequal and oppressive social
relationships. Of particular interest was the way in which science articulates a value free
language about social ‘facts’, which then ‚promotes passivity and fatalism‛ (Agger, 1991)
about social conditions. Later critical theorist Jurgen Habermas, in developing his
communicative theory, would distinguish between self-reflection/communication and
causality/technical rationality (Owen, 1999).

Agger (1991; see also Benhabib, 1984) suggests that this distinction undermined the
emancipatory aspects of the critical theory project as it left the sciences intact through the
suggestion that emancipation would instead come from dialogue in the communicative
sphere of the lifeworld. The various conditions under which dialogue as discussed by
Habermas have been subjected to intense critique (Dryzek, 1990). Despite this, social work
theorists would later find resonance between the work of Habermas and Donald Schon
(1983). Schon developed an epistemology of practice which became known as reflective
practice. The combination of an epistemology of practice with the communicative theory of
Habermas centred on the operations of dialogue which would be foundational to the social
work model of critical reflection developed by social work academic Jan Fook (1999).

Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009) make the point that critical theory and ‚ < its level of
abstraction often lies at some remove from the questions, concepts and interpretation that
typify empirical research‛ (p. 145). This makes translation of the theoretical insights of
critical theory into critical research methods and procedures frequently difficult. These
authors propose, therefore, some methodological principles for how critical theory may be
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used to inform empirical26 social research. These methodological principles for critical
research relate to the role of empirical materials; the importance of theoretical ideas in the
conduct of critical research; and the use of a hermeneutic notion of interpretative levels from
which such theory might be applied. As mentioned above, critical research is interested in
problematising social relations that are represented as natural and given and so the kinds of
theory utilised are emancipatory in flavour. Thus, critical research questions thus should be
directed to problematising dominant and oppressive social relations. In this research the
questions are directed at problematising a taken-for-granted practice within the discipline of
social work by asking from where this practice has emerged and in what ways it might be
understood.

This problematisation process of critical research extends to consideration of the politics of
who is undertaking the research (Fine, Weis, Weseen, & Wong, 2000) and the production of
knowledge through the work of interpretation (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000). In this study
critical theory has been utilised to pay attention to the ideological-political dimensions of the
research in addition to answering the aims of the study with regard to reflective practice.
Thus, the research has been conducted with the notion that there is no position from which
to interrogate the practice of reflection which is not also context-dependent and thus valueladen (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

As a result, the choice of methods is to a great extent an interpretative and political activity
as these choices are able to ‚differently produce, reveal, and enable the display of different
identities‛ (Fine & Weis, 1996, cited in Fine et al., 2000, p. 119). Thus the autoethnographic
account presents and explores a range of different identities from student, practitioner and
educator. These subject positions are ones that emerged from the careful and strategic use of
an archaeological analytic deployed to consider the emergence of this practice within the

Empirical research here merely means that kind of research with tightly established procedures for handling
data such as grounded theory. Alvesson and Skoldberg use the term ‘empirical’ to describe data materials as the
bedrock of social research and acknowledge the various objections to pure empiricism rather than as a particular
research approach often associated with positivism (p. 3). This includes work with secondary data material in
addition to interviews and accounts of people’s experience. I am taking my lead from their work and using it in a
similar way.
26
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discipline. The use of critical theory to inform a program of problematisation within this
research is therefore explicit.

Alvesson (2002) writes about the issue of researcher reflexivity and suggests that the usual
social research approach is to include the ‚researcher-self and its significance in the research
process‛ (p. 171). Alvesson (2002) with his colleague (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) advocate
a broader conception of reflexivity which ‚< stands for conscious and systematic efforts to
view the subject matter from different angles, and to avoid strongly privileging a favoured
one‛ (171). Just as not all protest music is loud, this research has utilised a subtle approach
to the deployment of critical theory. What makes this an overall critical research project is
therefore the careful deployment of different methods and theories through which to view
the subject matter of reflective practice. I turn now to discuss the elements of poststructuralism, which has also informed the study.

Melody 2: Post-structuralism – new sounds with old instruments
It is difficult to consider post-structuralism without discussing the impact of structuralism
across social theory in a wide range of disciplines. Brewer (2003) suggests that broadly
structuralism is ‚any approach in the social sciences that accords primacy to social
structures over human agency‛ (p. 309). In according primacy to structural forces social
theorists considered a range of areas such culture (Levi-Strauss, 1958); history of the human
sciences (Foucault, 1972); ideology and the state (Althusser, 1968); and, psychoanalysis via
Lacan (see Sarup, 1993, pp. 5-29). What structuralism demonstrated was ‚*humans+ are
subject to the structural forces that envelope [them]; not free of them – prisoners of the
unconscious mind, of discursive formations, of systems of signs or sets of social relations
rooted in the system of production‛ (Brewer, 2003, p. 310). In terms of social work theorising
this movement towards understanding structural forces was picked up early by radical
social workers unhappy with traditional methods of casework that tended to see the
problems people experience as being firmly seated within individual agency and pathology
(Bailey & Brake, 1975; Rojek, Collins, & Peacock, 1988). This focus on structural forces was
then elaborated through the work of Peter Leonard (1975); Bob Mullaly (1997, 2007); Nigel
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Parton (2000) and later through critical authors in Australia such as Bob Pease and Jan Fook
(1993).

Brewer (2003) goes further to state that post-structuralism is an extension of structuralism
rather than a suggestion that structuralism was wrong in its approach to the description of
structures, relations and forces. This explains why many authors discuss them together
(Olssen, 2003; Sarup, 1993). Moreover, Sarup (1993) earlier had explained that both bodies of
theory may be seen as critiques. Additionally, both theoretical perspectives maintain similar
critiques on certain topics within social theory. These notions centre on the human subject as
based on a Cartesian notion of reason27 (Olssen, 2003); the uses of a particular kind of
historicism28 or pattern to the play of events in social theory; and, the issue of meaning and
the relations between the sign and signifier; or as Olssen (2003) outlines:
*structuralism+<dispensed with the ‘correspondence’ theory of language or truth
which saw them as representing reality as a transparent reflection (or expression) of
the real. Rather than categories and concepts taking their origins and meaning from
the nature of the world, they were determined by the nature of language, as well as the
contingent historical factors that shaped language.(p. 190)
With regard to the structures, however structuralists tended to emphasise these as ‚fairly
constant and unchanging<*S+ocieties appear to change more than they actually do, since
social change rarely involves a dramatic shift in the underlying structure‛ (Brewer, 2003).
This is to produce a history where structures determine social relations. In contrast poststructuralists remain more interested in discontinuities (Dean, 1994). Thus Sarup (1993) says
that ‚*P+ost-structuralism<involves a critique of metaphysics, of the concepts of causality,
of identity, of the subject and of truth‛ (p. 3). For social work theorists this translated into
the adoption of only parts of a post-structural critique because not all aspects sit comfortably
This idea of a Cartesian subject derives from the famous dictum ‚I think, therefore I am‛ of Descartes, which
‚presupposes that man *sic+ is a free, intellectual agent and that thinking processes are not coerced by historical
or cultural circumstances‛ (Sarup, 1993, p. 1). It has been the centre of a range of critiques from feminist
philosophers (Benhabib, 1992; Griffiths, 1995; McAfee, 2009) and post-structuralists (Foucault, 1972).
28 Sarup (1993) discusses historicism as the idea that the present is superior and has direct relations to the past
and thus travels a trajectory of development from one state to another characterised by events that explain the
present in the context of what went before. Historicism implies a continuous idea of events (Dean, 1994), whereas
this critique from structuralists and post-structuralists alike develops a discontinuous notion of history, which is
more contingent than causal (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).
27
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with the broad humanism of the profession (Ife, 1997, 1999), a humanism that inhabits the
centre of a social work raison d’etre.

It could also be said that not all those theorists associated with post-structuralism consider
the same aspects of knowledge and reality such as identity, issues of causality, or
metaphysics or truth mentioned above. Rather, theorists take up different aspects as a
program of inquiry, just as progressive rock musicians take up different aspects of the music
and extend these to produce different sounds and ideas. Different poststructuralists stress
different critical aspects depending on their specific focus and thus there are different poststructuralisms. Hence, not all of the insights from this ‚thought collective29‛ (Dean, 2014)
have been utilised in the study design; instead, I have sought to leverage different elements
to develop different lines of interpretation on the topic of reflective practice. Below I will
discuss the specific post-structural insights that have been useful to this study. I have
primarily relied on the early work of Foucault with regard to the development of an
archaeological analytic (Foucault, 1972) and thus my use of post-structural theory has been
primarily in aid of problematising the practice of reflection as well as to unsettle identity and
subjectivity as an essentialism.

The debate introduced by post-structuralists about the issue of truth has informed the
approach to this study. Post-structuralists disagree with the idea that it is possible to find an
ultimate truth hidden, or within, the subject, the text or sign. Sarap (1993) suggests that this
is because post-structuralists de-emphasise the sign and instead concentrate on the signified.
What this means is that ‘reading’ assumes significance as a productivity relation whereas
structuralists presumed stability with regard to the sign. Consequently ‘readers’ are given as
equal weight with regard to making meaning as the author/speaker within post-structural
theory. This means that for structuralists, while the reading of a text or sign, may be
predetermined by stability of meaning within the sign, this is not the case for post29

Dean uses the term ‚thought collective‛ after Mirowski (2009, cited in Dean, 2014, p. 152) to denote ‚an
organized group of individuals exchanging ideas within a common intellectual framework‛. While these
theorists may share a common framework, their theories may overlap or depart from one another on specific
aspects. I have adopted this term here as the same could be said of post-structural thinkers such as Jacques
Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault.
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structuralists. Post-structuralists such as Derrida (1966) considered this stability to be
mythical as in his view there is no outside reference to reality that would anchor the sign.
Indeed Bolton (2012) suggests that instead signs are nested within other signs and that this
chain of signification has no end. This also means deconstruction of texts and signs may
also be unending. The unending nature of deconstruction is one of the main criticisms of this
approach and Derrida specifically (Baert, Weinberg, & Mottier, 2011). In this study this idea
is important to understanding the account here about reflective practice is partial. It has also
been utilised to eschew attributing what is spoken, written or practiced with regard to
reflective practice to the single consciousness of the author, particularly with regard to the
archaeological stage of the study.

The unending nature of deconstruction connects to the second of the main features of a
poststructural theory or melody utilised within this study. This is the feature that history is
not patterned by one event leading inevitably to another event making the present
understandable in terms of the past nor is the present leading to an ultimate end. This idea
that the present is an outgrowth of past is one of the syntheses or unities outlined by
Foucault (1972) which is seen to be at odds with the deployment of an archaeological
analytic. Thus, Sarap (1993) can say that Foucault rejected the ‚Hegelian teleological model,
in which one mode of production flows dialectically out of another<‛ (p. 58). In fact, this
rejection of the dialectic is part of the reason for adopting an explicitly poststructural stance
in the study. It works in juxtaposition to the embedded dialectic present in both critical
theory and interpretivism (Conant, Kern, & Abel, 2014). The post-structural rejection of a
history as events across a total horizon was important to this study because it offered a way
to explore reflective practice within the social work field without tying it to events or ideas
that existed previously as natural developments of previous practices. Instead, the
archaeological analytic allowed for understanding the emergence of reflective practice as
contingent and thus part of wider discursive regimes operating across the field.

The third aspect of post-structuralism that has informed this study is the critique of
subjectivity and the associated issues with viewing individuals as ‚the bearer of meaning
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and as an active and ‚ < acting subject around which the social world revolves‛ (Alvesson
& Sköldberg, 2009). Thus, in the archaeology it was possible to discern different kinds of
subjectivity at the centre of the emergence of reflective practice and these had more or less
dominant positions within the subsequent dispersion of the practice and its associated
models and modes of thinking. Within the autoethnography, exploration of the different
subjective position of teacher, researcher, student and woman allowed an interrogation of
that ‚space between the position of subject offered by a discourse *or discourses+ and
individual interest‛ (Weedon, 1997, p. 109) to illuminate places of resistance. In the
interviews conducted as part of this study the relation between subjectivity and language
utilised by interviewees formed part of the focus of the analysis. As Alvesson (2011, p. 99)
remarks, in discussing the metaphor in relation to interviews, the focus of this kind of
analysis is ‚how the discourses are making themselves present in the interview situation,
working on the subject<‛ (p. 99).

In sum, post-structural theory has informed the study through a focus on subjectivity as an
emergent construct constituted from the operation of language practices and discursive
regimes within a specific field, which is local, limited and specific. It has picked up these
aspects through careful, targeted use of some elements of post-structuralism which enable
problematisation at different levels. Thus the study does not purport to offer a total account
of reflective practice displaced from its context and universal in its description. I turn now to
consider the third melody of the study, that is interpretivism, and in particular,
hermeneutics.

Melody 3: Interpretivist hermeneutics – Gospel music
It could be said that social work comes to interpretivist approaches and the incorporation of
lived experience into social work practice through something of a tortured route. Early
social workers were concerned with documenting the effects of poverty and problems of
living using case methods initially developed in such a way as to be investigations of
problems in the environment shaped by social conditions (Shaw, 2014). Indeed, Shaw
suggests that the mutual influence between sociology and social work saw the unique
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development of ‚casework‛ into something that incorporated the social conditions,
inasmuch as what the people at the centre of these conditions thought about these
conditions. Later social workers would shift tack for a time as they ‚… swallowed the elixir
of psychodynamic explanation‛ (Shaw, 2014, p. 762). Psychodynamics or psychoanalysis is,
according to Epstein (1994) ‚< one of the four governing faiths of modernism [along with]
<capitalism, Marxism and democracy‛ (p. 3). Thus social work researchers were part of
early movements in social research concerned with establishing ‘new’ methods of social
science in addition to instituting a ‘scientific’ base for the profession. Different approaches to
methods would for a period of time divide the profession (Cornwell, 1975; Epstein, 1999)

Subsequently, the emphasis on using methods associated with natural sciences changed in
social work as in the social sciences with the advent of various critiques of this position put
forward by the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) and the
ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel (1917-2011) (Gubrium & Holstein, 2000). Robbins,
Chatterjee, Canda, Richardson and Franklin (2012) suggest, however, that it was not until
the 1970s that interpretivist thought permeated the social work discipline with much force. It
showed itself in practices such as ‚existential psychology, Gestalt psychology, and
humanistic therapies such as Rogerian client-centred practice‛ (p. 337). These therapies and
approaches place human meaning making at the core of the process for working with
service-users. Moreover, Robbins et al (2012) place phenomenology, social constructionism
and postmodernism together as united by their considerable critiques of positivism (
Robbins et al., 2012).

The other element that unites these theoretical perspectives is a sense of how reality might
be constructed, an insight that owes its roots to the work by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2000). Actually, Gubrium and Holstein assert that ‚although the term
construction came into fashion much later, we might say that consciousness constructs as
much as it perceives the world‛ (p. 488). It is Husserl’s philosophy that provides an
emphasis on how human consciousness is structured and what this makes possible in terms
of perception. Gubrium and Holstein (2000) suggest that Schutz extended the philosophy of
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Husserl into consideration of everyday life. Central to this process is that of empathic
identification (Schwandt, 2000) where the interpreter is able to create understanding through
a ‚<psychological re-enactment – getting inside the head of the actor to understand what he
or she is up to in terms of motives, beliefs, desires, thoughts and so on‛ (Schwandt, 2000, p.
192). The idea of individuals and social actors as active and conscious in their perceptions of
the social world is an important aspect of social work carried forth from the impact of this
theoretical perspective. It is an idea that permeates many of the contemporary theories and
models within the discipline (Saleebey, 1997) and can be seen in the emergence recently in a
new reflective practice approach (Pawar & Anscombe, 2015).

This interaction between individual consciousness and the social world is at the centre of
interpretivist concerns. There is a call and response aspect to this interaction in
interpretivism where individual lifeworlds are shaped by both the individual and the social
conditions in which they find themselves (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). This is echoed in
certain kinds of gospel music where the song emerges through the pattern of call and
response. In some respects the call and response pattern may also be seen in critical theory if
the use of dialectics is privileged in particular. In my discussion of critical theory, however, I
have taken my lead from social work theorists who emphasise the structural aspects instead,
although even here dialectics between structures and individual outcomes are often
assumed. I have chosen to down play this aspect of critical theory and instead use an
interpretivist notion of consciousness. This is why I have chosen to consider this theoretical
perspective separately from both critical theory and post-structuralism.

There are, of course, significant links between this melody and critical theory particularly;
less so with the other melody of post-structuralism, which in some aspects critiques the
central premises of the theory centred on understanding (Schwandt, 1999). These links are
through the way various theorists have drawn from work by Martin Heidegger30 and

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was a German philosopher who wrote Being and Time (1927), which can be
considered influential to the development of ‚Satre’s existentialism; Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, and
Derrida’s notion of deconstruction‛ (Wheeler, 2014). It is through Heidegger that the work of Nietzsche finds
itself in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009)
30
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Friedrich Nietzsche31 leading to some kinds of interpretivism to be discussed as either a
hermeneutics of existence or hermeneutics of suspicion32. The aspect of the interpretivist melody
foregrounded within this study is the process of building understanding about the
phenomenon of reflective practice.

Interpretivism centres on the issue of understanding or versterhen in social life. Blaikie (2004)
suggests therefore that the term covers broad theoretical perspectives that share a common
ontology and epistemology and which are concerned with ‚*t+he study of social phenomena
requires an understanding of the social worlds that people inhabit, which they have already
interpreted by the meanings they produce and reproduce as a necessary part of their
everyday activities‛ (p. 509). There are three assumptions and commitments that
characterise interpretivism. The first assumption is that ‚human action is meaningful‛
(Schwandt, 2000, p. 193). The second is more of a commitment to ‚<respect for and fidelity
to the lifeworld‛ (Schwandt, 2000, p. 193). The third assumption concerns human
subjectivity, and the claim that it is possible to ‚<understand the subjective meanings of
action (grasping the beliefs, desires, and so on) yet do so in an objective manner‛ (Schwandt,
2000). This last assumption is the one which has been debated extensively within social
research methods as it assumes the interpreter is able to bracket their own historical and
social location in providing the interpretation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). It is also the main
point of departure for philosophical hermeneuticians (Schwandt, 2000) and poststructuralists (Gannon & Davies, 2012) albeit in different directions.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) has been a significant influence on modern social thought and according to
Wicks (2014) this influence was especially felt in French philosophical circles across the period 1960-1980. His
work influenced the development of a range of different social theory but was perhaps most influential in the
development of post-structural thought, particularly through the adoption of genealogy in Foucault’s work for
the tracing of power knowledge relations. In interpretivist thought Nietzsche is sometimes included in a
hermeneutics of suspicion along with Marx and Freud (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).
32 Hermeneutics of suspicion is a term used to describe any kind of hermeneutics that questions truth status of
understanding. This kind of hermeneutics is also called radical (Schwandt, 2007c) because it not only questions
truth claims but also the very conditions under which understanding might be achieved. It is this distinction
with regard to the conditions that sets it apart from Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics according to
Schwandt. Interestingly, critical hermeneutics associated with Jurgen Habermas share some aspects from both the
hermeneutics of suspicion and philosophy (Schwandt, 2007f).
31
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This is not without its debates in terms of how such meanings and social worlds can be
understood. Moreover the meanings that might be attributed to actions, behaviours, and
events by social actors could be different to what the social researcher might make of the
same event or behaviour. Early theorists such as Weber (1864-1920) and Schutz (1899-1959)
were keen to develop an objectivist approach to social subjectivity. Despite a focus on
processes for studying social life, developed as distinct from that of the natural sciences,
early hopes remained that broadly comparative social statistical measures and a focus on the
meaning abstracted from that of the social actor would offer theories of social life at a
‚higher level of generality‛ (Blaikie, 2004, p. 509). Debates over this possibility and methods
resulted in different kinds of interpretivism, in the end primarily united by a common
rejection of positivism. Not all of kinds of interpretivism, however, are included within the
gospel melody of this study.

According to Schwandt (2007g) there are two main variants under the term phenomenology:
existentialist and hermeneutic. Phenomenological existentialism has been influential within
social work for theoretical perspectives such as those mentioned previously: gestalt
psychology (Congress, 1996), existential social work (Krill, 1996), transpersonal theories of
social work (Cowley, 1996). To some degree it has also informed the client centred
approaches adopted from work by humanist psychologists Abraham Maslow (1908-1970)
and Carl Rogers’ (1902-1987) and Pamela Trevithick (2011). The influence of this
interpretivist perspective probably occurred due to its development in universities and
schools of social work in the United States particularly post war (Schwandt, 2000). The
theoretical perspective in use in this study is that of hermeneutics, in particular, that
associated with Hans Georg Gadamer, which is more associated with the European
tradition. This tradition is concerned with prospect of ‚ < get beneath or behind subjective
experience to reveal the genuine, objective nature of things‛ (Schwandt, 2007g), and as a
critique of both taken-for-granted meanings and subjectivism. In contrast the existential
interpretivism associated with Ricoeur (1913-2005) is concerned primarily with
understanding the everyday social meanings people attach to their lifeworlds (Schwandt
2007g). In this study interpretative techniques devised by hermeneutic scholars have been
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adopted to aid in developing relations between the individual studies and the research as a
whole.

Originating in the study of biblical texts, hermeneutics is still concerned with the study of
texts, however the idea of what constitutes a text has shifted with successive generations of
theorists in this tradition (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). This meant that by Gadamer’s time
what is meant by texts had broadened to include any social phenomena that could be
converted or rendered into a textual form (Linsenmeyer, 2015). In hermeneutics,
interpretation occurs through the attempts to understand the meaning of a phenomenon
through considering the whole in relation to the parts and completing movements between
the parts through their relation to the whole (Higgs & Paterson, 2005). Again, empathic
identification is central to this movement between understanding the part of a phenomena
and its relation to a whole context (Schwandt, 2000).

The overarching question of this research is clearly an interpretive question as it is
concerned with developing understanding about reflective practice in social work
education. The design of the study is broadly hermeneutic because it develops this
understanding through explicit movements between a broad scale understanding of
reflective practice as a professional project through to various examinations of its use and
value in the lives of practitioners, educators and students. The hermeneutic movement of the
study also occurs through various exegeses written as a means of outlining the relation
between each individual study, the construction of the text and the main question of the
research as a whole. Thus, in this research, the texts to be interpreted using a hermeneutic
process are the following: texts constructed by me as the researcher/researched in the form
of an autoethnographic study (Ellis & Bochner, 2000); an archive derived from the
deployment of an archaeological analytic (Bernauer, 1990); and, asking questions of the text
created from qualitative interviews (Ayres, 2008; Kvale, 1996).

Combining melodies
How do you bring melodies together? There are places where music might come together to
form a background harmony for the whole piece. Table 1 below sets out the positions about
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which each perspective has something to contribute: delineating objects of research/concern;
subjects; what orientation to thinking is involved and ethical concerns. Each theory
approaches these aspects differently. Consequently I have constructed a table which offers a
snapshot of how each perspective considers issues of concern to this research study.
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Table 1: Key aspects of each theoretical melody important to this study
Contribution

Critical theory

Post-structuralism

Interpretivism

Object of research

Social relations, structures
and human experiences
society, power, relation
between individuals and
society.

A critique of historicity,
meaning, language and
human subject (Sarup,
1993.)

Human experience.

Subjects

Individuals, agents (Jary &
Jary, 2005)

Discursive and
subjectivising practices
(Rose, 1996, 2008); subjects

Human beings.

Orientation to thinking

Dialectical (Leonard, 1997),
analytic, evaluative and
communicative (Tully,
1989).

Problematising, analytic,
genealogical (Koopman,
2013).

Analytic, evaluative,
understanding,
interpretation (Tully, 1989).

Ethics is addressed to
rebalancing the unequal
distribution of power and
resources for individuals
and communities (Koggel &
Orme, 2010).

Interrogation and critique
form the basis of an ethics of
the self that addresses
power/knowledge practices
(James & Wilson, 2011).

Human beings and
experience are a central
ethical concern (Twomey,
2015).

(practices of critical
reflection) (Owen, 1999)
Ethics

As can be noted there are significant areas of agreement amongst these theoretical
perspectives and some areas where the approach to subjects, objects, ideas about reality,
reflexivity and embodiment are in fact quite distinct. The lines of inquiry pursued in this
research privilege certain parts of these theoretical perspectives over others. For example
embodiment, subjectivities and reflexive engagements are a core theme of the autoethnographic
research. In the archaeology, by contrast attention is paid to the way in which discourses,
freed from being situated in individual consciousness, shapes the subjectivities available for
social workers with regard to theory, practice and reflection as a tool for professional
learning. In the qualitative interviews the experience of social work educators, practitioners
and students is placed in the centre to consider the kinds of social work reflective practice
makes possible and visible in contemporary practice.

Conclusion
Thus the study has made use of these different theoretical perspectives: the protest songs of
critical theory have provided a focus on connections between the personal and political,
social structures and outcomes for individuals; the soaring riffs and epic strains of
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progressive rock help visualise and describe a social landscape that moves and changes and
is emergent and contingent; and, the call and response gospel sound can be likened to
hermeneutics, which supplies the movement from part to whole and back again. These
theories have informed distinct and specific melodies for the purposes of this research.

The next two chapters engage in a more in-depth discussion of the study design. I begin in
the chapter three with the big questions of placing the research within the context of the
philosophy of social science. I do this through a consideration of questions of ontology and
epistemology. The chapter concludes with my description of the research design using a
reflexive methodology. In chapter four I discuss the methods of all three studies.
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Inte rlude 2
T h e o r i e s a n d my o w n i r r a t i o n a l i t y
I like to think of myself as a rational person. Further I like to think that my adoption of
various theories has been largely informed by careful and systematic study of relevant ideas
about my topic. And yet<and yet<
As I came to write about my use of theory in relation to the study I found my reasons for
rejecting some ideas over others were less rational than I had previously imagined. Some
theories were more beloved than others and I found often for no good reason other than I
seemed to ‘get’ these more easily than others. With others I had to work harder to
understand what the theorist was trying to explain. It was tempting, of course to go with the
theories that came easily<ones I had learned well and which fit so neatly with the
professional learning I had already undertaken. I found I had held onto ideas about these
theories from my undergraduate socialisation that made them feel like a pair of softly worn
leather gloves. Sigh, oh so lovely and comforting and familiar<
But there were surprises< my understanding of theory was akin to knowing theory like a
person might know a pair of Nike shoes through the term Just do it! (Peters, 2009) I knew the
taglines pretty well but as it turned out not much about the theory beyond that. Some of
these taglines are ‚unfair privilege accrues to some groups by way of their class, ethnicity,
and gender‛; ‚economic rationalism is a scourge against social justice‛; ‚hierarchy is bad‛;
and ‚the personal is political‛. And while I could, at a stretch, trace them to undergraduate
sociology, politics and gender studies my overall understanding of where these ideas came
from was sketchy at best. I don’t disagree that there may be truth (!) in these pithy taglines
but expanding beyond to understand precisely what it means in practical and theoretical
terms took some effort.
Worse still I had developed some pretty strong biases towards some ideas over others, not
based in how well they explain a problem of practice or research – no, that would be
rational, right? No, these biases had more to do with who liked or used the particular theory
amongst my various circles of acquaintance. I found I had rejected some ideas, theorists and
possibly even whole bodies of knowledge based on whether a previous lecturer or colleague
with whom I may have developed a disagreement, or with whom I disagreed about issues
used those ideas or not. Thus it seemed I was applying another kind of rule of thumb or
shorthand. Such-and-such likes and uses theory Y; I like such-and-such so therefore I will
probably like theory Y too. So-and-so uses theory X and I disagree with their world view
about most things, therefore I reject theory X as well.
Saves a lot of time<
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Cha pter 3
A l b u m n o t e s 3 - P h i l o s o p h y a n d Me t h o d o l o g y

Introduction
This chapter is part of the album notes. This chapter is written in two main sections. The first
section contains a discussion of the philosophical considerations of ontology and
epistemology. I discuss the way in which a critical realist approach combined with a weak
social constructionism supplies a focus for choosing the methodology for the study. In the
second section this methodological approach is outlined. Before commencing section one I
present a musical analogy for research design, starting with ontology.

How does the philosophical and methodological design of the study relate
to the creation of this reflective rhapsody?
It is possible to think about music philosophically, epistemologically and methodologically.
However this is not the primary purpose of this research. In this brief section I instead offer
an analogy of how one might place music in the context of discussions of ontology through
to method and analysis. This analogy is meant to serve my wider purposes in presenting the
philosophical, epistemological and methodological thinking behind the study.

Beginning with ontology we might ask ‚< what kind of thing is a musical sound or a
musical work?‛ (Goehr, Sparshott, Bowie, & Davies, 2015, n. p.). These authors suggest that
philosophers of music have spent more time on the second part of the question than the first.
Nevertheless, thinking about music philosophically occurred at the same time as many of
the great debates about knowledge, science, aesthetics and subjectivity (Bowie, n. d). In the
case here it is beyond my purposes to do more than acknowledge that music exists and that
music works in a particular way (Goehr et al., 2015) and therefore I must leave the
discussion of what kind it is to the music philosophers.
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Music and art have been subjected to many of the same philosophical debates and have been
part of the same inventive and innovative spirit that characterised the period beginning in
1700s (Howard Goodall, 2013). These inventions and innovations changed the way we create
music in the modern period especially in the West (Goodall & Jeffcock, 2006). Like the
Greeks and their many terms and ways of categorising knowledge (Thomas, 2007), the same
can be seen in the ways different arrangements of notes occurred over time; these were
called modes33. Eventually, to facilitate different instruments for different musical effects two
scales34 were created. Epistemology could be likened to the different scales or modes
available for producing different kinds of music, just as different epistemologies result in
different kinds of approaches to knowledge.

What these different scales and modes enable in terms of music was the creation of different
genres. This is similar to how different epistemologies resulted in different approaches to
research design. The classification of music into genres has a long history going back to
Aristotle and the study of genre has developed into two main forms (Samson, n. d.). The
first is a branch based on analysing music for its aesthetics. This approach has its roots in
literary theory. The second approach is based on understanding the communicative function
of music in a social and historical sense (Samson, n. d.). Thus in my analogy genre in music
could be likened to methodology in research design in two respects: the relation to
epistemology and the classification according to the universalist-relativist continuum
(Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Lastly, to bring this discussion to a close, let us turn to briefly touch on the place of methods
and analysis within this analogy between music and philosophy of social science and
research design. For my purposes methods can be likened to the forms of instrumentation
needed for producing various arrangements for the performance of analysis. These forms of
instrumentation are discussed in chapter four. In terms of analysis, I have likened this to the
Modes are the way in which groups of notes were arranged to create different mood effects (Goodall &
Jeffcock, 2006). Examples are Ionian, Dorian and Aeolian modes.
34 These are the major scale and the minor scales in use today. The major scale was largely adopted from the
Ionian mode, whereas the minor scale was created out of an amalgamation of the Dorian and Aeolian modes
(Goodall & Jeffcock, 2006, n. p.)
33
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performance of research. While this outline of my musical analogy could be taken much
further and given more depth for tracing connections between philosophy of social science
and methodology space forbids more than this brief survey. The rest of this chapter instead
presents an outline of the ontological, epistemological and methodological issues pertinent
to this research and in relation to researching reflective practice. I begin with a discussion of
ontology and critical realism.

Critical realism35
Ontology is the study of kinds and their respective qualities and is often tied to philosophy of
science. This means that the study of ontology involves asking questions about the status of
beings/kinds in the universe (Hacking, 2002). According to Bhaskar (1998), there are three
main traditions in the philosophy of science concerned with the issue of being. These are
classical empiricism, transcendental idealism and his proposed perspective called
transcendental realism. Classical empiricism incorporates amongst others the idea that the
world may be known through sense-experience and that ‚knowledge is a surface on which
facts appear‛ (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 19). This tradition proposes that experience may correspond
with reality and that it is apprehendable through this. This tradition also considers that there
is little distinction between natural kinds and social kinds. In social science this ontology is
most often associated with the epistemological position of positivism (Lincoln & Guba, 2000,
p. 165). While this study has not employed an empirical ontology, it has utilised studies and
research that proceed from the basic premises of this tradition.

The second tradition, of transcendental idealism, considers that kinds are in effect like
models or ideals and therefore they are not independent of human cognition. Indeed,
knowledge of beings comes from the minds of humans. Further, this perspective holds that
this knowledge is thus a ‚structure rather than a surface‛ (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 19). This
perspective has been described as constructivism by Lincoln and Guba (2000) and the
position underpins a wide array of epistemologies including social constructionism and
interpretivism. As this study utilises methods within these epistemological traditions the
35

I am grateful to Dr David Hodgson for several discussions which assisted in focussing this section.
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premise that human cognitive activity creates a structure through which kinds become
knowable has been included in this study. This is to the extent that two of the methods
within the study assume a knowing subject that can account for the experience of being
reflective.

The last tradition is that of transcendental realism36 where knowledge is generated by objects
in the universe. This is the tradition that has most influenced the study here. Critical realism
in this sense makes three main claims in terms of ontology. The first is that knowledge of the
universe produced by scientific activity involves two distinct sides (Bhaskar, 1998). The
second claim is that reality is stratified into three domains: the real, the actual and the
empirical. The third claim involves the prospect of building knowledge of causal tendencies
when generative mechanisms, events or structures may emerge in the domain of the real
and thus may or may not be observed by the methods of science. These claims have
significance to this study because they provide an ontological basis for the use of different
methods of inquiry at the epistemological and theoretical level in the study. I will discuss
each in turn.

The notion that there may be two ways to think about kinds or beings was also canvassed by
Ian Hacking in his discussion of ontology in the context of delineating social constructionism
(Hacking, 1999). For Hacking the two sides may be divided between interactive and
indifferent kinds. The terms intransitive and the transitive used by critical realists (Archer,
1998; Outhwaite, 1998) are broadly correspondent with some slight differences. The
difference is that Hacking divides the dimensions by using the notion of interactivity and
thus in the indifferent category he includes objects such as rocks, quarks and stars. For
critical realists, the intransitive may also contain people, beliefs, and concepts (Al-Amoudi,
2007, p. 545). Critical realism divides the dimensions on the basis of dependence on human
activity (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 16). Thus the transitive describes ‚< the antecedently established
facts and theories, paradigms and models, methods and techniques of inquiry available to a
Transcendental realism has become known as critical realism following the shortening of the terms critical
naturalism and transcendental realism according to Bhaskar (1998a). For the rest of this discussion the term critical
realism will be utilised.
36
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particular scientific school, or worker‛ (p. 16) and from which knowledge of these objects
emerges. In Hacking’s schema this would be the interactive side (Hacking, 1999).

The difference between the intransitive and transitive are important to critical realist ideas
about reality. The objects in the intransitive can be known by science but their existence
would continue even if science did not exist to know them (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 16). Bhaskar
contends that this is not the case for the transitive. Namely, one could conceive of a world
where the moon still rises without an explanation of how that occurs using concepts from
science. It is not possible to imagine a science without concepts, established facts or theories
through which knowledge about kinds becomes known. Bhaskar (1998a) is worth quoting at
length on the significance of intransivity:
The Western philosophical tradition has mistakenly and anthropocentrically reduced
the question of what we can know. This is the epistemic fallacy <epitomised by
concepts like the ‘empirical world’. Science is a social product, but the mechanisms it
identifies operates prior to and independently of their discovery < (italics original, p.
xii)
Thus critical realism suggests that there may be objects within the intransitive that can be
known only partially through methods of inquiry that originate from the transitive
dimension. I turn now to consider the second claim of critical realism.

The second claim of critical realists is that reality can be conceptualised as stratified into
domains (Houston, 2001). These domains are known as the empirical, the actual and the real.
It is in the empirical that we have those structures, mechanisms and events that may be
observed through experience. This is the narrowest domain of the three. The domain called
the actual, while containing the structures, mechanisms and events described in the
empirical, also has within it objects which may be beyond the researcher to record or
observe. Lastly the domain of the real is considered to be the domain that is the most
extensive and also contains aspects of reality from which events, structures and objects may
emerge into the other domains but which are unable to be known through current scientific
methods. The role of the scientist therefore is to understand structures, events and
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mechanisms that occur and emerge in these domains and how these relate to one another (R.
Bhaskar, 1998).

According to Outhwaite (1998) the third claim important to critical realism is the idea of
seeing ‚Causal relations as tendencies, grounded in the interactions of generative
mechanisms; these interactions may or may not produce events which in turn may or may
not be observed <‛ (p. 282). What this means is that generative mechanisms may emerge in
the domain of the real and some aspects of these may be observed within the empirical
through observation; however, not all parts of these mechanisms will be amenable to
observation by experiment or experience. For example, it has been understood that humans
have the ability to infer emotions from the facial expressions of others (Bernhardt & Singer,
2012). Aspects of this ability can be observed through experiments; the generative
mechanisms of this ability however may not be immediately observable as these occur in
domains beyond current technology or method to determine. Yet, their existence is
hypothesised as occupying domains such as the actual or real. Critical realists assume that
generative mechanisms or causal tendencies may operate beyond closed systems and
therefore could be universal. This notion is called transfactuality37.

Bhaskar (1998a, p. 21) contends that these claims with regard to reality present the other
traditions of classical empiricism and transcendental idealism with a number of problems.
The key one important to understand in terms of this study is the premise with regard to
apprehending objects emerging from the intransitive through the use of experience. Bhaskar
states that experience has become conflated with the ontological level when instead it should
be confined to the epistemological level as a means through which science builds
knowledge. The conflation extends the second problem, which is to see the world only
through the prospects of it as able to be experienced. If this is the case then physics could not

Transfactuality is a term Bhaskar uses to describe generalisation within a critical realist framework. Danermark
et al suggest that there are two different ways in which generalisation can be understood from a critical realist
position. One sense encompasses phenomena/events that are generally occurring whereas the other sense is
focussed on what fundamental properties and structures there are that work as generative mechanisms and
could be seen as emergent from the domains of the actual or real (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlssson,
2002)
37

50
posit the existence of physical objects which may be beyond the ken of human experience
but may be known through experimental procedures. Bhaskar (1998a) takes the view that
essential experience ‚may be more correctly conceived as an accidental property of some
things‛ (p. 21) whereas in the other traditions this property is emphasised, albeit to different
extents. For this study critical realism provides a frame for considering reflective practice as
a process which may have generative mechanisms occurring in the real but may be
examined as a practice within the actual or indeed the empirical. It also assists with placing
ontological considerations in proper relationship to the epistemology of the study. It is too
these that I know turn.

Epistemology
Epistemology as a concept describes the parameters and conditions under which things
might be known within contexts of debates about the nature of reality. This is particularly in
relation to research and science. There are debates about the meaning of epistemology
within the philosophy of science where it is asked, for example what is epistemological as
opposed to what is ontological or methodological? (Crotty, 1998). The word itself can be
traced back to the Greek concept episteme which means formal or scientific (Flyvbjerg, 2001)
or indeed as certain knowledge (Danermark et al., 2002). Within the context of its first
appearance as a category of knowledge, there were many other types of knowledge and
episteme was generally defined in opposition to the word doxa, which denotes belief or
common opinion (Danermark et al., 2002) or other forms of knowledge such as phronesis
which describes the use of knowledge for practical affairs. To a considerable extent, Western
science has been built on this distinction between reason and belief. Another distinction
made by the Greek philosopher Aristotle was between episteme and techne where techne
refers to craft knowledge and so has a practical instrumental focus that is ‚oriented towards
production‛ (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 57).

Hence, epistemology is concerned with formal rules for engagement with an area of inquiry.
With the adoption of particular epistemological perspectives, one also adopts perspectives
on objectivity, subjectivity and the extent to which the social and natural sciences differ.
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These differences between natural and social science have been important areas of debate
with regard to epistemology, not least due to early attempts to introduce a ‚nullifying of the
ontological differences between natural and social reality‛ (Archer, 1998, p. 189). Indeed
early social science attempted to apply methods and epistemologies that maintain a
separation between object and subject and this lead to the creation of positivism. The extent
to which objectivity is possible with interactive subjects has led to sustained critiques about
the purposes of social science and to the emergence of a range of positions on the issue of
explanation versus understanding38. The key difference turns on the recognition of the
interactivity that humans bring to the social (Hacking, 1999). This quality creates social
reality as an open system due to the reflexive39 nature of humans that is different from that
found in the natural world (Archer, 1998).

Social constructionism40 is an epistemology that has been associated with a range of
positions with regard to realism, objectivity and subjectivity as well as a range of theoretical
perspectives in research (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). According to Crotty (1998, p. 42)
constructionism holds that:
<knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human
practices being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their
world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context.

Explanation here is denoted by Schwandt (2000, p. 191) using the German word eklaren often contrasted with
epistemologies based on verstehen, also German and which equates to the English word understanding. Thus,
Schwandt (2000) suggests that the two epistemologies had different purposes: positivist social science is
concerned with establishing the ‚causal explanations of social, behavioural, and physical phenomena‛ whereas
interpretative epistemologies ‚aim to understand human action‛ (p. 191)
39 Reflexivity is a term that has at least six distinct meanings according to Lynch (2000). The quality all reflexive
types have in common is that recursive movement to consider events or phenomena. Within Lynch’s typology,
he discusses methodological reflexivity. Methodological reflexivity describes the process of paying attention to
the ways in which knowledge is constructed in the context of research. This is primarily the kind of reflexivity
promoted by Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009) where ‚serious attention is paid to the way different kinds of
linguistic, social, political and theoretical elements are woven together in the process of knowledge development
during which empirical material is constructed, interpreted and written‛ (2009, p. 9).
40 I am using the term social constructionism after Hacking (1999, p. 49) who suggests leaving the term
‘constructivism’ to mathematicians who had a grip on it much earlier. Hacking uses the terms constructionism to
mean all ‚various sociological, historical, and philosophical projects that aim at displaying or analysing [sic]
actual, historically situated, social interactions or causal routes that led to, or were involved in, the coming into
being or establishing of some present entity or fact‛ (Hacking, 1999). Schwandt (2000) also uses the term
constructionism.
38
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Further Fuss, (n.d., cited in Schwandt, 2007c, p. 3) suggests that constructionists are
interested in social practices, discourses, and ideologies and how these are produced and
organised within a field of view, and because of this ‚they therefore reject the idea that any
essential or natural givens precede the process of social determination‛ (ibid).

While these explanations link closely with the position in the philosophy of science
discussed by Bhaskar as transcendental idealism, there are different positions within this
epistemology with regard to material reality. Schwandt (2007c) outlines these as the strong
and weak positions within the epistemology but suggests that both positions include the
notion that ‚our concepts, theories, ideas, and so forth do not chart, map, or
straightforwardly represent or mirror reality‛ (p. 4). The key difference between the two
positions is the extent to which constructionists acknowledge reality as having its own
existence outside human ideas about it. Strong constructionists deny the existence of any
‘ontology of the real’ (Schwandt, 2007c, p. 40) whereas the weak position encompasses a
material reality that can impact on the social. In light of my use of critical realist ontology,
the weak position in terms of epistemology is more able to incorporate notions of a stratified
ontology.

I began this research with a desire to trouble a practice in my profession that seemed to have
taken on ‘natural’ qualities. That is, reflective practice had become inevitable for social
workers as a way of learning but also as a way of conducting professional practice.
Troubling ‘givens’ is something of a sport for social constructionists, particularly those
engaged in theorising from a critical or post-structural perspective. Nevertheless, it is
possible to offer a simple thesis that is well outlined by Hacking in his engaging treatment of
social constructionism (Hacking, 1999). Hacking (1999) states:
‘X’ need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. ‘X’, or ‘X’ as it is at present is not
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. (p. 6)
If we substitute ‘X’ with my topic then following thesis may be offered: Reflective practice
need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. Reflective practice, or reflective practice as it is at
present in Australian Social Work Education is not determined by the nature of things; it is not
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inevitable. Thus this study attempts to problematise the naturalness of reflective practice as it
is understood in social work education. What it is not troubling is the existence of the
human ability to be reflective with regard to the social milieu in which humans find
themselves (Archer, 2010). Instead, the study is using a weak social constructionist
epistemology to the issue of reflective practice as it is conceived within a particular setting or
social arrangement.

Schwandt (2000, p. 198) points out that the commonality with both weak and strong
positions within social constructionism is how they proceed from an assumption that
knowledge is ‚not disinterested, apolitical, and exclusive of affective and embodied human
experience, but is some sense ideological, political, and permeated with values‛. This
assumption explains why it is that social constructionists take the simple thesis outlined
above further by suggesting that ‘X’ is a problem and that it would be better if ‘X’ was
changed or in some cases done away with completely. This reveals that the epistemology
can in some cases include an underlying logic aimed at transformation/emancipation. Thus,
a researcher using this epistemology tends to describe the topic or concept in detail, and
generally then explain how bad it is, with a view to contributing to the emancipation of
human beings from the described social relations or practices. From this position many
researchers then move to suggest measures to do away either with the practice or at the very
least transform it. My intention is not necessarily aimed at doing away with the practice of
reflection but rather I am seeking to problematise the practice through the strategic use of
different forms of critical reflection41 (Tully, 1989).

Tully (1989) suggests that there is a widespread notion at least in political philosophy that ‚that our [sic] way
of political life is free and rational only if it is founded on some form or other of critical reflection‛ (p. 172).
Furthermore this has led to heated debates about what kind of reflection should be foundational to a democratic
liberal society. The main contenders according to Tully are a critical or justificational form associated with
Habermas or an interpretative kind aimed at understanding, often associated with Charles Taylor (ibid). Tully
points out that this seeming need to choose a foundational kind of reflection obfuscates the possibility of using a
variety of practices of critical reflection to understand the pressing political problems we face (Tully, 2008).
Different kinds of critical reflection include ‚ < deconstruction, evaluation, explanation, genealogy,
interpretation, interrogation, justification, representation, survey, validation, verification‛ and ‚< these have
distinctive grammars and complex historical genealogies as established practices or languages-games ‚ (Tully,
1989, p. 198). Three main forms of critical reflection have been utilised explicitly in this research: interpretation,
critique and problematisation.
41
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Combining critical realist ontology with a weak social constructionist epistemology is on the
face of it problematic, due to the issue of accepting the material bases of reality. Hacking’s
work is again helpful here in suggesting that it is possible to reserve our focus on what is
constructed by creating clarity about the focus of attention on the kind of thing at the centre
of the inquiry (Hacking, 1999). For example, he suggests that it may be possible to use the
commonsensical notion of object to denote things in the world such as ‚<people (children),
states (childhood), conditions (health, childhood autism); practices (child abuse, hiking),
actions (throwing a ball, rape), behaviour (generous, fidgety)<‛ as being objects in the
material sense, while still being ontologically subjective.

However, in accepting a stratified ontology we may direct efforts to understand what in the
domains of the empirical and actual may be constructed through human ideas and social
practices. It also allows for this study to leave aside processes that may be generated from
the real and take on board the ‚ < fortunate consequence of the stratification of the world is
that we don’t have to work back through all the successive constitutive strata in order to
understand objects in any specific stratum‛ (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 63). Thus it is
important to describe not only the processes of inquiry but also the level of reality with
which these processes are concerned. Certainly Danermark et al go further and suggest that
the task of the social scientist is therefore to attend to that which is emergent as mechanisms
or processes within the stratum under investigation.

It is therefore possible within this conception of reality to take for granted the existence of
stratum below, or even above, the one in which an inquiry is focussed. For example, the
social sciences confine their inquiries generally to the structures and social relations of
individuals and communities. In doing so it is possible to proceed with the assumption that
the biological components that make up people who inhabit these structures and relations
are in existence without having to describe them down to their biological and chemical
details. Social science may describe the way in which the biological components impact on
structures and social relations, and indeed describe or investigate the mechanisms that
contribute to these impacts. A disease such as cancer is an example. Social science may
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describe the way in which cancer is considered within society, its impact on individuals,
families and its prevalence and the way in which this disease has and is received by health
systems. Social science would not necessarily consider the chemical or biological
components of cancer but instead assumes that these emerge in different stratum for
investigation by scientists using processes and procedures adequate for the task of
understanding it within that level of reality.

Thus, in this study, the question of the stratum and the object of the study are important in
determining strategies of method that would yield the widest interpretation of the
phenomena of reflective practice. The ability to reflect can be assumed due to its existence
being seated within the human brain (Evans, 2008). There is evidence for this position from
scientific experiment within the disciplines of psychology and neuroscience (Evans, 2011).
My study does not have to establish that this ability of individuals exists but rather can focus
instead on the social relations, structures and mechanisms whereby the ability is utilised and
practiced. The social relations in this particular study can be seen to include the discipline of
social work, its establishment within the academy in Australia and within society, the
structures and conditions of learning within which reflective practice is taught including
within field placements. Therefore, epistemology needs to be able to encompass objects or
kinds including ideas, discourses, and practices within this particular social field. Secondly,
the rules of knowledge need to be sensitive to context and will not render a generalised
account of the phenomena. Third, any rules of knowledge should be able to encompass a
range of methods and levels of interpretation to aid in developing the problematisation of
the practice along different lines of inquiry. Thus, social constructionism is able to address
these requirements within this study. I will turn now to discuss the methodological
approach, which served to support my efforts at developing different lines of inquiry.

Reflexive methodology and problematisation
The methodology that forms the basis of this study is reflexive methodology (Alvesson &
Skoldberg, 2000). Reflexive methodology synthesises key insights from a range of other
methodologies such as grounded theory, phenomenology, critical theory, post-structuralism
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and feminism and discusses these in the context of the philosophy of science and the nature
of epistemology within the social sciences. In doing so Alvesson and Skoldberg assert that
all social research involves interpretation of some kind, and in view of this insight, they
propose a range of methodological principles that can assist researchers to pursue the
incorporation of reflexivity in how they conduct and report social research. For Alvesson
and Skoldberg (2000) reflexivity is important because:
Good research should be characterized by the following features<empirical
‘arguments’ and credibility; an open attitude to the vital importance of the interpretive
dimension; critical reflection regarding the political and ideological contexts of, and
issues in research; an awareness of the ambiguity of language and its limited capacity
to convey knowledge of a purely empirical reality and awareness about the rhetorical
nature of ways of dealing with this issues (the representation-authority problem) [and]
theory development based on the mentioned issues. (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000, p.
277)
Thus, research as it is interpretative can include reflection on the construction of knowledge
in relation to identified research problems and other social reality (Alvesson, 2002).

Is it possible to combine different aspects from methodologies, which in the research
methods literature are often seen as having distinct and sometimes incommensurate
philosophical and epistemological orientations (Guba, 2005; Morgan, 2007). This is part of
what Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009) address. Further, they argue that this may be
undertaken by researcher’s paying careful attention to the use of interpretative levels as a
way of conducting mixed qualitative methodological research. In this study this notion of
interpretative levels was explicitly utilised to design a study that employed three distinct
methods to examine how reflective practice is understood. This meant that each small study
addresses a different interpretative level within the main inquiry. In this respect reflexive
methodology was considered to be a way in which to hold the tension between the various
methodologies and theoretical frames, drawn as they are from quite distinct research
traditions.
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It is possible to assert that all social research is broadly reflexive in the sense of being a
double hermeneutic42 enterprise; the interpretation rendered by interpreting subjects
(Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). Further Alvesson and Skoldberg make the point that if one
includes critical theory with its focus on the ways in which social structures and power
impact on participants and their subjectivities within social research then we might be
discussing a triple hermeneutic43. With regard then to reflexivity within their suggested
methodology, Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) make the following point:
In reflexive contexts there cannot be definite demands – at least not heavy ones – as
regards theoretical consistency, in the sense that a particular ontological and
epistemological position is strictly maintained throughout. The point of reflection is
rather to break away from consistency and a narrow focus on a particular aspect, to
question weaknesses inherent in the mode of thought one embraces (and is easily
imprisoned within), to break up and change a particular language game rather than
expanding it. (p. 246)
This ‚<break away from consistency and a narrow focus on a particular aspect‛ (Alvesson
& Skoldberg, 2000, p.246) is taken seriously here and has been incorporated into the design
of the study. It meant paying attention to the careful handling of each study as distinct
inquiries but with the aim of using each as forms of juxtaposition, deconstruction and
reconstruction. This is to take up the challenge of engaging in distinct kinds of reflexivity
within a single study as outlined by Alvesson (2011) where he discusses the differences
between reflexivities that ‚emphasize problematic or ‘dangerous’ thinking – intellectually,
politically or ethically – and those that try to produce new insights‛ (p. 108). Consequently,
the study has implemented the elements of a quadri-hermeneutic as ‚exemplified<by the
empirically based, the hermeneutic, the ideologically critical and the postmodernist‛
(Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000, p. 248).

A term coined by Anthony Giddens that has come to denote the distinction between natural and social science
where social scientists study ‚ < social phenomena (i.e. human activities of various kinds) that (unlike the
objects studied in natural science) are already constituted as meaningful‛ (Schwandt, 2007e, p. 76).
43 A triple hermeneutic takes the idea of the double hermeneutic proposed by Giddens (1976, cited in Alvesson
and Skoldberg, 2009, p. 203) and includes a focus on the social structures that constrain and create inequal power
relations. The double hermeneutic was first coined by Anthony Giddens to acknowledge that social research is
always working with the ‚interpretation of interpreting subjects‛ (Schwandt, 2007e)
42
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This attention to quadri-hermeneutic methodology has also facilitated the adoption of a
problematisation approach to formulating the research questions of the study.
Problematisation, in this sense, is a strategy of formulating research questions that emerge
from ‚< a dialectical interrogation of one’s own familiar (or home) position, other theoretical
stances, and the domain of literature targeted for assumption challenging‛ (Alvesson &
Sandberg, 2013, p. 49; emphasis original). There are significant links between
problematisation and the programmes of research formulated by Foucault (Tully, 1999) and
others such as John Dewey, Paolo Freire, and C. W. Mills (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011).
There are a range of processes involved in problematisation but these all involve scrutinising
assumptions as a beginning point; those that are evident in the theory or topic but also those
held by the researcher. Alvesson and Sandberg’s (2013) interest is in the development of
interesting theory and so they suggest that two issues are important in developing
problematisations from assumptions. First, what types of assumptions are relevant to the
topic? And second, what is the process for articulating and challenging the assumptions
identified (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013). Reflexive methodology is one of a number of
‚methodological resources‛ (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013, p. 50) that can facilitate
problematisation.

Alvesson and Sandberg (2009) offer a typology of assumptions that can assist in opening
inquiries to problematisation within a given literature domain. This typology distinguishes
five sets of assumptions that ‚differ in both depth and scope‛ (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013,
pp. 54-55). These are in-house; root metaphor44; paradigm; ideology; and field45 assumptions. The
assumptions should be viewed as sitting along an overlapping continuum from the ‚minor
form‛ (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013, p. 55) of in-house assumptions to the broader field
assumptions which can potentially problematise whole bodies of thought in the social
sciences. Foucault’s (2002) The order of things is an example of a study that addresses field

These assumptions are described as ‚broader images of a particular subject matter‛ (Alvesson & Sandberg,
2013, p. 54). Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 5) suggest that ‚the essence of metaphor is understanding and
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another‛. An example from social work might be the adoption of the
term ‚swampy lowlands‛ (Schon, 1983, p. 42) to describe the inherent uncertainty of practice.
45 Field assumptions are the broadest set to problematise as these generally include whole disciplines and can
work across a range of disciplines and professions. A famous example of this kind of problematisation is that of
Foucault’s History of Madness (Foucault & Khalfa, 2006)
44
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assumptions. In the context of this study my main question is aimed at providing a wide
lens through which each stage of the study can problematise reflective practice from a
different position on this suggested continuum. Not all of the positions outlined in this
typology are relevant to the study here so I will confine my discussion to those of in-house,
paradigm and ideology below.

In-house assumptions are those that are shared by members within a particular school
within a discipline or profession (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013). In this sense then this study
sought to develop understandings of the culture and meanings attached to reflective
practice within social work through the lens of an insider, particularly one who had learnt
the critical reflective model (Fook & Gardner, 2007). The main way this has been accomplished
is through the autoethnographic stage of the study and also through discussion in some of
the Interludes (exegeses) included across the whole thesis.

Paradigm assumptions are those that problematise the ontological, epistemological and
methodological levels of a specific literature or domain of a school, discipline or profession
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013). The strategic deployment of an archaeological analytic has
been utilised to consider the transformation of problem-solving practice, significant to social
work in its earlier history, into different models that focus on changing the assumption of
social workers themselves. This transformation has occurred largely through the adoption
and dispersion of ideas drawn from more structural, critical and feminist sources.

The final assumptive ground developed in this study was that of ideology. Here ideological
assumptions are those that include the ways in which social workers discuss reflective
practice as part of their personal and professional beliefs. The third stage of this study had
been originally envisaged as a series of case studies of the ways in which students,
practitioners and educators in social work use reflective practice within their work or study.
In fact, the other stages clarified a number of specific areas about reflective practice in
Australian social work education and practice. The first is the predominant model of
reflective practice in Australia, the kinds of reasoning or rationality this makes possible for
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students, educators and practitioners and lastly the subject positions which emerged from
the predominant model as a technique of the self.46 The autoethnographic and archaeological
stages of the inquiry suggested a different line of inquiry than that originally designed in the
study. The result is that the interviews have contributed to understanding the various
ideological assumptions47 expressed as value and belief statements in accounts of reflective
practice.

Thus, problematisation has been explicitly developed as part of the research questions
across the entirety of the study along with the elements of a quadri-hermeneutic across the
range of methods utilised. These are designed to address my own limits in terms of
deploying a repertoire of interpretation. As mentioned previously part of the reflexive and
problematising nature of this methodology is to work at both understanding one’s own
repertoire and going beyond this where possible. This study has utilised a mechanism (the
exegesis) to work directly with expanding, and to some extent displaying, my repertoire of
interpretation and its limits. To do so is to use this process to illuminate the way ‚<
different elements or levels *might+ played off against each other‛ (Alvesson & Sköldberg,
2009, p. 272). Further the process of exegesis between each stage operates to link the parts
into the study into a whole inquiry. Table 2 has been reproduced from Alvesson and
Skoldberg (2009) and it illustrates the way the different levels of interpretation can play this
part in a single research project.

Techniques of the self are ‚those reflective and voluntary practices by which men [sic] not only set themselves
rules of conduct, but seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make of
their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria‛ (Foucault, 1984,
cited in O'Farrell, 2014).
47 Ideological in this sense as the ‚political-, moral-, and gender-related assumptions‛ articulated by participants
based on their occupation of a range of subject positions outlined as part of the archaeological study (Alvesson &
Sandberg, 2013). These ideological assumptions can also be found in the shared literature and moral order
(Ylijoki, 2000) of the profession of social work. Also of interest is the way in which participants use reflective
practice in ways that resist disciplinary power established within this moral order (James & Wilson, 2011).
46
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Table 2: Aspects of a reflexive methodology

Aspect/level

Focus

Interaction with empirical material.

Accounts in interviews, observations of situations and
other empirical materials.

Interpretation (understanding).

Underlying meanings.

Critical interpretation.

Ideology, power, social reproduction.

Reflection on text production and language use.

Own text, claims to authority, selectivity of the voices
represented in the text.

Table 3 outlines my own interpretation in order to further illustrate my understanding of
how this methodology works. I considered various research methods48 for the purposes of
developing assumptive ground and chose autoethnography, Foucauldian archaeology and
interviews as illustrated in the column added to the right under possible research methods. As
each method is described in the next chapter at some length, here I will only briefly account
for their placement within the methodological framework outlined by Alvesson and
Skoldberg (2009).
Table 3: Levels of interpretation with suggested research methods

Level of
interpretation

Aspect

Focus

Possible research
methods

1

Interaction with empirical
material.

Foucauldian discourse
analysis (archaeology);
interviews.

2

Interpretation (understanding).

Accounts in
interviews,
observations of
situations and other
empirical materials.
Underlying meanings.

3

Critical interpretation.

Ideology, power,
social reproduction.

Archaeology, interviews.

4

Reflection on text production
and language use.

Own text, claims to
authority, selectivity
of the voices
represented in the
text.

Reflective exegeses;
autoethnography.

Autoethnography.

As mentioned in chapter one, three lines of inquiry have been developed involving different
methods. The first line of inquiry in the research is broadly interpretative through the use of
an autoethnographic process, although there are some distinctly post-structural elements in

There are debates on whether discourse analysis (of whatever type) and autoethnography should be
considered to be methods or methodologies. Crotty (1998) places them in his schema as methodologies. As they
are nested within a reflexive methodology I discuss them as methods in this study.
48
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this stage as well especially with regard to how best to consider the subjectivity within an
autoethnographic process. The second line of the inquiry operates at level one of this
schema in terms of working with empirical materials. Archaeology can include written,
recorded and observed materials as part of the archive (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). A
description of the process and the data are discussed in the chapter below. The exegesis
involves quite different processes of interpretative activity and considers the process of
archaeology from levels three (ideology, power and social reproduction, also known as
critical theory) and four (researcher bias, text production and language use considered as a
form of post structural theory).

The third line of inquiry operates primarily at levels one and two as this stage is interested
in understanding and explanation of how reflective practice is utilised in social work
education and practice. The exegesis at this stage will operate again at levels three and four
in order to consider the process and analysis of stage three paying particular attention to
issues of representation and text construction. Table 4 below outlines the way the various
lines of inquiry in the research aimed to incorporate different levels of interpretation.
Table 4: Illustration of relation between each level/foci and each stage of the research

Level of
interpretation

Aspect

Focus

Possible research
methods

Lines of inquiry

1

Interaction with
empirical material.

Foucauldian
discourse analysis
(archaeology);
interviews.

Inquiry 2 and 3.

2

Interpretation
(understanding).

Accounts in
interviews,
observations of
situations and
other empirical
materials.
Underlying
meanings.

Inquiry 1 and 3.

3

Critical interpretation.

Ideology, power,
social
reproduction.

4

Reflection on text
production and
language use.

Own text, claims
to authority,
selectivity of the
voices
represented in
the text.

Autoethnography,
qualitative
interviews.
Foucauldian
discourse analysis
(archaeology),
interviews.
Reflective exegeses;
Autoethnography.

Inquiries 1, 2 and 3.

Whole study.
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Conclusion
I began this chapter by offering an analogy between research design and different aspects of
how music is created in order to illustrate how issues of reality, knowledge and
methodology fit with the creation of this research approach. The chapter has surveyed the
debates about reality, knowledge and then offered a description of the methodology that has
informed the research design. I offer a brief recap and summary of the main points here
before moving in chapter four to a description of the methods (instruments utilised) to
undertake (perform) the research.

In sum, the research has been informed by critical realist ontology, albeit in a fairly limited
way, which has resulted in the incorporation of an acknowledgement that reality may be
stratified into layers. Moreover, if stratification is assumed then the methodology and
research methods employed in this research are necessarily partial and will not likely
advance any causal inferences to mechanisms that might be coming from layers beyond the
empirical, or possibly, actual layers of reality. This acknowledgement does not preclude the
use of a social constructionist epistemology, and this has been adopted for this research. This
epistemology recognises the constructed nature of knowledge but also concedes that not all
social phenomena are the result of human consciousness alone. The adoption of social
construction supports the whole study, which has been designed using reflexive
methodology and resulted in using three different forms of critical reflection (hermeneutic,
critique and problematisation) for examining the phenomena of reflective practice in
Australian social work education. This methodology is well suited to the task of bringing
different methods to bear on the topic in order to develop different lines of inquiry. The
contrast and juxtaposition of the methods forms a major aspect of the reflexive nature of the
research overall.
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Inte rlude 3
Methodological battles and misinterpretations
Like most doctoral candidates I made a number of attempts at writing this chapter on
methodology. The version that stayed is rather more traditional than some of my early
drafts. By traditional I mean that it follows a fairly standard line, adopted from Crotty (1998)
where the discussion starts with ontology and wends its way to methodology. I did attempt
an earlier version which completely sidestepped this linking of methodology to philosophy
as I had been persuaded that linking them was part of an ideological battle in research
methods, waged to claim some ground from the ‚positivists‛ (Morgan, 2007) in the 1970s
and 80s. From some accounts it appears this is a battle that is still being fought but perhaps
the ground has shifted since then and its being waged over the inclusion of non-Western
ontologies and epistemologies (Denzin, Lincoln, & Giardina, 2006). The earlier nontraditional version was based on my idea that perhaps my readers would appreciate not
having the same old battles rehearsed apart from the odd footnote. My point in revealing
this is to acknowledge that this is not just any text and I am not just writing for my own
knowledge, or even pleasure. It is a text produced to report the results of years of research
work and to demonstrate knowledge about how this research might be located within the
wider context of social research in my discipline and generally. It is also being presented for
examination. These factors, of course, shape many of the decisions about the creation of this
text.
My first foray into the research methods scene was through being allowed to hang around
with PhD students in arts, social science and humanities as an undergraduate honours
student. I was definitely on the sidelines but I did witness various battles for sources of truth
about knowledge. These battles were waged between colleagues from arts, social sciences
and science disciplines, all of whom were based on a small faculty. The faculty was a unique
interdisciplinary laboratory and these battles could get vicious. It was a seminal experience
for me. When I began this engagement with the literature doubts started to surface about my
earlier understandings of critical postmodernism, reflexive methodology and even the issue
of linking philosophy and theory to research methods (Silverman, 2007). I realise now how
much of my thinking had been shaped by the dialogues and battles of that earlier time.
One consequence of this is that I am now fairly certain I misinterpreted what using a reflexive
methodology entails. This misinterpretation occurred early in designing the research. Later
when looking for studies using the same methodological approach I could find none. It
seems I might have taken the ambition of developing a repertoire of interpretation a little
too literally. Thus, the decision to keep to the traditional format here was made on the basis
that this is a thesis with enough non-traditional combinations, metaphors and other
idiosyncrasies to be going on with. Including a methodology chapter written in a nonstandard fashion was a step too far.
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Cha pter 4
Album notes 4 - Methods

Introduction
This chapter outlines in detail the three
methods utilised in the different lines of
inquiry. Here we are looking at the

Autoethnography

instrumentation needed to offer a
performance of the rhapsody. Adjacent
is a figure showing the three lines of

Reflective
Practice in
Australian
Social Work
Education

inquiry as depicted in chapter one. Each

Archaeology

Qualitative
interviews

section corresponds to a different
method and a similar diagram will
indicate this at the beginning of each

Figure 2: Picture of all three methods

section. The discussion will begin by
outlining the method generally, the kinds of data utilised within each study and any core
concepts and issues related to its application to the specific research question of the study.
Each section also outlines the limitations of the specific method. I will begin with an
examination and description of autoethnography (the solo performance). I then move to
discuss the development of an archaeological analytic (a post-rock anthem) in relation to the
emergence of reflective practice in social work education. In the third section, I outline the
method of the final study, which involved interviewing practitioners, educators and
students in social work about their learning and use of reflective practice (a choral piece).
The chapter then closes with a brief discussion of the different ethical considerations
involved in each study.
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Autoethnography49
The term autoethnography is thought to
have been first coined by David Hayano
Autoethnography

(Anderson, 2006; Ellis & Bochner, 2000).
Reflective
Practice in
Australian
Social Work
Education

The method refers to research designed
to understand a phenomena through the
connections between the self, culture and

Archaeology

Qualitative
interviews

the wider society (Ellis & Bochner, 2000).
Reed-Danahay (1997) suggests therefore
that:

Figure 3: Autoethnography

*A+utoethnography stands at the intersection of three genres of writing...(1)‛native
anthropology,‛ in which people who were formerly the subjects of ethnography
become the authors of studies of their own group; (2) ‚ethnic autobiography,‛
personal narratives written by members of ethnic minority groups; and (3)
‚autobiographical ethnography,‛ in which anthropologists interject personal
experience into ethnographic writing.‛ (p. 2)
Moreover, Reed-Danahay (1997) links her discussion of autoethnography to a need to break
apart the former distinctions between ethnographic and autobiographical research. In her
treatment of the origins of the method this is outlined as a way of meeting the challenges
posed by post-modern theorising about the distinction between the subjective and objective,
the self and society (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 2). Thus, this kind of autoethnography arose
from assumptions that research accounts could move between objective phenomena and the
subjectivity of the researcher and that this would shed light on the intersections between
society, culture and various selves.

I am indebted to Professor Donna Chung, Ms Petra Elias, Dr Tina Fernandes, Ms Kirsty Oehlers, Associate
Professor Liz McKinlay, Dr Karen Upton-Davis, fellow companions in a fledgling WA social work
autoethnography group, for discussions which assisted in focusing this section.
49
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As a result a range of processes have been developed by autoethnographic researchers to
enable this movement between the self as a lens and the cultural, social and, increasingly,
political phenomena at the centre of various inquiries (Ellis & Bochner, 2014). This has led to
the situation where the autoethnographic method may have diverse emphases depending
on disciplinary differences and orientations. For example, in literary criticism, notions of
culture are understood through existing theories that posit dominant and subordinate
cultural groups, and autoethnographic research within this discipline would include
attention to this knowledge. Thus, autoethnography would act as a ‚counter-narrative‛
(Reed-Danahay, 2006, p. 2) to dominant cultural stories. By contrast, for ethnographers the
method is more likely to be used to interrogate cultural practices which may, but may also
not be limited to, local cultural practices and border-crossings (Reed-Danahay, 2006). ReedDanahay suggests that autoethnographers such as Ellis and Bochner have also used the term
to ‚label forms of self-reflexivity‛ (ibid, p. 2). To a considerable degree the acceptance of the
inclusion of the researcher perspective within qualitative accounts can be seen as tied to
broader social movements emphasising human reflexivity50.

In light of increasing acceptance since the original appearance of autoethnography as part of
the ‚fifth moment‚ of qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 27) there has been a
widening in applications for the method as well. For example, autoethnography has been
used in studies of management (Kempster & Stewart, 2010); health and illness (Moore, 2012);
disability (Scott, 2013); the military (Taber, 2010); organisations (Doloriert & Sambrook,
2009); counselling (Wright, 2009); education (DeMeulenaere & Cann, 2013); nursing (Foster,
McAllister, & O'Brien, 2006; J. Wright, 2008); and, increasingly social work (Krumer-Nevo,
2009; Pfau, 2007; Ruch, 2000; White, 2002). These works represent a diverse range of ways to
undertake autoethnography. There has, in the last few years, emerged two different

Some authors suggest that reflexivity is a condition of late modernity (Beck et al., 1994) and thus it is tied to a
dissolution of structures into individual agency brought about the decline of traditional and habitual models of
identity (Farrugia, 2013). Archer (2007) suggests that this notion of reflexivity attributes it as a property to
collectivities, institutions or organisation that cannot have it. Archer, in contrast to Beck and Giddens, firmly
seats reflexivity within the purview of agents thus it is the way in which people consider themselves in relation to
their social conditions and vice versa (Johnson, 201). The main points of agreement amongst social theorists are
that reflexivity is made more important as a quality of agents under conditions of rapid social change (Archer,
2010; Farrugia, 2013).
50
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approaches to autoethnography and comparing the differences between them was helpful in
locating my own approach.

An alternative conception of autoethnography to that promulgated by Carolyn Ellis and Art
Bochner was proposed by Anderson (2006) an analytic autoethnography. Anderson suggests
that this kind of autoethnography could preserve the reflexive character of the method but
may also encompass a more realist position in terms of ontology. This is not the only
difference between the kind of autoethnography proposed by Anderson and that of the
predominant kind described by Reed-Danahay (1997) and which has led to the evocative
autoethnographic movement disseminated by Ellis and Bochner (2000) and others (HolmanJones, 2008). Table 5 (next page) outlines the similarities and differences across a range of
issues that I have identified as critical for use of the method by both major schools of
thought. I have also included a column which outlines these categories and orientations
within the present study:
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Table 5: Comparison of analytic and evocative autoethnography part one

Categories and
orientations

Analytic

Evocative

My study

Reality

Accepts the existence of reality
outside the knowledge generated
by the researcher (Anderson, 2006,
p. 48; Charmaz, 2006).

Rejects the realist position (Ellis & Bochner,
2000).

Accepts the existence of reality outside the
interpretations and knowledge generated by the
research. Adopting a critical realist position means
an acceptance that reality is stratified across three
domains, real, actual and empirical.

Epistemology

Constructivist51.

Constructivist/subjectivist.

Weak constructionism (Hacking, 1999; Schwandt,
2000).

Data generation and
researcher visibility
within the text

Field notes; participant
observation; other members of the
same cultural or social group; selfnarratives.

Researcher narratives; journals; poetry; prose;
co-constructed evocative stories; vignettes;
visual texts and performances.

Journal data; class notes and associated marginalia;
poetry; reflective recall; published literature; unit
plans and assignment instructions; participant
observation and voice recordings.

Essential for researcher visibility
in the text.

Essential researcher visibility in the text.

Essential researcher visibility in the text.

Anderson (2006) utilises the term constructivist as does Ellis and Bochner (2000) reflecting to some extent its usage within the tradition of ethnography and symbolic
interactionism.
51
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Table 6: Comparison of analytic and evocative autoethnography part two

Membership of cultural
group, research or setting

Required

Helpful but not essential nor precluded. Focus
is on the researcher rather than participation in
a group or setting.

Required.

Focus of research

Understanding social or cultural
phenomena through participation
with group. Always involves
dialogue with others.

Social or cultural phenomena through practices
that reveal these through self-examination. May
include dialogue with others but is not
essential.

Participation within the cultural and social setting
informed the process of self-examination. Dialogue
with others occurred in naturalistic ways.

Reflexivity

May utilise methodological selfconsciousness52; or analytic
reflexivity53..

May utilise radical reflexivity; 54standpoint
reflexivity55; or breaking frame56..

May utilise reflexive social construction57; standpoint
reflexivity and analytic reflexivity.

Kind of reasoning

(mostly) Abduction58

(mostly) Induction

Abduction

The process of taking account of the researcher’s relationship to participants and the instruments and methods of conducting research (Lynch, 2000).
Anderson outlines this kind of reflexivity as ‚the self-conscious introspection guided by a desire to better understand both self and others through an examining of one’s
actions and perceptions in reference to and dialogue with those of others.‛ (2006, p. 382)
54 A reflexivity outlined by Lynch (2000) that embodies the political and emancipatory hopes for the conduct of programs of research designed to allow the voices and
experiences of participants to be heard. This kind of reflexive program rejects empiricism and sociological functionalism and advances a ‚constructionist alternative‛ (ibid, p.
37).
55 A form of reflexivity where the researcher subjects their own position and construction of the research (cultural, social, political) to critical scrutiny in order to interrogate the
functions of a priori socio-structural features (Lynch, 2000, p. 31).
56 This is a kind of reflexivity most often seen in literary, film and art and can be distinguished from standpoint in not using a priori categories but rather the emphasis is on
rendering accounts of the researcher and researched through the deployment of ‚locally ordered and highly flexible‛ (Lynch, 2000, p. 32) experiences. Lynch (2002, p. 32) cites
the work of Erving Goffman where the assumption is that people can shift standpoints ‚both physically and imaginatively‛ to illuminate different ways of seeing experience.
In autoethnographies this kind of reflexivity interrogates the boundaries of experience for new ways of seeing chosen research topics.
57 Refers to the idea that humans are self-reflecting beings; this kind of reflexivity was first described by Weber and Mead, and later expanded by Berger and Luckmann
(Lynch, 2000). It includes the notion that human reflections and knowledge can disappear as originating with human action and knowing and come to constitute the ways in
which ‚consensual beliefs and concerted practices give rise to objective social institutions‛(Lynch, 2000, p. 29).
58 A process that moves between inductive and deductive reasoning ‚first converting observations into theories and then assessing those theories through action‛ (Morgan,
2007, p. 71). According to Blaikie (Schwandt, 2007b) abduction means to move between everyday understandings which social actors hold and consider the social scientific
understandings of the same phenomena. In autoethnography, the method itself renders open taken-for-granted ideas about a given topic.
52
53
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The main differences between analytic and evocative kinds of autoethnography is the type
of reasoning employed, the kinds of reflexivity utilised, orientation to ontology and finally
the relative emphasis on membership in the group under study. As can be imagined
research of both kinds may come in many forms. These forms can include poetry, story,
constructed narratives, and performance as methods of evoking experience (Holman-Jones,
2008) interleaved with more analytic accounts (Anderson, 2006). The present study has used
a synthesis of both kinds of autoethnography but has adopted a critical realist stance.
Therefore my approach tends towards the analytic more than the evocative.

I utilised a range of empirical materials in addition to my own creative output as my
purpose was to use my own experience as a way of identifying and articulating disciplinary
assumptions about reflective practice. The processes of data creation and analysis are
intimately related to each other in this kind of method. As such the method developed here
was uniquely tied to the research question of how I learned reflective practice. I will move
now to discuss the process of assembling the different kinds of data utilised in creating the
autoethnographic account of this study.

Assembling the data; creating a process<
There were two main phases to the autoethnographic study of stage one. They involved
different kinds of data. I assembled the following sources for the first phase:


Journals from my third and fourth social work undergraduate years (2001-2003);



Class notes with associated marginalia from the same period;



An autoethnographic research study conducted in a senior research methods class in
the Bachelor of Social Work (BSW) in semester 1 in 2001;



Two reflective logs on the research study which outlined the method of conducting
that autoethnographic research study;



Three reflective papers written as class assignments as a social work student
unrelated to the autoethnographic research study and reflective log papers; and,



BSW unit plans with instructions on the same assignments.

This data set was to act as a temporal anchor and a source of remembrance about learning
reflective practice in the context of formal education as a social work student. And while the
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original autoethnographic study had a different focus to my purposes for this study, it was
included because it formed a reflective record of the process of socialisation into being a
social worker.

In addition I also collected a range of published sources related to learning reflective
practice. My intention was to use published textbook and peer reviewed sources as forms of
authority (an objective pole) against which the accounts from my novice self might be
considered (the subjective pole). The second phase was intended to create a link between my
student experience and the present in order to consider the issue of teaching reflective
practice as a social work educator. These ideas and processes were suggested by work from
Pfau (2007), although the data sources I chose and my method of creating the account are
different. The data for this phase included:


A teaching journal spanning the years 2007-2012;



A number of unit plans which I had constructed that contained reflective practice
assignments; and,



Research journal (written and audio) on the autoethnographic process.

I began the research journal specifically in order to capture my thinking about the data as I
was reading, remembering and analysing it. During this stage I also used published texts as
authoritative (objective) sources on reflective practice but with a new focus that related
directly to teaching practice.

With each phase I made notes and recordings of my thinking and reactions to the various
sources of data. The process was challenging, not least due to the confluence of different
identities occurring across one liminal59 space. I was at that time learning the craft of
teaching as well as occupying the identity of being a student through undertaking this
study. I found echoes began to occur between my earlier experiences as an undergraduate

Liminal is a term used to describe that of being ‚betwixt and between‛ (Beech, 2011). It was described by Van
Gennup (1960, cited in Beech, 2011, p. 287) in the context of ritualistic process whereby people change from one
identity to another. Van Gennup considered there to be three phases to the process and the liminal phase was the
second step where separation has occurred from a previous identity but consummation has not happened as yet.
Thus liminality in this schema is the state between separation and consummation [of the new identity].
59
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and the latter experience of learning to lecture and learning to study as a postgraduate. My
identity as a research student found resonances with learning to be a social worker as well as
learning the craft of teaching. I found re-reading these various selves across the pages of
journal entries, old assignments and marginalia poignant, sometimes hilarious and weirdly
fascinating and also disturbing. The resulting autoethnographic vignettes are ‘constructions’
designed to illustrate the main outcomes of the autoethnographic process. These are
outlined in chapter five of this thesis. In the next section I give a brief discussion of the
limitations of the method after which I will move to describe the process of conducting the
second stage of this study: the archaeology.

Limitations
Autoethnography certainly offers a way of understanding social relations, cultural
phenomena and human experience, albeit refracted through the lens of a single individual.
This is both its strength and its limitation. While it allows for an in-depth understanding of
social categories and cultural conditions, the researcher is only one part of these complex
relations. Indeed Anderson says ‚No ethnographic work – not even autoethnography - is a
warrant to generalize from an N of one‛ (2006, p. 386).

Thus while the method itself has offered a way for a member of this shared professional
community to examine the process of learning to be reflective the account remains partial.
The method did assist in problematising the assumptions evident in both the practice and
literature about reflective practice in social work. The question of how I learned reflective
practice is, however, just one example of how reflective practice is understood in Australian
social work education and so cannot be generalised. Importantly, generalisation was never
the goal of this line of inquiry.

As mentioned above, the autoethnographic account offered a place to begin the whole
research study. Moreover the inclusion of social work texts within the data set contributed to
an imaginary dialogue between myself and a generalised social work ‘other’ where the
literature stood for the social work community and I stood with/for the novice/learner. From
this analysis came a number of insights important for subsequent lines of inquiry, which
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would widen the lens for the main question about the ways in which reflective practice is
understood in the Australian social work context. For example, it became apparent that the
term ‘critical’ carries a particular meaning within the Australian social work community and
the combination of this term with reflection suggested a particular approach to reflective
practice. The impact of this notion of ‘critical’ for students is also not obvious from a straight
reading of the literature where the status of the term critical is taken for granted.

A further limitation is the self-scrutiny required and the associated vulnerability this might
introduce for the researcher. My inclusion of empirical materials developed by others was
intended to off-set this tendency to some extent. Further, I was fortunate to have had access
to a small number of interested colleagues who listened, questioned and challenged some of
the perceptions of the matters arising in the analysis. These conversations and materials
were important anchors outside of the self at the centre of the inquiry. The intense focus on
knowledge arrived at through the subjectivity of a single individual was an interesting, and
at times, challenging journey.

This focus on humans as a source of knowledge would be challenged enormously by the
conduct of the archaeological stage of the study. I was going to shift my focus to consider
reflective practice in a landscape depopulated of people and where the emphasis is instead
on the discursive. From the very beginning of formulating my research design archaeology
was always intended as an antidote to the highly subjective nature of autoethnography.
Having said that nothing could have prepared me for how radical a shift in thought
archaeology would require. I will move now to discuss the method of archaeology.
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Archaeology
Foucault’s bizarre machinery60
The method61 of archaeology62 was developed by Michel Foucault through his conduct of
three major studies: Madness and
Civilisation (2001), The Birth of the
Clinic (1989) and The Order of Things
Autoethnography

(2002). The method is also described
by Foucault in two of his works: The
Order of Things – A archaeology of the
human sciences (2002) and The
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Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). This
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method can be considered to be a
form of critical reflection (Tully, 1989)
along with genealogy (Koopman,

Figure 4: Archaeology

2013). These methods are in
Koopman and Matza’s terms ‚higher order methodological constraints, limits, and
heuristics that facilitate inquiry‛ (Koopman & Matza, 2013). In this study I have developed
an approach that utilises some aspects of an archaeological method to consider the topic of
reflective practice within social work education in Australia. The description of how this has
been utilised is below. In my construction of the method for this particular study I have

Sheridan (1980, p. 103) discusses Foucault’s attempts to ‚replace the old unities of discourse – oeuvre, authors,
books, themes‛ as a ‚mass of bizarre machinery‛. This machinery distinguishes archaeology from the history of
ideas in four main ways: ‚the attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradictions, comparative descriptions,
and the mapping of transformations‛ (Sheridan, 1980, p. 104).
61 Koopman and Matza (2013, p. 822) discuss the various terms that have been used to describe the tools devised
by Foucault in his pursuit of critical forms of inquiry. These are analytic, method, technique and diagnostic. Their
main point is that each of these suggested terms point to the fact that the tools are ones that work to constrain
and facilitate inquiry, rather than as theories. In this chapter I have utilised the terms method and analytic are used
interchangeably.
62 Archaeology has only the faintest resonance with the academic discipline of archaeology according to Scheurich
& McKenzie (2008, p. 318). In fact to consider Foucault’s archaeological method in terms of geological excavation
is likely to introduce the wrong analogy as the method does not refer to excavation in the sense of digging
beneath. Instead archaeology is descriptive and seeks to consider the surface manifestations of discursive
regimes.
60
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primarily utilised The Archaeology of Knowledge along with a range of secondary sources
(Bernauer, 1990; Graham, 2011; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Sheridan, 1980; Topp, 2000).

Archaeology is a historical method aimed at describing history as a series of discontinuities
rather than as a linear or continuous series of happenings where a development at one point
is a natural outcome of previous events. Foucault was specifically interested in
problematising the knowledge within human systems (Tully, 1999). In Foucault’s terms
(Foucault, 1992, pp. 59-60) archaeology refers to the description of an archive through which
the limits and forms of the sayable, conserved, remembered, reactivated and appropriated
aspects of discourse63 within the field are defined and outlined. These are sometimes
referred to as discursive formations which Foucault discussed as ‚systems of dispersion‛
(Sheridan, 1980, p. 97) of knowledge, a term Foucault preferred to theory, sciences or
disciplines. Davidson (1986, cited in Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1128), in a comparison of
archaeology with the later developed method of genealogy, suggests that ‚archaeology
attempts to isolate the level of discursive practices and formulate the rules of production
and transformation for these practices.‛ Foucault discusses his archaeology as talking about
‚a practice, its conditions, its rules, and its historical transformations at the end of The
Archaeology of Knowledge‛ (Foucault, 1972). This is a point I return to when discussing the
limitations below.

In the context of the archaeological process the outline of these limits and forms creates the
opportunity to ‚treat discourse<as a monument<described in its intrinsic configuration‛
(Foucault, 1992, p. 60); to investigate the conditions of existence of discourses and, lastly to
relate the discourse to the practical field in which it arises and not to the ‚single mind,
thought or subject that engendered it‛ (Foucault, 1992, p. 61). Indeed in this case I am using
archaeology to investigate the emergence of a technique (reflective practice) in a quite

Sayable refers to what serious speech acts are possible in a given discursive field; the conserved denotes those
utterances that are retained and those that disappear; remembered describes speech acts that everyone recognises
and the relation between those retained and things forgotten; reactivation refers to those discourses from previous
times and how they might be reinvented in the present; and lastly appropriation describes the access of groups
and communities to different types of discourse and the rules for how that process occurs (Foucault, 1992, pp. 5960).
63
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specific practical field; i.e.Australian social work education and practice. An archaeological
analytic is thus only possible through the restraint or suspension of an array of unities or
syntheses (Foucault, 1972). These unities are discussed below.

Clearing the space for an archaeological analytic
These syntheses or unities actually work to introduce continuity between happenings across
disparate time and space, and because they act as a backdrop, they undermine the operation
of thought needed to displace this background meaning (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). These
unities enable accounts of history to assume the centrality of humans as a continuous
development. This is a deeply humanist kind of history which ‚allows a reduction of the
difference proper to every beginning‛ (Foucault, 1972, p. 21). Histories of this kind are
sometimes referred to as total histories (Dean, 1994). Archaeology, in contrast, offers a way of
conducting a general history (Dean, 1994); one not concerned with human agency but with
the way in which subjectivities and practices are made possible and visible. Archaeological
histories, through a suspension of unities and syntheses, become able to locate and focus on
discontinuities, series, divisions, events and relations between them (Dean, 1994).

Therefore, an archaeological history of the Foucauldian kind, operates in the space made
possible by two key developments: these are the decentring of the sovereignty of the subject;
and the rejection of the idea that history is about the search of origins, which was developed
by Nietzsche (Bernauer, 1990). This suspension of the unities makes the analytic 64of
archaeology possible. I have created two tables that outline different levels of syntheses that
are in need of suspension. The first table (table six) outlines the two major unities of
hermenuetics and Marxism. Below this is another table (table seven) which includes minor
syntheses that must also be held in suspense. I have included a description and also a
reference to what each synthesis makes possible for a total history.

Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982, p. 56) suggest that archaeology is best described as an analytic because ‚it seeks to
discover the a priori conditions that make possible the analysis practice in each specific discipline including
structuralism.‛
64
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Table 7: Major syntheses

Major syntheses
Kind

Description.

This synthesis makes it
possible:

Hermeneutic.

The phenomena of everyday
experiences which is arrived at
through human interpretation.
Heidegger’s Being and Time resulted
in two kinds of hermeneutics now
translated into social science
methodologies (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1982). The first focuses on
the ‚describing the experience of
everyday life as it is internalized
[sic] in the subjective consciousness
of individuals‛ (Schwandt 2007g, p.
226).

To make the connection of social
practices to human experience,
collective or individual as a way of
providing a continuous history. A
hermeneutic synthesis introduces
the notion that these background
practices can be known through
human consciousness. Thus agency
is assumed and from this flows
many of the minor unities outlined
below.

Marxist.

The second kind is called the
hermeneutics of suspicion and is
associated with Gadamer (Alvesson
& Sköldberg, 2009). The focus here
is on understanding background
practices but with an emphasis on
the collective or shared aspects of
everyday life. This has been
characterised by Foucault as the
Marxist error – where there is a
past ideal state or future to which
one might return or aspire
(Foucault, 1972).

For social scientists and historians
to search beneath the surface for
other hidden or deep meanings.

Table 7 outlines the minor syntheses in need of suspension to enable the work of producing
an archaeological account as outlined by Foucault (1972).
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Table 8: Minor syntheses

First order syntheses
Kind

Description

This synthesis makes it possible:

Tradition

Refers to the search for origins as a way of conducting history. Confers a ‚special
temporal status to a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical‛
(Foucault, 1972, p. 21).

To see history as continuous development from a beginning point to
the present inquiry and thereby ‚isolating the new against a
background of permanence‛ (Foucault, 1972, p. 21).

Influence

Refers to the support to ideas, theories, events that occurs through
communications that introduce causes using instances of repetition and
resemblance (Foucault, 1972).

To link ‚individuals, oeuvres, notions and theories‛ through causal
fictions offered by the apparent similarities across time.

Development or
evolution

The idea that in each event there is a ‚principle of coherence‛ (Foucault, 1972, p.
22) where development is an outcome of assimilation and exchange and has a
beginning point in common which can be traced back to an origin.

The mastery of time and to see current events or statements as an
outcome of previous adaptive strategies.

Spirit.

This is the idea of a collective unconscious which includes symbolic links which
span different times and events (Foucault, 1972, p. 22).

Claim a coherent meaning and explanation for various events and
statements.

Familiar
divisions or
grouping.

Categorisations of various knowledges and genres which are accepted as givens
but are themselves products of history. For example groupings such as ‘art’ and
‘science’.

To take for granted divisions inherited from previous times with the
assumptions that they are unchanging and continuous.

Book.

The synthesis of the book refers to the special pre-eminence given to this object,
and its contents (Foucault, 1972, p. 23). Foucault suggests that books should be
viewed as ‚nodes within a network<and thus cannot be regarded as identical in
each case‛ (Foucault, 1972, p. 23).

To attribute solely to a single subjectivity (the author) ideas and
history when in fact the content may actually be unintelligible
without recourse to a ‚complex field of discourse‛ which renders
thought possible (Foucault, 1972, p. 23).

Oeuvre.

This is a related issue to that of the book in that oeuvre refers to status accorded to
a group of works by a single author and decisions made about their relative
connections (Foucault, 1972, pp. 23-24).

To include or group single author’s works in ways that refer only to
the author and not the discursive formations that enable those works
to manifest.
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This negative work is described by Bernauer (1990, p. 104) as the step which leads to the
‚establishment of a field of effective signs‛. In addition, Bernauer (1990) suggests that the
archaeologist needs to maintain an attentive curiosity ‚aimed at the rarity of what is
said<and embraces an interest in the exteriority of those signs that do come into existence‛
(pp. 105-106). Exteriority represents the notion that what is said can be distinguished from
the consciousness of the person who has said it. Further, an archaeological sensibility includes
sensitivity to the effect of accumulation by which Bernauer means the way in which
discursive events are preserved, combined and spread within a field. Within this field of
effective signs the archaeologist locates the smallest unit within the discourse, i.e. the
statement (Foucault, 1972).

This step proved to be both crucial and extremely challenging. Many of the syntheses
represent the foundational aspects of accepted scholarship where author attribution is seen
as crucial to the avoidance of plagiarism and appropriation of other’s ideas. These are the
very sciences that Foucault turned his attention to in his studies of madness, psychiatry, and
the history of thought. My initial attempts at conducting the archaeological stage proceeded
with the collection of data, which would be considered a reasonable sample by many texts
on discourse analysis (Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Perakyla, 2008; Scheurich & McKenzie,
2008). When I began what I thought was the archaeological analysis I found I could suspend
some second order judgements as recommended (Kendall & Wickham, 1999); however, I
was not confident that I was locating the kind of statements so often discussed in
Foucauldian scholarship within my archive. The suspension of the syntheses makes the
location of the archive possible. What I had been doing was using the syntheses to create a
sample that would work for a discourse analysis concerned with tracing influence of
particular authors or ideas. It would, however, not assist with mapping the field of effective
signs needed for tracing discourse formation in ways that would lead to ‚clarification of the
history of the rules that regulate particular discourses‛ (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p.
1128). I turn next to describe this field and the various components for undertaking this kind
of analysis in addition to having cleared the space through the various suspensions.
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Tracing the field of effective signs – discourse formation
Statements are not merely linguistic; although they do utilise language. Statements are more
than speech or utterances. What makes them extra-linguistic is the view that they are
actually events within the field. Statements can be seen in this way by how they must pass an
institutional test of some kind (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 48). Dreyfus and Rabinow
distinguish Foucauldian speech acts or statements from those outlined in speech act theory
undertaken by John Searle (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 46). Searle’s work is different as it
maintains an interest ‚in how the hearer understands a speech act ‚(Dreyfus & Rabinow,
1982, p. 46, emphasis original).

Archaeological method in contrast is not interested in statements as a representation of a
single consciousness, but rather in their relation to ‚existential rules and conditions‛
(Bernauer, 1990) that delimit the phenomena. Archaeological analysis is concerned with
outlining how statements signal other relations of knowledge, materiality, and their relation
to the field under study. As a result of this difference Foucauldian statements were called
serious speech acts by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982). I follow their lead in discussing
statements within this study as serious speech act/events.
Serious speech act/events (SSA/E)
The next stage in conducting this kind of analytic is to outline a discursive formation which
is made up of SSA/Es. A discursive formation is a group of SSA/Es made possible by a ‚a set
of rules that determine what can be stated at a particular time and how these statements are
related to one another‛ (Bernauer, 1990, p. 107). The rules that must be outlined by the
analyst are those concerned with the formation of:


Objects;



Enunciative modalities;



Concepts; and,



Strategies.

Each of these are part of the field in which ‚archaeological thinking takes place‛ (Bernauer,
1990, p. 110); that is in the archive. The description of them involves different operations of

82
analysis (Graham, 2011). I will outline each in turn and briefly explain the various
operations required to trace the way SSA/Es contribute to a description of discursive
formations. I have relied on a range of key secondary sources in addition to Foucault’s The
Archaeology of Knowledge (AS) for this outline. At the end of this description I will discuss the
limitations of the method for my purposes with this study, paying careful regard to the
contribution an archaeological analytic has for addressing the second question of the study
and for developing the paradigmatic assumptive ground of reflective practice in Australian
social work education and practice.
Objects
Objects are those things which SSA/Es confer coherence on within a field (Bernauer, 1990, p.
108). There are three ways in which the archaeological analytic traces the formation of
objects within discourse. These involve tracing the surfaces of emergence, the authorities of
delimitation and to outline the grids of specification (Foucault, 1972, p. 41). I will deal with
each aspect beginning with surfaces of emergence and use small examples from my study to
illustrate the way these are used to reveal discourses as ‚ practices that systematically form
the objects of which they speak‛ (Foucault, 1972, p. 49).

Topp (2000), in a careful reading and application of Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge,
suggests that surfaces of emergences remain specific to the discursive field with which the
archaeological analytic is concerned. Surfaces of emergence in the case of this study are
those spaces where social work practice is explained and described to others. Therefore,
reflection on practice emerged as an object which could be described, differentiated from
other kinds of practice through various schools of social work across Australia. Moreover,
different processes of reflection also emerged through informal and formal networks
between different schools, often delivered as conference papers, workshops and through
textbooks.

The next analytic move is to trace the authorities of delimitation. Authorities of delimitation
refers to those groups, individuals and professions which are recognised as being positioned
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to speak about the object (Topp, 2000). Thus, for this study, the question became what groups,
individuals, or professions represent authorities of delimitation within this particular field? The
authorities for reflective practice were educators with strong connection to field placement
programs within schools of social work. Other professions who contributed to the
development of reflective practice within this field are educators, particularly educators
influenced by humanist and Marxist ideas about education as a form of transformation and
emancipation.

The final move in revealing the object of this particular discursive field is to trace the
existing bodies of knowledge within the field onto which this object may be grafted or
through which new objects might be detailed. In the case of reflective practice these are
already outlined as methods of social work practice, especially those that already included
introspection or evaluations of practice. While there are a range of models of reflective
practice as objects across the discursive field in this study, they are all effectively traceable to
three main bodies of knowledge: pedagogy (Dewey, 1960; Schon, 1983; Taylor, 1996);
psycho-dynamic and humanist schools of psychology (Miller & Rose, 1988); and critical
social theory (Agger, 1991; Beck et al., 1994). Moreover, in different contexts there are
different emphases on aspects of each of these bodies of knowledge. For example, the critical
reflection model that emerged in Australia is informed by more critical social theory and
pedagogy, and less by psychodynamic knowledge. In contrast, the model that has emerged
in the UK is informed by more psychodynamic knowledge and pedagogy with only limited
aspects of critical theory in the form of work on communicative action65 introduced from the
work of Jurgen Habermas (Ruch, 2002; Ruch, 2007, 2009) and incorporated into it. This is an
example of what Foucault (1972) refers to as locating the grids of specification.

Communicative action is a theory proposed by Jurgen Habermas to take forward the Kantian idea of the lawful
use of reason as being a mechanism for ‚ < reconciling the real and the ideal‛ (Owen, 1999). In this sense it is an
orientation to thinking about the present and its limits which has long been considered as an Enlightenment
ethos. The key difference between Kant and Habermas’ is that Habermas uses a notion of intersubjectivity, which
seats the communicative action on the recognition of the claims of other subjects as being valid participants in a
discourse, provided they meet certain claims and conditions (Bohman & Rehg, 2014).
65
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Enunciative modalities
The next set of traces are those that directly concern how to distinguish ‚who has the right to
make statements, from what site these statements emanate, and what position the subject of
discourse occupies‛ (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 68). There is a caution here that Foucault
discusses at length and which concerns the suspension of the unities described above.
Foucault (1972) is not referring to the consciousness of a single subject but rather the
‚various statuses, the various sites, the various positions that he [sic] can occupy or be given
when making a discourse‛ (p. 54). Topp (2000, pp. 367-369) helpfully provides some
guidance on the three elements through which to trace these modalities. These elements are
individual speaker status, institutional and technical sites and lastly subject positions within the
formation.

Individual speaker status refers to those within this discursive formation who have the right
to make statements regarding social work practice and reflection in particular. In the case of
this study these individuals generally occupied the space between academia and the field of
social work proper. Field education coordinators or directors of field education occupy a
position within a network of relations between the formal curricula and that of the activities
of practice where students are placed within social work agencies. In this regard these
individuals can speak across both arenas and have status in each, albeit through different
mechanisms.

These individuals are able to speak from both places. Within the institutional site of
academia, field education coordinators or directors bring practice expertise and contact with
the activities that constitute social work practice. In the field these individuals are able to
speak with the authority of the institution. The agency sites themselves have differing
statuses as does the kind of practice which these individuals are known for. The field
supplies the technical expertise and this is treated as authentic if it originates through stories
of practice, captured in case studies and manuals of field education and incorporated into
models of practice for students. Only individuals who have practice experience derived

85
from sanctioned arenas of practice are authorised to generate ‚serious speech acts‛ (Dreyfus
& Rabinow, 1982, p. 48) in this particular formation.
The third element is the subject positions made possible within the discursive formation.
Subject positions refer to the ‚possible positions that subjects may take up: positions such as
teacher, expert, leader, follower, observer, commentator, practitioner, measurer or judge.‛
(Topp, 2000, p. 370). Within this study there are a number of subject positions in relation to
reflective practice. These are practicum students, practitioners, students, lecturers,
supervisors, clients, and field educators.
Concepts
This refers to descriptions of the pattern and regularity with which concepts appear within a
given discursive formation. Topp (2000, p. 370), in his discussion, outlines three moves
through which concepts can be traced. Firstly, concepts are traced according to succession
and patterning. This means tracing the way concepts that characterise reflective practice
follow a certain order when it is being articulated and explained. For example, in many
social work texts that outline reflective practice the concept is discussed in relation to theory
and practice, professional artistry, and the impact of social conditions in which social work
operates (Connolly & Harms, 2012; Fook, 1999; Healy, 2014). Secondly, an archaeological
analytic traces forms of coexistence (Foucault, 1972, p. 57). Tracing this includes the way
concepts are included or excluded within a body of knowledge which is to trace a ‚field of
presence‛ (Foucault, 1972, p. 57). The way to trace them includes giving attention to the way
in a body of knowledge they are:


Criticised;



Judged;



Discussed;



Verified by experiment;



Repeated;



Justified by tradition or authority;



Or implied by the ordinary language of practitioners and participants in the discourse
(Foucault, 1972).
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An example could be tracing the term problem within social work professional language and
the way this term has come to denote a certain stance towards practice, which could
characterised as pathologising of clients and their circumstances. The term problem
eventually becomes excluded as a term appropriate for practice through some of the
processes outlined above.

Concepts are also traced according to their relations with or from other domains, which
Foucault outlined as a field of concomitance. This is where concepts from related domains are
utilised within a discursive formation but serve as analogies, models, principles, and forms
of reasoning that support the current discourse. In social work an example would be to trace
the term ‘self-awareness’ and how it served as a rationale for including the practitioner-self
in deliberations on social work practice with others. Foucault also discussed the way an
enunciative field might contain a field of memory (Foucault, 1972). Attention to this part of the
field enables the tracing of any ‚< lingering implicit concepts that filter and transform the
current concepts in use‛ (Topp, 2000, p. 370). Thus, in this line of inquiry concepts were
traced along these three different lines to locate their relations and regularities in order to
illustrate the emergence of reflective practice.

Third, Foucault outlines a range of procedures of intervention (1972, pp. 58-59). Procedures of
intervention are strategies used to transform concepts within discursive formations.
Foucault outlines seven different kinds of procedures, not all of which will be present as
regularities but nevertheless can be traced (Foucault, 1972, pp. 58-59). These procedures are
described in Table 8 below with examples from this study. Only those procedures traceable
in this study are included as examples:
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Table 9: Procedures of intervention

Kind of procedure

Description

Example from this study

Techniques of rewriting.

The way in which elements or descriptions are used from
one area without reference to where they come from using
the same words.

The term critical is a case in point – in social work the term may be used to include a range of
theoretical perspectives associated with Marxism, feminism (Thorpe & Petruchenia, 1990),
Habermas and Bourdieu (Connolly & Harms, 2012; Fook, Hick, & Pozzuto, 2005), whereas the
same term critical can be also used in other disciplines to denote critical analysis with regard to
operations of thought, which include compare/contrast, use of inference, analogy, deduction and
induction (Halpern, 1992).

Methods of transcribing
statements

This is the way common every day natural language
(speech acts) become serious speech acts (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1982, pp. 47-48) through the ‚use of a more or
less formalized *sic+ and artificial language‛ (Foucault,
1972, p. 58).

In social work the phrase ‚use of self‛ denotes a whole language that takes in professional and
personal identity and the socialisation process of becoming a social worker (O'Connor, Wilson, &
Setterlund, 1998).

Modes of translating.

The various means by which qualitative descriptions can
be re-presented as quantitative descriptions and vice versa.

Methods of increasing the
approximation of
statements.

Processes that relate statements to each other within the
discursive field.

Delimitations of validity of
statements.

This is how concepts are made valid within a field by their
inclusion or exclusion.

This is through the authorisation of who can speak about practice. Field education coordinators,
practitioner-academics writing about practice.

Transferring concepts or
statements from one field
of application to another.

Concepts and statements arising in a different discursive
formation can be utilised or transferred to a new formation
decoupled from the original statement or concept.

Schon’s concept about practice and technical rationality were being read onto existing debates
about traditional approaches to casework (Fook, 1996a; Fook & Pease, 1999).

Methods of systematising
propositions.

The mechanisms by which statements that may already be
linked are further rearranged into new systematic wholes.
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While this table describes all seven kinds of procedures utilised within Foucault’s own
scholarship, I have only included those relevant to my deployment of an archaeological
analytic. It has been suggested that this is appropriate and that each inquiry shapes the tools
appropriate to the analytic (Koopman & Matza, 2013). This has been the experience in this
study as the use of archaeological analytic was deployed only to a limited extent within the
research as whole. The main procedures located were where concepts/statements had been
transferred from one field to another and utilised within the context of social work practice; the
methods of transcribing, which refers to the way in which less formal or natural language with
regard to practice is abstracted into a new language incorporating ideas without referencing
back to the original concept(s); and the way in which techniques of rewriting could be seen
with regard to some statements or concepts.
Strategies
Strategies refers to the way in which objects, modalities and concepts form themes or
theories which afford a discursive formation its coherence (Foucault, 1972). Foucault advises
that the configuration of these various aspects should be seen as particular and thus must be
traced through the specificity of each instance of discourse. This means that for this research
utilising an archaeological analytic such strategies must be traced in relation to the
particularities of the actual field of the study. This is a key point often missed in uses of
Foucauldian ideas about discourse (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000); that the concepts and
ideas have arisen in relation to careful tracing of practices and texts under specific
conditions. In my study, this accounts for why some aspects of Foucault’s machinery have
not been traceable or utilised.

Objects, concepts and modalities form themes and theories, which Foucault characterises as
strategies, not least due to the inclusion of practices beyond grammar and language. Locating
this configuration is the final component for tracing a discursive formation using an
archaeological analytic. Again with this tracing there are a number of operations of thought
to be employed. These are the determination of the possible points of diffraction; the economy of
the discursive formation; and lastly the function of the body of knowledge (Foucault, 1972).
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The possible points of diffraction refer to how concepts within a discursive formation can be
incompatible or at odds with each other. Topp (2000, p. 372) offers a range of questions that
assisted in applying this within the archive with regard the points of diffraction:


What incompatibilities are evident in the active body of knowledge?



What alternative approaches and theories are evident within the bodies of
knowledge?



Have alternative approaches developed into coherent theoretical options?

An example of incompatibility can be seen in the way two different kinds of critical
reflection have been combined into one social work model (Fook & Gardner, 2007) and yet
they contain quite different orientations to thinking and reflecting. Both are aimed at a
critique of the present and share their heritage in the Kantian project of enlightenment albeit
from different standpoints (Owen, 1996). The first is oriented to interrogating the gap
between the ideal and the real and can be characterised a form of Habermasian critique or
critical reflection (Ruch, 2002). The second orientation is aimed at interrogating the limits of
the present through problematising all claims to truth through deconstructing the
knowledge and language through which claims are made (Tully, 1999); this deconstruction
includes claims to any ideal state.

These incompatibilities resulted in the development of a postmodern critical perspective (Pease
& Fook, 1999) in Australia, which later proved foundational to the development of the Fook
and Gardner model (discussed above). Both use different aspects of what philosophers
describe as critical reflection (Tully, 1989). Critical notions that are retained include an
analysis of how human wellbeing and agency may be undermined by structures and
processes of oppression and domination. In order for people to cope within such structures
they develop a ‚false consciousness‛ (Little, n. d.). People thus require emancipation from
this false consciousness which, is thought to be best achieved through processes of
conscientisation, mostly through various programs of collective action and dialogue (Healy,
2000).
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By contrast postmodernist66 ideas maintain somewhat different notions about human
agency67. Indeed many of these theories constituted a critique of the various structural ideas
at the heart of a critical theory (Mullaly, 1997, 2007). Thus, from a number of the
poststructural theoretical positions it is doubtful there is a human agent through which
conscientisation might occur (Sarup, 1993). Furthermore, using a postmodernist approach,
processes of emancipation should be subject to scrutiny for the way in which the language
positions people as victims of various sociologically derived structures such as gender, class,
and ethnicity (Jessup & Rogerson, 1999). This is an example of the existence of points of
diffraction.

The economy of the discursive formation is a description of the relations between the
discursive formation being outlined and others contemporary to it. This can also include
discursive formations related to it. Foucault (1972) suggests that discourses may be in
relations of opposition, used as an analogy of something else, or indeed may be
complementary. An example of a strategy at odds with reflective practice within social work
is that of evidence based practice (EBP). Indeed, the two are often set in opposition to one
another with EBP being characterised as a rational planning approach to the use of
knowledge in social work practice (Taylor & White, 2000). Reflective practice is often put up
as an alternative to this kind of technical rational approach to practice. Attempts have been
made to effect a rapprochement between the two approaches (Plath, 2006). An example of
complementary strategy is that of community development, particularly from the critical
tradition (Ife, 2001).

Lastly, to describe the function of various strategies (bodies of knowledge or theories) within
the discursive formation is to outline the positivity that is created between words and things;
where ‚<function can be theorised as a discursive junction-box<and *where words and

I use the term postmodernism here as the authors Pease and Fook (1999), while acknowledging some
differences, used the terms interchangeably but with a preference for postmodernism (p. 9).
67 Early poststructural accounts were an extended critique on the notion of a human subject according to Sarap
(1993) and they do not tend to utilise the term agent as this would undermine the argument that human beings
are only understandable as parts of discursive structures and relations. The term human agency has enjoyed a
resurgence in recent times through the work of Margaret Archer (2000).
66
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things+ become invested with particular relations of power‛ (Graham, 2011, p. 668). An
example can be seen in the following statement ‚The increasing bureaucratization of social
work practice and an emphasis on instrumental accountability have generated approaches
that seek to validate practice discretion and practice wisdom‛ (D'Cruz et al., 2007). Why
would that be the case? The text links bureaucracy and accountability in opposition to
practice discretion and wisdom signalling a relation between practices that is generative of a
relation between knowledge (practice wisdom and discretion) and the effects of another
kind of power relation (accountability).

This concludes my description of the archaeological analytic utilised within this study and
as outlined by Foucault and others. In summary, the crucial factor to consider has been the
particular operations of thought that enable the archive to become available to the analyst, thus
making possible the tracing of objects, enunciative modalities, subjects and strategies. The
actual outline of various tracings is presented as a form of post-rock music as part of the
rhapsody album. This can be found in chapter six. The next section will discuss the issues of
restraining the analysis and the limits to my use of this in relation to the question for this
stage of the study.

Limitations and restraints in the use of an archaeological analytic
Many discussions of problematisation in research consider Foucauldian archaeology as a
grand form that most often operates at the epistemic level (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000;
Bernauer, 1990; Graham, 2011; Kendall & Wickham, 1999). Foucault (1992, p. 54) also
considers the project in which he has deployed an archaeological analytic to be aimed at the
level of the epistemic. By this Foucault meant an archaeological analytic was formulated for
examining ‚disciplines – so unsure of their frontiers, and so vague in content – that we call
the history of ideas, or of thought, or of science, or of knowledge‛ (Foucault, 1972). Alvesson
and Karreman (2000, p. 1134) suggest that analyses of this kind tend to occupy a space at the
level of a macro-systemic focus at the expense of more localised discursive investigations. In
their view it is quite difficult, albeit not impossible, to connect such grand analyses with
more localised studies of talk and text. The implication is that the application of this method
is better reserved for tracing the histories of whole disciplines or histories. Others (Graham,
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2011; Koopman & Matza, 2013) disagree stating that this misses the point that Foucault’s
work was carefully empirical and the many of the tools he developed should not be applied
universally beyond their historical context.

This is a fair point. It has indeed been a difficult task to restrain the archaeological analytic to
the level of the technique at hand. I take some comfort from comments by Foucault himself
and the way in which he discusses his methods as being tools for tracing practices (Foucault,
1972), which is what I have attempted here. I also take some heart from Tully’s (1999, p. 68)
point on the issue of critique being about ‚deliberative judgement, of orienting practical
reason to the unique, local exigencies‛. I have instead utilised only some of the ‚bizarre
machinery‛ formulated by Foucault and deployed these only to the extent needed to inform
this aspect of the overall inquiry. Given this, it is possible to acknowledge that others may
already be able to view reflective practice as one of many ‚techniques of the self‛ well
described in other archaeologies and genealogies of the contemporary neo-liberal period
(Cruikshank, 1996; Rose, 1989, 2008). The archaeology here attempts to trace it as a part of a
local and contingent emergence, which has had consequences for how we approach
learning, teaching and using it in social work education and practice in Australia.

The other limitation of this method is the tendency to want to trend towards totalisation but
in terms of discourse by acting as if ‚individuals are only embodied appendices of various
discourses that have constituted the subjectivity the observer may think that s/he observes‛
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011, p. 1130). My interest in using archaeology was to delineate the
emergence of this now firmly established practice within social work. In light of the almost
complete acceptance of reflective practice as a core social work skill, I was interested in this
totality within my own discipline and wanted to examine it differently than the way
accepted accounts (Fook, 1999, 1996c; Gould & Taylor, 1996; Redmond, 2004; Yelloly &
Henkel, 1995) have characterised it. It is hard to imagine now a social worker declaring their
rejection of reflective practice. It seemed to me that by paying attention to the divisions and
transformations of this practice within my own discipline I would arrive at a more robust
account of its emergence than if I just traced it using the methods of scholarship which
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connect events across time and through the unity of authorship and oeuvre or even through
hermeneutic interpretation (Foucault, 1972). I chose to use it as a method within the study
rather than as the whole methodological approach in order to work against any notion that
social workers using and recommending the practice are without agency.

The other issue is that archaeology in some circles is considered to have been superseded by
other forms of problematisation such as genealogy (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Even Tully
(1999) suggests that certain structural aspects of archaeology were abandoned by Foucault.
Thus, it is more common now to source studies that trace specific power/knowledge
configurations using genealogical analyses than it is to find studies using the earlier
archaeological analytic. As I mentioned earlier, the question for this part of the research was
centred on tracking the emergence of reflective practice, rather than to engage in a thorough
problematisation of its use in social work specifically in relation to power/knowledge
relations. I took heart too from Miller (1997, cited in Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1134)
who offered the idea that:
Whatever the form of the data, Foucauldian discourse studies involve treating the
data as expressions of culturally standardised discourses that are associated with
particular social settings.
Hence, somewhat in spite of these various discouragements, archaeology was adopted and
this offered a focus on texts as well as practices.

To conclude, these limitations all formed important cautionary tales when conceptualising
this study. It is a risky business to incorporate a method that includes the suspension of any
hermeneutic synthesis in a study designed to accomplish a hermeneutic arc between the
experience of a single individual, across a discursive landscape and into the talk and texts of
my fellow professional inhabitants. Lastly, this attempt is not one that tries to say everything
that could be said about reflective practice in Australian social work education; nor has it
been undertaken to lay bare particular power relations between specific individuals or
institutions within the discipline of social work in Australia. Rather, this archaeological
attempt has been made to clear the field of existing structures and ideas linked together by
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the economy of knowledge usual to academic and social work practices, and thus to try to
think differently about the topic of reflective practice.

The next section of this chapter outlines the method utilised in undertaking interviews for
the final stage of the study. In this stage I utilised qualitative interviewing with practitioners,
educators and students on their use of reflective practice in learning and practicing social
work. Participants shared their thoughts not just on what they believe about reflective
practice but how they described the rationale, means and ends, spaces, locations and
practices of contemporary reflective practice.

Qualitative interviews
Introduction
The interview is a well-established method in qualitative research (Silverman, 2007).
According to Warren (2001)
interviews are based on conversation
and as such are informed by a

Autoethnography

constructionist epistemology. In this
respect qualitative interviews
conducted in this study operate
within the empirical realm outlined

Reflective
Practice in
Australian
Social Work
Education

Archaeology

Qualitative
interviews

within critical realist ontology in
addition to being constructionist in

their epistemological foundation.

Figure 5: Qualitative interview

Thus the assumption is that the
accounts generated within this aspect of the whole study offer a partial and incomplete
account about the phenomena of reflective practice. This is because it may be there are
generative mechanisms operating within the domain of the real and actual that may not be
available through this generation of experiential accounts by participants using a method for
understanding phenomena in the empirical domain (Bhaskar, 1998a). The inclusion of
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participants in the study forms an important part of going beyond my own experience and
that of the discursive landscape outlined by earlier parts of the research. This part of the
research forms a dialogue with fellow travellers and thus is characterised as the choral part
of the rhapsody.

According to Fontana and Frey (2008) qualitative researchers generally no longer consider
the interview as a strictly neutral undertaking. Instead interviews are now considered always
already performances, which include ‚ the hows of people’s lives (the constructive work
involved in producing order in everyday life) as well as the traditional whats (the activities
of everyday life)<‛(Fontana & Frey, 2008, p. 119, emphasis and brackets original).
Moreover, the purpose of interviews within social research is acknowledged to be
significantly shaped by various theoretical perspectives (Alvesson, 2011). These perspectives
contain ideas about the subject, object and kinds of knowledge made visible and possible by
interviews of respondents close to phenomena under study. Those from an interpretivist
paradigm see qualitative interviews as being concerned with the meaning and interpretation
of the lifeworlds of participants (Warren, 2001). In this part of the research my interest was in
the ways participants utilise and describe learning reflective practice.

Furthermore I am also taking a lead from Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009) and applying a
fairly minimalist critical interpretative approach ‚<which in the dialectic between
reinforcing and questioning established institutions and ideologies, avoids the unequivocal
adoption of either position‛ (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Thus, my purpose is not to take
the accounts offered through the interview process and apply a thorough-going
deconstructive interpretation of the kind outlined by Alvesson, which he termed DReflexivity (Alvesson, 2011). This kind of reflexivity includes destabilising practices such as
problematisation and destablisation of taken-for-granted certainties and is a particular kind
of critical reflection (Tully, 1989). This kind of reflexivity is taken up in other aspects of the
study.
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Rather, in this qualitative stage of the study my aim was to institute another kind of
reflexivity more concerned with reconstructive techniques. This reflexivity is discussed by
Alvesson as R-reflexivity (Alvesson, 2011). R-reflexivity involves pointing out alternative
ways to conceptualise an issue, or even a premature closure of possibilities. The aim is to
‚<provide alternative descriptions, interpretations, results, vocabularies, voices and points
of departure< ‛(Alvesson, 2011). Both kinds of reflexivity ideally work together and this is
the case in research as a whole but for this stage primarily I am utilising a reconstructive
kind of critical interpretion.

In addition, this stage utilising qualitative interviews was undertaken in order to move the
inquiry beyond my own experience and that of the archaeological analytic of the previous
stages. In terms of the research as a whole this line of inquiry addresses interpretative level
one (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) and is therefore focussed on accounts in interviews and
the use of empirical materials. The other level of a reflexive methodology addressed in this
part of the research is that of ‚critical interpretation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) of the
ideological, power and socially reproductive mechanisms can be described. Therefore, this
stage was designed as a way to consider the political-practical-moral assumptions about
reflective practice, which participants might or might not share as an element of their
membership in the profession of social work. In light of this focus an explicit analysis of how
participants valued reflective practice was included and is discussed in chapter seven.

Methods
Kind of interviews
A semi-structured format for the interviews was chosen as appropriate as this allowed for a
‚series of predetermined but open-ended questions‛ (Ayres, 2008, p. 811) exploring a range
of topics related to learning and using reflective practice. This process allows for the
interview to range away from predetermined questions but still offers some structure to the
encounter. Three different interview guides in the form of a series of questions or open
ended statements was developed (see Appendix G). The interview guides were approved by
the ECU Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). I conducted all 14 interviews, either
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by phone or in person at a location and time convenient to the participant. Time allocated
for each interview was 40 minutes with the average duration of 32 minutes.
Consent procedures
The procedure approved by HREC had three stages. On recruitment participants were sent
the information letter and consent form and asked to read and return a signed consent form
to me either by email if remote or in person depending on how the interview was
conducted. Before commencing each interview, I again explained the purpose of the
interview, the confidentiality provisions, and asked participants if they wished to proceed. I
also asked for verbal consent to audiotape the interview. All participants returned signed
consent forms and gave verbal consent before the interview commenced.

Interviews were transcribed verbatim by a reputable transcription service and returned to
participants for their approval and/or amendment. Participants were asked to give final
consent to be included in the data analysis. All 14 interview participants gave consent for
their interview to be included in the analysis.
Empirical materials produced
The final tally of data included 14 interviews which represents a total of 77,360 words. The
total time of audio recording was 468.01 minutes/seconds.
Process of analysis
First stage
There were three stages to the analysis. This involved two main cycles of coding and then a
process of categorising to analyse for emergent themes. The first cycle included preparing
the transcripts by firstly de-identifying each of them and instituting a tracking process for
following up the numbering ascribed to each of the paragraphs on each interview transcript.
This was to enable easy tracking after which I utilised an open coding process as
recommended by Saldana (2012). The units of analysis were generally phrases or meaning
units within the transcript and I utilised a form of condensation ‚which entails an
abridgement of the meanings expressed by participants into shorter formulations‛ (Kvale,
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1996, p. 192). These formulations were highlighted, numbered and placed next to the
emerging codes. The codes were then entered into a word document table along with the
phrase or meaning unit identifier. After I coded all the interviews using this method, I wrote
a number of analytic memos about what I thought the main overall themes might be at this
first stage.

I also utilised a computer program called wordle68 to consider the frequency of particular
codes that had resulted from the process (Lake, 2015). I removed the word reflection for this
block of text to concentrate on other phrases or meaning units. Lastly in this phase of the
analysis, I also separated out all the phrases used by participants about the barriers to
reflection and utilised Wordle to create a word-cloud of these ideas about barriers. I have not
specifically addressed barriers to reflection in the discussion of the analysis presented in
chapter seven primarily because it did not emerge as a significant aspect of the inquiry.
Nevertheless, I have included these word-clouds can be seen in Appendix I.
Second stage
After this initial open coding process, a second stage to the analysis was initiated. This
second stage was conducted on the open codes that resulted from the first stage. Open codes
were entered into a table with a separate row for each code. The exception was the codes
concerned with barriers. These were omitted from this second stage and excluded from this
table. A column entitled values codes was added to the table. Four other columns were also
added to the table. These columns were to enable coding for a domain analysis, which is
discussed below. Using this table and working between the initial codes in column one and
the transcripts I began the analysis with the practical-moral descriptions by participants
about reflective practice in terms of values, attitudes and beliefs. The second stage table can be
seen in Appendix I.

Wordle is a program for generating word clouds. These word clouds are produced by the frequency with
which words appear in a block of text that is uploaded to the program. The program can be accessed at
https://www.google.com.au/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=wordle
68
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I chose a schema to assist with analysing for the political-practical-moral expressions of
participants with regard to reflective practice. This schema was one that explicitly enables a
focus on value dimensions. Saldana (2012) suggests that this schema is ‚ < appropriate for
virtually all qualitative studies, but particularly for those that explore cultural values,
identity, intrapersonal and interpersonal participant experiences and actions<‛ (p. 111).
Utilising this schema I analysed the open codes to consider the values, attitudes and beliefs
about reflective practice expressed by participants. The coding process was challenging
especially with regard to values, attitudes and beliefs. Saldana (2012) too admits that the
boundary between values, attitudes and beliefs may be slippery. Nevertheless from this
cycle of coding a number of categories emerged and could be grouped under values,
attitudes and beliefs.

It also meant that I needed to institute an extra procedure within the coding and
categorising process due to the way in which participants often used similar words but these
may have different meanings. As I was undertaking the second cycle of coding I would tag
cases where I found I had coded similar items to separate categories. I would then revisit the
transcript, and in some cases the audio as well, to check my interpretation of the sensemaking of the participant. I recorded analytic memos about these instances in order to aid
the final analysis.
Third stage
Using the remaining four columns in the table I conducted a further layer of analysis which
result in a number of themes that outlined the reasons and practices for using, teaching and
learning reflective practice. I chose to conduct a domain analysis for doing this (Saldaña,
2012, p. 157). Domain analysis is a method of analysis that is considered interpretative and is
a way of presenting the cultural knowledge associated with the topic of reflective practice. The
first step in a domain analysis is to analyse for specific terms within the data. This had
occurred during the first cycle of coding. In this second stage of coding I undertook an
analysis of the semantic relationships which participants outlined in their discussion of
reflective practice. There are nine possible semantic relationships that might be coded for, as
outlined by Spradley (1979, cited in Saldaña, 2012). I chose to consider only four out of the
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nine as these four directly related to the focus of the research question. These were meansend; rationale; location for action and function (Saldaña, 2012). According to Sells, Smith and
Newfield (1997) not all semantic relationships will be relevant to all ethnographic research. I
present the results of the analysis as the third track of the album, a choral piece within the
rhapsody. I have included the coding sheets in Appendix I.
Representing and theming the data
Once the codes were stabilised through this second cycle of coding I then undertook a
further process to categorise the values, attitudes and beliefs and the four semantic
relationships discussed above. A sheet for each was prepared and the data from the master
sheet was cut and pasted into these documents. This step also included cutting and pasting
the initial codes or meaning units and statements into the sheets and grouping them
together. This enabled a systematic progression from code to category to theme in the case of
values, attitudes and beliefs. A graphical representation became possible as it could pick up
the relative weighting of each theme based on the analysis. The same process was
undertaken with the domain analysis categories. The progression of the domain analysis
from codes to themes and finally to graphical representations are also included in Appendix
I. Discussion of the resulting themes is outlined in chapter seven. I turn now to discuss the
participants.

Participant information
Fourteen participants were recruited for this part of the study using purposive sampling69
(Palys, 2008). Three different groups were identified as important to building understanding
on the uses of reflective practice and confirmed through the conduct of the autoethnography
and the archaeology. These were social work practitioners, educators and students. Each
group required different processes of recruitment. For the educators participants were
recruited through my own networks. I chose not to interview social work educators from
within the social work team at my own institution. This is because these colleagues were
already familiar with the study and I was in a leadership role for most of the study, which
Purposive sampling is where participants are chosen on the basis of their connection to the aims of the research
(Palys, 2008). Even though it is considered to be fairly standard within qualitative research there are different
criterion that might be utilised to decide on where, what and how to recruit participants. In this case I recruited
for ‚typical cases‛ for three different categories of participants: social work students, practitioners and educators.
These ‘cases’ were suggested as key informants based on the other outcomes of the previous lines of inquiry.
69
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might introduce a potential conflict of interest to the interviews. Five educators in total
participated in the study; three from Western Australia, one from South Australia and one
from Queensland. All the educators were women. No other demographic information was
collected as this was not deemed relevant to the study.

In contrast to that of educators, the recruitment of students was undertaken through my
own institution, although attempts were made to recruit from other Bachelor of Social Work
(BSW) courses. To recruit student participants I initially placed posters around campus
about the research calling for participants; however, I received no inquiries through this
method. Ethics approval was sought for a change in recruitment methods. This approval
allowed recruitment via direct email to students through an ‘all-student’ program
Blackboard70 community site in which all students are automatically enrolled if they are
enrolled in the BSW. The recruitment emails for this process is included in Appendix F.
Students who met the following criteria were eligible to participate in the study:
1. Must have successfully completed one semester in a BSW course.
2. Have undertaken at least one reflective practice assessment.
3. Should not be enrolled in any units of which I am the unit coordinator or lecturer
during the interview phase of the study (July 2014 – December 2014).
The first criteria and second criteria were aimed at ensuring that student participants had
experienced at least one semester enrolled within a BSW course and had experienced
learning reflective practice through an assessment process. These criteria were included in
the email invitation. It was hoped that these provisions would assist participants to provide
an informed view in relation to the research question. The third criterion was discussed with
students who indicated interest in participating. This criterion was included to ensure that
the students’ participation was free of coercion resulting from my assessment of assignment
work. Three of the four students were female. All were mature aged students; two were
already practicing within the human services in addition to studying social work students.
Two students were in their first year, one was a second year student and one was in third
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Blackboard is the name of the learning management system (LMS) utilised in my university.
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year of their course about to commence field placement. No other demographic information
was collected.

In order to recruit social work practitioners I sent an email invitation to a local human
services agency network with approximately 1200 members asking for participants. The
criterion for participating was that the person had to be eligible for membership of the
AASW71. When potential participants contacted me I asked them how long they had been in
practice as I was keen to include both new graduates72 and more experienced practitioners.
Practitioner participants were also recruited through my professional networks. A total of
five interviews were conducted with social work practitioners. Two practitioners were new
graduates and the other three were experienced ranging from three years to 11 years in
practice. All practitioners were women. The practitioners were practicing in the following
fields:


Health



Child protection



Justice



Aged care

No other demographic information was collected.

Limitations of qualitative interviews
Interviews by their very nature are open to a range of criticisms. Kvale (1996) in his
treatment of qualitative interviews suggests two different metaphors: interviewers as miners
or as travellers. Miners conceptualise the role of the interviewer as one where nuggets of
truth or meaning are ‚< uncovered, uncontaminated by the miner <nuggets of data or
meanings *are dug out+ of the subject’s pure experiences, unpolluted by leading questions.‛
(Kvale, 1996, p. 3). In this metaphor nuggets of knowledge remain pure and unchanged by
the interpretative process of the miner/interviewer. The other metaphor is of a different kind
where the interviewer is a traveller. Kvale (1996, p. 4) describes this approach as one that is

Eligibility for membership is only possible if the person has graduated from an AASW accredited school of
social work or were eligible after an assessment by the AASW of their overseas qualifications.
72 Defined as graduated within two years at the time of the study.
71
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akin to collecting stories from conversations one has with people throughout the
traveller/interviewers journey and which will be told as ‚ < stories < to the people of the
interviewer’s own country, and possibly also to those with whom the interviewer
wandered.‛ The traveller interprets these stories for different audiences and they are ‚ <
validated through their impact on the listeners‛ (Kvale, 1996, p. 4). These two metaphors
correspond to different research perspectives. Kvale considers the key contrast between
these metaphors is that the miner represents a mainstream conception of knowledge in social
sciences and the traveller could be seen as a postmodern perspective. My view is that the
difference is rather between an objective epistemological perspective and that of the more
constructionist/subjectivist positions (Crotty, 1998). Subjectivist epistemology can
encompass other research paradigms such as interpretivist, critical and postmodern
(Robertson, 2007). Kvale (1996) uses these metaphors to provide a contrast in the various
objections to interviews. As the traveller metaphor more closely represents the way in which
interviews have been included in the research my focus is primarily on these internal
critiques raised by Kvale. Table 10 outlines my response to each of the critiques:
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Table 10: Response to Kvale’s critiques

Kvale’s (1996, p. 292) - internal critiques

My response

Individualistic, it focuses on the individual and
neglects a person’s embeddedness in social
interactions.

Questions were asked about the social context of the interviewer with regard to the topic. Interviewees were also asked about their
experience with social work and also their own learning of reflective practice. Other aspects of the whole study (archaeology,
autoethnography) provided context for choosing who to include as participants in an interview stage.

Idealistic, it ignores the situatedness of human
experience and behaviour in a social and
material world.

This research is not claiming that the interviews in this study are able to, or likely to capture all elements of human experience of the
respondents. Nevertheless it is true that every act of asking a question involves interpretation by both the interviewer and interviewee
(Gibbs, 2011, November 21).

Intellectualistic, it neglects the emotional
aspects of knowledge, overlooks empathy as a
mode of knowing.

The interviews were conducted with participants with whom I share experiences in terms of education experiences and in some respects
practice and learning experiences. Thus the interview process was conducted as a conversation between fellow inhabitants within a
professional field, albeit with different subject positions. Using techniques of rapport building, tone of voice, showing interest and allowing
the interview to flow as a conversation assisted with ensuring the interview was not a primarily intellectual interview.

Immobile, the subjects sits and talk, they do not
move or act in the world.

This is a limitation of interviews however interviews by themselves may be seen as a form of action if we take the view that interviews are
more than a one-way communication and that the conduct and interaction between interviewee and interviewer is a form of action (Gibbs,
2011, November 21).

Cognitivist, it focuses on thoughts and
experiences at the expense of action.

Participants were asked questions that would elicit responses that would yield views about where and how reflective practice takes place
in their experience, not just what they think about the topic. The data analysis also considered the topic in relation to actions in practice.

Verbalising, it makes a fetish of verbal
interaction and transcripts, neglects the bodily
situatedness of the interview.

This is a limitation of interview research generally. There was recognition that the transcribing process contributes to the erasure of the
bodily aspects of the interview. This made consulting the audio important during the analysis where there were a few instances which
required re-listening to the audio recording as this offered a better sense of the meaning of particular points made by a participant.

Alinguistic, although the medium is language,
linguistic approaches are ignored.

The forms of data analysis did not encompass a linguistic analysis of the interviews as this did not fit with the aims and research questions
of the inquiry. Nevertheless it can be acknowledged as a limitation of the analysis which focused on instances at the expense of sequences
which would have been closer to a linguistic approach. A linguistic analysis was therefore beyond the scope of the study.

Atheoretical, it entails a cult of interview
statements, and disregards theories of the field
studied.

The conduct of the interviews has been informed by three kinds of theory: Critical, poststructural and interpretative. This means that the
analysis was informed by an acknowledgement of intersubjective nature of interviews, the possible power relations, and the way in which
interpretations of the topic can be informed by the way in which the questions and interview proceed.

Arhetorical, published reports are boring
collections of interview quotes, rather than
convincing stories.

I have utilised Borum and Enderud’s (1980, cited in Kvale’s 1996, pp. 266-267) guidelines for reporting interview quotes. They entail
keeping them short, contextualising them through their placement within a wider discussion of my analysis and interpretation of the study,
rendered into written form for ease of reading and all identifying information removed.

Insignificant, it produces trivialities, and
hardly any new knowledge worth mentioning.
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Another limitation is the standard one that concerns sampling. The sample was never
intended to be representative of the whole professional social work body. Instead, the
sample was chosen to represent the main subject positions that emerged as significant to the
development of reflective practice within Australian social work specifically. These positions
were social work practitioners, educators, field educators and students and they emerged as
significant through the discourse analysis in the archaeological phase of the research. In
terms of sample size, or how many people to interview, pragmatic considerations were
important (Baker & Edwards, 2012). The qualitative interviews represented only a third of
the study as a whole and were conducted as the last stage of the research. Three main
subject positions were chosen with the understanding that participants may have occupied
more than one of these potential positions and thus would be able to draw on experiences
beyond the primary category. Thus, a minimum of three participants and a maximum of five
in each category would be sufficient to provide a picture of contemporary perspectives on
reflective practice. I found that three out of five educators recruited had been field
educators. Two out of four of the recruited practitioners had been educators at some point in
their careers. One significant limitation with regard to the student participants was that none
of them had experienced a field placement, although two out of four students already
possessed practice experience in the field. Field placement experience had not been a
condition for participation. This represents an area for future exploration. All participants
had experiences as social work students to draw on in their discussion. In conclusion, whilst
there are considerable limitations to qualitative interviews, I have attempted to address
these through careful attention to research design, maintaining a reflexive attitude to the
limits of interviews and the issues of representation and sample size. Other issues pertaining
to assessment of quality in qualitative research are addressed below in the table presented in
the interlude following this chapter.

Ethical considerations
There have been different ethical considerations for each of the different stages. This section
includes a discussion of the ethical issues that pertain to the research that move beyond the
institutional approval given by the institutional review board of my institution. As
mentioned above the study has been approved by the Edith Cowan University Human
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Research Ethics Board (WATTS 5875). In this section I want instead to briefly discuss the
ethical stance that has informed the conduct and subsequent production of this research.
Ethical issues
Miles and Huberman (1994, cited in Higgs & Paterson, 2005) outlined a number of key
questions every social researcher should consider whilst conducting social research. These
questions relate to the issues of worthiness of the project, competence and trustworthiness of
the researcher, informed consent, benefits, costs and reciprocity between the researcher and
participants, harms and risks, issues of privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity, and lastly,
integrity and quality. In this section I mainly focus on worthiness of the project, competence
and integrity and quality. Confidentiality and informed consent processes have been
outlined above.

Tracy (2010) suggests that the worthiness of a project relates to its timeliness, relevance,
significance and whether the topic is interesting. This research began with my desire to
explore a particular practice within my own discipline for the purposes of seeing how
teaching it might be improved. The timing seemed right to consider how the profession of
social work understood this core skill which was being named as essential in an increasingly
prescriptive set of national social work education and accreditation standards (Australian
Association of Social Work, 2013a; Australian Association of Social Workers, 2010b) and the
ever evolving practice standards for the profession (Australian Association of Social
Workers, 2003, 2013b). The near complete acceptance of it, I sensed amongst colleagues and
in various literatures, indicated that being reflective was a significant marker of a good social
worker. This also sparked my curiosity. Moreover, the practice had been in use for some
time in the discipline with enough documentary and research evidence and debate to make
an inquiry possible from the point of view of testing its limits. In terms of making the topic
interesting, given the ubiquity of materials about reflective practice, the choice of pursuing a
methodology that would problematise it rather than attempt to spot gaps (Alvesson &
Sandberg, 2013) was used in an effort to contribute interest to the topic.
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Problematisation brings its own ethical dilemmas. Problematisation can be uncomfortable
but it is not necessarily unethical. It is uncomfortable precisely because it often targets the
very things that one has assumed as settled, and which form the background horizon within
a community of practice or, in this case, a discipline (Koopman, 2013). This background is
often not open for critique. In considering how to design a study that would consider this
limit or horizon I considered the following question. On what basis was I warranted to
engage in this kind of limit testing? One driver of the research was my commitment to
teaching practice within my discipline and this has been important to how the research has
been conceptualised and conducted. I was aware of how beloved this practice was for my
fellow teachers and scholars and how much effort had informed its development within the
discipline. I am taking my cue here from Hammersley (2005, p. 183) where he suggests that:
It is also important that the main business of academic criticism does not come to focus
primarily on the character or competence of other researchers, or on the way they have
pursued their work, rather than on the knowledge claims they have put forward.
My aim was to build on these efforts first through engaging in a thorough exploration of
them. The methods chosen were in large part intended to pay due respect to these efforts
and the knowledge-creation of my own discipline but I wanted to do so in a way that
effectively tests its limits, respectfully, but without losing sight of how ‚< research
knowledge is always implicated in the operation of power‛ (Hammersley & Traianou, 2014,
p. 229).

The issue of designing research also relates to the competence of the researcher. Competence
is an issue which Miles and Huberman raise as an important ethical question. My response
is to wonder if anyone knows what competence is required in advance of conducting their
research. In terms of competence I had been a member of research teams, had led research
projects myself and had participated in various research projects as a subject prior to
embarking on this doctoral research. The skills and knowledge from these experiences
provided a place to begin. I chose methods that would extend the boundaries of these skills
and my knowledge of social research. With this in mind I also chose my supervisory panel
with regard to their skills, knowledge and values and worked to remain as open as possible
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to their advice and critiques of the approach taken. I benefited enormously by being
surrounded by trusted colleagues and opportunities to discuss and receive feedback on my
research in various forums over the life of the study. These measures I think have
contributed greatly to building the required competence to carry it out.

There are, of course, ethical considerations that occur in the context of specific methods.
Thus the autoethnography, conducted as a first stage in the research, introduced a range of
ethical dilemmas that were in the end to act as sensitising forces for the conduct of the latter
archaeology and qualitative interviews. The issue of representation especially with regard to
autoethnography can be summed up in the adaption of a question posed by Clandinin and
Connelly (2000, cited in Tolich, 2010, p. 1599): Do I own the story of my learning and teaching of
reflective practice just because I tell it? My learning of reflective practice involved others as has
my teaching of it. What rights do these others have in the telling of this story of my journey
from student, to practitioner to lecturer? What ethical considerations must be considered as I
represent the voices of participants in the qualitative interviews? What issues of
representation are there in the conduct of archaeology? I have utilised the 10 ethical
guidelines for autoethnography as outlined by Tolich (2010) to address some of these
concerns. The guidelines are grouped under the following headings: consent, consultation,
and vulnerability. The table below outlines these and my responses and the processes that
resulted for this study.
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Table 11: Responses to Tolich's ethical criteria

Items

Tolich’s guidelines (2010, pp. 1607-1608)
1. Respect participants’ autonomy and the voluntary
nature of participation, and document the informed
consent processes that are foundational to qualitative
inquiry.

No participants were interviewed for the autoethnographic or archaeological stages of the
research. Colleagues, students and others with whom I discussed my study were made aware of
the nature of the research and that some of the study included writing stories that could contain
elements of our conversations, especially in the autoethnographic study. Any vignettes or stories
that contained elements that made the participants identifiable were discarded. Published
documents and sources were utilised in the archaeology, other documents such as unit plans
were considered to be public domain.

2. Practice ‚process consent,‛ checking at each stage to
make sure participants still want to be part of the project.
3. Recognize the conflict of interest or coercive influence
when seeking informed consent after writing the
manuscript.
4. Consult with others, like an Institutional Review Board
(IRB) (Chang, 2008; Congress of Qualitative Inquiry).

This occurred for participants in the qualitative interviews.

5. Autoethnographers should not publish anything they
would not show the persons mentioned in the text.

Only elements of the study deemed suitable were included in the autoethnographic part of the
study, which has been published in a paper in Social Work Education – the International Journal.

6. Beware of internal confidentiality: the relationship at
risk is not with the researcher exposing confidences to
outsiders, but confidences exposed among the
participants or family members themselves.

Due to the nature of the study care has been taken to centre the autoethnographic gaze firmly on
my own practice, rather than that of others with whom I work or teach. Vignettes that recount
dialogue have been created from a range of different conversations over a time span of 12 years.
Care has been taken to ensure these do not include confidences that would be considered risky,
or detrimental to anyone or their families.

Consent

Consultation

My response

Retrospective consent was not required for this research.

The whole proposal, including the intended autoethnographic stage, was approved by the IRB
of Edith Cowan University.

Archaeological analysis does not centre on individuals. Care has been taken to ensure
confidentiality and privacy is preserved in the qualitative interviews including how the quoted
materials of participants is offered, framed and discussed in the text.

Vulnerability
7. Treat any autoethnography as an inked tattoo by
anticipating the author’s future vulnerability.

I discussed my own vulnerability within supervision and with two close trusted colleagues
during all stages of the research as a strategy for considering present and future personal costs
of the research. The final study is presented as my acceptance of any future vulnerability and
thus stands as my version of an inked tattoo.

8. Photovoice anticipatory ethics claims that no photo is

Due care has been taken to anticipate whether each story of the autoethnography could cause
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worth harming others. In a similar way, no story should
harm others, and if harm is unavoidable, take steps to
minimize harm.
9. Those unable to minimize risk to self or others should
use a nom de plume as the default.

harm and efforts to de-identify any critical incidents and descriptions in vignettes without losing
the sense of the story or illustration have been made.

10. Assume all people mentioned in the text will read it
one day.

The autoethnography, archaeology and qualitative interviews have been written with this view
in mind and thus all care has been taken with how myself and others are represented and
discussed.

In terms of my own vulnerability I do not believe the study represents a scale of risk that makes
the use of a non de plume necessary. I have taken due care to ensure I have represented the
work of others fairly and with due courtesy.
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In conclusion, Tolich’s criteria have been immensely helpful not just for considering
autoethnography but in also consideration of how participant voices might be represented.
In terms of the archaeology these criteria have also been effective for thinking about how the
ideas and work of others should be included and discussed.

Conclusion to chapter four
This chapter concludes the album notes for this reflective rhapsody. Here I have outlined the
methods (instrumentation) chosen for the ‘tracks’ of the album and discussed the processes
and limitations of each. I have also discussed the ethical issues of conducting each of these
different approaches to the research. In the next chapter the first track of the album
commences with the performance of the autoethnography.
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Inte rlude 4
Quality in qualitative research
This interlude acts as a conclusion to the ‘album notes’ section of the thesis. It seemed a good
point at which to pause and reflect on the aims, theories and methods utilised in this
research and to engage in something of a self-assessment of the research for which I have
used criteria developed by Tracy (2010) as a guide. First, the aim is consider the ways in
which reflective practice is understood in a specific discipline but in a limited field. This
field is Australian social work education and practice. In this research I have utilised critical
theory, post-structuralism and interpretivism as the theoretical melodies (framework) and
seated within a reflexive methodology, these ideas have informed my choice of methods to
aid in developing three different lines of inquiry about the topic. Each of these lines of
inquiry has called on different kinds of thinking and I have experienced this as incredibly
challenging as it stretched my thinking in ways I did not know were even possible.
Table 12: Responding to calls for quality in qualitative research

Criteria

My response

Worthy topic - The topic of the research
is:

Relevant

Timely

Significant

Interesting

How Australian social work education understands reflective practice
presented as a timely topic given the increasing emphasis on
reflexivity in the practice, education and accreditation standards of
the social work profession. I have chosen a problematisation
approach given the widespread acceptance of the need for reflective
practice.

Rich rigor - The study uses sufficient,
abundant, appropriate, and complex

Theoretical constructs

Data and time in the field
Sample(s)

Context(s)

Data collection and analysis
processes
Sincerity - The study is characterized by

Self-reflexivity about subjective
values, biases, and inclinations
of the researcher(s)

Transparency about the
methods and challenges.

The study has been conducted over a significant period, involved a
range of methods of data collection including documentary analysis,
interpretative methods of autoethnography, discourse analysis and
interviews to consider the topic across a range of research question.
Data collection has been systematic and examples included in order
illustrating the approaches taken to analysis.

Credibility - The research is marked by

Thick description, concrete
detail, explication of tacit
(nontextual) knowledge, and
showing rather than telling

Triangulation or crystallization

Multivocality

Member reflections

I have adopted an explicitly reflexive methodology and incorporated
a number of opportunities to reflect on the text production and
conduct of the research. These include transparency about the various
challenges associated with conducting the research using quite
different methods. I have included my own voice at times but tried
not to let this overwhelm the voices of others or the discursive
elements as much as possible. I discovered just what a balancing act
that can be.
I incorporated three different approaches to undertaking the research.
Given the use of different methods the amount of concrete detail and
description is considerable. I have not explicitly included member
reflections but I have worked to preserve and honour the sensemaking of participants as much as possible.
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Criteria

My response

Resonance - The research influences, affects, or
moves particular readers or a variety of
audiences through:

Aesthetic, evocative representation

Naturalistic generalizations

Transferable findings.
Significant contribution - The research provides
a significant contribution:

Conceptually/theoretically

Practically

Morally

Methodologically

Heuristically.

I have explicitly utilised a metaphoric structure to present
the research, employing evocative methods to describe
various experiences. Feedback from naïve readers suggests
that various aspects of the research resonate, are moving
and suggestive of connections to their own experience.

Ethical – The research considers:

Procedural ethics (such as human
subjects)

Situational and culturally specific ethics

Relational ethics

Exiting ethics (leaving the scene and
sharing the research).
Meaningful coherence - The study

Achieves what it purports to be about

Uses methods and procedures that fit its
stated goals

Meaningfully interconnects literature,
research questions/foci, findings, and
interpretations with each other:

The study has resulted in a theoretically informed approach
to the teaching, use and practice of critical reflection. The
study has built on an extended understanding of reflective
practice. The research has applied a methodological
approach to the deployment of methods which are not
usually utilised together. The limitations and prospects
suggested by doing so could be seen as a significant
contribution.
Ethics approval for the study was granted by the ECU
Human Research Ethics Committee. Informed consent for
participants was sought and participants were given
multiple opportunities to withdraw. Participants were asked
to approve and/or amend their interview transcripts.

A great deal of attention has been given to achieving
coherence between research aims, design, methodology and
method, data and analysis. The use of the concept album
structure was one mechanism chosen to support the
conception of this being a single piece of research that
pursued three different lines of inquiry. The song structure
hopefully assists with linking theory, data analysis and
findings.

In the next sections I present the ‘tracks’ of the album. We will begin with the
autoethnographic study which has been presented as Track 1 and which features a solo
performance. My voice is strong in this track. In chapter six I present the archaeological line
of inquiry tracing the emergence of reflective practice and this is represented as a post-rock
anthem focussed on a discursive landscape of contingent relations, knowledges and
practices. The voices of participants are presented in chapter seven and represented as a
choir performance of the main themes to emerge about the value and use of reflective
practices in contemporary Australian social work education and practice. Chapter eight
returns to the overall aim of the research and presents something of a finale bringing
together my voice, participants and the discursive to offer my conclusions and
recommendations for teaching and learning critical and reflective practice(s) for social work.
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Cha pter 5
T r a c k 1 - A u t o e t h n o g r a p h y ( f e a t u r i n g a S o l o 73)

Introduction
Singing and playing a reflective song
This chapter presents the autoethnographic study. The aim of this autoethnography was to
address the research question:
what was my own experience of
learning, using and teaching

Autoethnography

reflective practice?
Autoethnographic writing is
often presented in a range of
formats which utilise different

Reflective
Practice in
Australian
Social Work
Education

literary (Richardson, 2001) and

Archaeology

Qualitative
interviews

artistic techniques (Kidd &
Finlayson, 2009; Spry, 2001). The
chapter has been written using a

Figure 6: Presenting the autoethnography

verse, chorus and bridge
structure taken from popular song forms (Owens, n. d.). The chapter is represented as a solo
performance.

Each vignette is presented as a verse and the explanatory discussion elements of the study
have been presented as bridges, both in the musical sense but also with the purpose of
making connections through explicating the relation of the verse to the aims of the inquiry.
Lyrics from various songs make up the choruses of the performance. These choruses have a
range of functions within the autoethnographic process. In some cases they serve to indicate
The Oxford Dictionary of Music describes solo ‚<A vocal or instr. piece or passage perf. by one performer, i.e.
a solo song is for one singer, with or without acc. The solo instr. in a conc. might also be acc. by a solo passage for
one of the orch. players.‛ ("Solo", 2015, n. p.)
73
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shadow material (Estés, 1998), unspoken fragments, or a change in the emotional register
within the wider song. The verses are presented as different forms of writing. There are
examples of my reflective thinking utilising various models of reflective practice, and some
journal extracts. Also included are other forms of speaking back to key texts such as a Unit
Plan and in two cases to my own previous work/reflections. I have also incorporated a
number of fictional dialogues about teaching and learning. Lastly some vignettes have been
represented as songs and steps in a performance as well.

The verses are not presented in chronological order and do not depict moving from my
undergraduate years through to my years as a lecturer. I did not want to present this process
of considering my learning and teaching of reflective practice as a movement from
unknowing to knowing how to be reflective. To do so implies that once learned, it is learned
forever. To represent it that way would be to work against what I actually found in
undertaking the process. Instead, I conceptualised the movement to be rather more like a
song with a central theme but which can deepen and change with the progression of the
music. I am hopeful that even without the movement in chronological order, the piece is
sensible. The bridges within the performance are intended to lift the weight of sense-making
across the whole piece.

Verse 1: Instrumental opening<
The song begins here<
Walking, walking<I feel the stretch lengthen my calves as I pick up speed, welcoming the
slight pain as proof of effort. I experiment with striding according to the beat of the
music<its dark out, no-one around<I always just assume I am safe out at night. It was my
daughter who asked me if I should go out at night? I hesitated a bit, realising I hadn’t
thought about safety. I like the cover of night, even like not wearing my glasses as it renders
everything misty and indistinct, leaves me space to concentrate on the music, letting my
thoughts whisper on<
Walking is a different experience in the mornings<I am more focussed on walking fast but I
like looking at everything, taking in the trees, mist on the lake, the dark water black and still
under the paperbarks, ducks and other water fowl drifting slowly out as the day gets lighter.
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I always walk west first towards the sea and face the sun rising on the way back to the
house, get to the top of the rise where there is a small clearing, pause the iPhone App
tracking my efforts and stand to feel the sun on my face when I can<taking it all
in<bringing the world into me<I like starting the walk in the dark in winter, three layers
on with a beanie and gloves, cold and not cold at the same time. Summer is a different
experience. I drive to the beach with the sun just up and walk on the sand near the shore,
waiting for the beach to be lit with sunshine over the sand dunes. Walking in and out of
shadow and light offers a beautiful poetry to the experience of water flowing along my feet;
feet that become brown over the long slow summer, just with that small bit of exposure.
Night walking is about something else, covered in darkness, miming along with a song,
more introspective, inward looking, found I can even cry a little when I need to, release
feelings, smile to myself, enjoy the solitude<And the thinking is different too in the
night<back and forth my attention wanders from the sound of the music, the beat, and on
over work, study, family, people, relationships, fragments of conversations, things to do,
back to the music<often I come out of a reverie to find I am moving to the rhythm of the
music<walking through pools of darkness and light with the street lights a pale orange. A
reversal from the mornings in summer on the beach<
Morning walks are about processing things, making up to-do-lists, bringing mind, body and
purpose together. I often find myself concentrating too on how I feel in my arms, shoulders,
neck, down my back and through the legs<shaking off sleep, dreams, worries<getting
ready for another day<blood moving, picking up speed, faster thinking<and it’s here that I
do much of my<
<thinking about my thesis, sorting out problems with the analysis, asking myself questions,
acting devil’s advocate, humbugging myself about my cheek in attempting to do a PhD at
all, or indeed whatever new idea I have had about the research. The latest thing I have been
considering is the question of why I am using a musical metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980)
for the thesis. And running alongside this question I have been turning over the issue of
embodiment in qualitative research (Birk, 2013; Ellingson, 2006). Such a cognitive subject
this topic of mine: reflective practice. So I began to think where is the body in it all? I found
myself asking why music, why not some other metaphor<like the one I used in the original
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autoethnography about place and country (Read, 2000; Watts, 2001)? Why this metaphor<
especially when I have to learn about the production of music? I mean what is a note and
how does this relate to a chord? Is it another elaborate exercise in writing avoidance (very
possibly)? Could I pick a harder road, not being any kind of musician myself, not even
knowing enough to ask sensible questions of people I know who do make music<
<and it comes to me as I pound along to the song Timber (Pitbull (Feat. Ke$ha), 2013) that
the two are linked,
embodiment and music,
not just for others who use their bodies to study or make music (Bartlett &
Ellis, 2009; Webber, 2009); or who write about illness (Birk, 2013) or grief (Lee, 2006)
or even those who make music and research too (Carless & Douglas, 2009)
but also for me<
I only recently took up walking in a bid for sanity. Music was part of a rapprochement
between me and the parts of me I had been ignoring for most of my adult life. Walking was
hard at first. It brought to consciousness so many feelings of being at odds with myself. That
there existed a me who was dragging my/our body up and down the roads around the
house, and that part of me was kicking and screaming on the inside, while other parts geared
up to meet the challenge; a gauntlet barely thrown down. And I<
<didn’t want to hear my own heavy breathing. I felt and heard it like an accusing
chorus; an indictment of neglect at my failure to maintain a fit body, to keep my body trim,
evidence of my lack of self-control and will. Carrying this shame I discovered and the
breathing stood as a symbol of my shame for being this way<that and the feeling of
hesitation in stepping out onto something (will my legs support me, will my knees or ankles
give way, will I fall?)<unable to risk anything in case the body lets me down<as though I
had no part to play in its neglect<my laboured breathing felt like a failure of character<
but which part of me failed?
my body or was it me?
This was less a chorus and more a backbeat lying under the other personal songs forming a
playlist across my experience<
<so the me that wanted to feel better decided that the me interfering with this needed a bit
of a talking to<so I took us all off to a hypnotherapist. I asked the hypnotherapist to explain
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the problem to that part of me that was complaining. I asked her to gently request the bodyme to remember how to walk, run and move as it was meant to as I was sure the memory
was still contained within my tissues and muscles (Damasio, 2011; Hunt & Sampson, 2006).
She added a step of her own. She asked all parties to remember they are one and that no
accusations about failures of character and neglect were any longer relevant. These must be
left behind us all on the beach where this conversation between us all took place
(figuratively speaking).
On the way home the CD in the car started on I can’t stand the rain by Angeline Ball74. I put it
on repeat as it fitted perfectly. I took the road inland instead of the highway driving slowly.
This road weaves through low-lying forest and coastline coming out at places right on the
beach, and then winds back through farmland and forest. I stopped the car to look out over
the ocean with the song playing in the background. I heard the music, really heard it. The
continual backbeat playing in my head was silent for the first time since I could remember<
I would like to say that it was all good after that<walking wise, but no<I still panicked for
a while after if I heard my own breathing. Stairs of any kind represented an exquisite
torture. But a delightful gift from my daughter of a playlist with old favourites and some
new music provided another turning point<the music helped keep the reluctant-me busy
while the other-me got on remembering how to walk easily, mindfully, joyfully, eventually
even a slow jog<
start the playlist, begin walking,
after a minute or so assume the stance for jogging,
using the beat to structure the pace and distract –reluctant-me by directing
attention to the song
body-me did the rest<
once I got out of the way<
<it came to me one day sometime later that both parts of me had begun acting together – a
new backbeat had emerged...
along with a metaphor and possible way to consider
the journey into
my experience of
learning reflective practice

Song written by Ann Peebles, Don Bryant and Bernard Mitchell (Peebles, Bryant, & Miller, 1973) and included
on the CD from The Commitments [Original Motion Picture Soundtrack] (1991).
74
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Bridge
Jackson, borrowing from Foucault (1990, cited in 2009, p. 165), suggests an important
question to consider particularly in relation to the use of voice in qualitative inquiry. She
asks ‚< what am I doing when I speak of this present?‛ This question is meant to ‚fashion a
different way of questioning the present‛ (Jackson, 2009, p. 165). Indeed Jackson uses this
question to consider the kinds of subjectivity made possible through speaking by looking at
an account from an interview with ‘Amelia’ conducted within a research study about which
she does not comment in much detail. The piece is utilised to illustrate and open a
discussion about the way in which power/knowledge relations are made visible through the
act of speaking. It seemed from this discussion by Jackson that the issue turned on what
kind of account ‘Amelia’ wanted to present when asked to consider her interview transcript
after the interview was returned to her. Jackson’s account of this raised issues for my
presentation of this autoethnography. What kind of account do I want to present and what
power/relations will this account make visible? Thus I opened the autoethnography placing
the matter at hand within the present by considering the use of metaphor within the account
as well as in the thesis more generally. Here I sought to present the intersection of my own
biography with the presentation of this part of the study. I think of it as a moment to turn
and look at the issue of learning and teaching reflective practice. It also signals that there is
no past that is free from a reflexive moment of re-imagination within this account.

Thus in considering this issue of what account to present I take up the problem of how the
enlightenment ideal, as a reflective questioning of the issue, simultaneously works to make
the present possible (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984). This does place the autoethnographic
study itself in a hall of mirrors with regard to the topic. Use of reflexive tools and techniques
in order to consider learning reflective practice may be an absurdity (Coleman, A, personal
communication, 24th April 2009). There is a small wriggle space that I intend to use and this
involves a recognition that this account is not an objective account but instead it aims to be
one that is truthful (Medford, 2006). Not giving an objective account here means I am not
speaking from above or outside power/knowledge relations. Rather, through the very act of
speaking/writing this account I am doing the work of making them visible. This should
trouble any sense that this autoethnographic account of my learning reflective practice
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occurred as a linear, structured, attained-once-and-for-all process. I offer the account
obliquely and through the subjectivity which make the ‚<social relations, cultural
meanings, and histories<assembled together to create truths< [through a rendition of+<a
desiring voice, a discursive voice, a performative voice‛ (Jackson, 2009, p. 172), which
represent various positions and subjectivities.

Verse 2: Critical incident #1– A minor song in six movements75
Background scene:
Person A invites Person B to participate in a class. Person A is running the class as subject
coordinator and has taught the class for many years. Person B is a stated expert in the field
which forms the basis of the class. Person A is keen for her students to benefit from being
introduced to an expert. Person B is senior in rank but not necessarily in teaching experience
to Person A. They are joined by Person C. Person C is a close colleague of Person B, having
worked with her before. Person C is a new colleague of Person A, having just joined the
school, not long after Person B. The incident occurs during and after the class.
Movement 1: Person A outlines the topic matter for students and gives some background to the
session. Person A introduces Person B by outlining their expertise and hands the class over.
Movement 2: Person B opens their remarks by offering the opinion that the background to the topic
is mistaken and that the approach taken in the class could be perceived as culturally inappropriate.
Person B proceeds to outline alternative interpretations and ways of approaching the subject
matter.
Movement 3: Person A is surprised at Person B’s stance given Person B’s publications on the subject
in question.
Movement 4: Students ask questions, which begin to challenge Person B’s stance and interpretation.
Person B begins to tell stories from practice that illustrates the opposite of their claimed position.
Person C looks on silently.

These accounts are constructed out of various critical incidents spanning 10 years of teaching. Rendered here
refers to boiling down something until it is purified to its bare extracts. Thus, critical incidents 1 & 2 are
represented as a series of moves and then in a song form that picks up on the main themes that emerged from
removal of all extraneous context. The minor songs are meant to demonstrate the emotional tenor of each critical
incident in addition to the movements
75
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Movement 5: Person B begins to become uncomfortable with the student questions. At the break
Person B offers an extensive critique of the whole approach to teaching being taken by Person A
from the point of view of its cultural sensitivity. The encounter has shifted to being about the
performance of the Person A, rather than what happened with Person B. Person C says nothing.
Movement 6: Person A wonders if she could have foreseen the differences in their approaches; she
wonders how she will retrieve the situation with students in the tutorial.
Post-incident events
Over lunch other members of the school join Person A, Person B and Person C. Someone
asks Person B how the class went. Person B says she thought it had gone very well and that
she welcomed the opportunity for a robust discussion of alternative ways to see the topic.
She felt the students asked excellent questions. Person B proceeds to praise and thank
Person A for her organisation of the class. Person C says nothing.
Minor song
Verse 1: I know about this area of social work.
Chorus: Agree with me I have status; I am very important.
Verse 2: You have different knowledge about this area but it is misguided because it is different to
mine.
Chorus: Agree with me I have status; I am very important.
Verse 3: I know about this area because I have researched it and I am published in the area. I can
change my mind and you should accept it.
Chorus: Agree with me I have status; I am very important.
Bridge: Being critical is the hallmark of a good academic, all encounters are opportunities for
changing the misguided thinking of others. It’s my role to ensure others know the truth about
matters so they can think like me.
Chorus: Agree with me I have status; I am very important.
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Chorus
The people that claim, to have known me then
Not on my wavelength and it's such a shame
That they have to play the name game
The fame game, oh the name game,
Lord it's a cryin' shame
(Van Morrison, 1999)

Bridge
Everyone here is performing status. Removing the contextual details and background makes
these performances more visible. To render something could be a form of reflective practice,
an analysis of the incident down to its bare moves. Perhaps this is the first move. We might
engage in an evaluation of the performances of each person involved forgetting that to do so
requires already existing norms of understanding and behaviour (Bourdieu, 1999; Haidt,
2001). We could then add possible explanations for the various positions and actions taken.
Doing so requires the ability to empathise (Oatley, 2010), reason and create imaginary
hypothetical scenarios as explanations ( Stanovich, 2011), but most of all, to have a
motivation for doing it. One could imagine Person A instead going for a long run, or having
a drink after work rather that engaging in an analysis of their own and others performances
after an incident like this. The most likely scenario is that Person A will talk it over with
someone especially if they experienced a strong reaction to the events. This is most likely to
occur on the day the incident or event happens, according to research by Bernard Rime
(2009). Is this then the likely motivation for reflection? Other than being able to discharge
emotion what does one get from engaging in reflection, especially if it means rehearsing a
less than edifying encounter at work?

Of course, the assumption at work here is that the critical incident belongs to Person A. It is
somewhat harder to imagine this as a critical incident for Person B, or possibly even Person
C. It is possible, but unlikely. This suggests, then, that the very motivation to reflect is
connected to performances of vulnerability and power. It probably accounts for why those
made vulnerable through a display of status and/or power are often the ones who engage in
the reflection. It is likely that Person B and C would consider themselves reflective if asked.
And there is no reason to doubt this as reflective capacity is considered a normal attribute
for people (Archer, 2007). Power is therefore intricately implicated in who engages in
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reflective practices then, but what about how they engage in it? Is the person’s biography
part of the picture? How does that affect the kinds of reflection and reasoning adopted by
someone post a critical incident?

Verse 3: Critical incident #2 – A minor song in six movements76
Background scene:
Person A asked to see Person B about something and they do not specify in advance what
the issue is. Person A and Person B are colleagues.
Movement 1: Person A suggests strongly that Person B is at fault in their recent behaviour towards
someone in the school.
Movement 2: Person B listens carefully but begins to feel defensive. Person B finds themselves
paying close attention to how their body is sitting, taking deep breaths and slowing down their
breathing, trying to keep calm.
Movement 3: Person B repeats back to Person A what they think is being said about Person B’s
behaviour. At the same time Person B begins an inner dialogue asking why and on what basis is
Person A could be thinking this? Person B begins to think of instances where she may have
committed the error, fault, behaviour, or omission being outlined in some detail by Person A.
Movement 4: Person B finds it difficult to see the errors but concedes that it is possible to interpret
the behaviour in the way Person A has done. On this basis Person B prepares to concede that Person
A may have a point.
Movement 5: Person A waits for Person B to respond; Person B responds with an apology for the
transgression, mistake, unfortunate or unpleasant thing on the basis of accepting the interpretation
of Person A. Person B does not really think the interpretation fits with her own interpretation of the
same behaviour but concedes on the basis that more than one interpretation is possible and both
might be reasonable.
Movement 6: Person A leaves content to have brought to Person B’s attention behaviours they feel
are inappropriate, misguided, unfortunate or unpleasant. Person B has taken responsibility for
behaviours based on another person’s interpretation and her own interpretation, barely formed as
yet, has gone unheard.

I am designating participants with letters to differentiate them. It is not meant to signal that the same persons
are involved in both critical incidents.
76
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Post-incident events
Person B discusses the incident with a third person (Person C), not involved in the event.
Person C is neutral and just listens. Person C is also a colleague of both people, neutrality is
a good strategy. Even so Person B experiences this as unsatisfactory and this forces Person B
to realise that even though one might rationally recognise the wisdom of Person C’s
neutrality it still leaves a feeling of being unheard or discounted in some way. Person B
realises also from this that they might actually want someone to side with their point of
view. It is also at this point that Person B starts to appreciate that not all interpretations are
equal and that they might have accepted responsibility for something they were not clear
about or did not intend to. Person B wonders if being able to trace the reasoning of others
and recognising that multiple interpretations are possible is really all that helpful under
these circumstances.
Minor song
Verse 1: When you do/don’t do *fill in the blank+ I feel *fill in the blank+…
Chorus: I should have known better. You should have known better.
Verse 2: Here are the reasons why your behaviour is a problem for [fill in the blank].
Chorus: I should have known better. You should have known better.
Verse 3: I would like you to stop/start doing [fill in the blank] so that I might return to, or begin
feeling [ fill in the blank] again.
Bridge: Paying attention to the feelings of others is important; I should be able to anticipate and
change my behaviour before it is offensive to others.
Chorus: I should have known better. You should have known better.

Bridge
Individuals come with habitual thinking patterns and expectations for how the world treats
them and how they should treat others (Haidt, 2001). Responses to critical incidents can
often be immediate and may be below the conscious perceptual level. It might take time and
energy to sort them out. Cognitive theorists have developed a dual process theory of how
people reason and make judgements (Evans, 2008). Evers et al. (2014) state that ‚Dualprocess frameworks assume that psychological responses are a joint function of two largely
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independent systems, one automatic and the other reflective‛ (p. 44). Type 1 processing,
which has been characterised as being independent of cognitive ability, (Evans & Stanovich,
2013) is distinguished by being autonomous77 and is not reliant on working memory.
Generally, type 1 processing is considered to be similar to animal cognition because it
involves learning that is conditioned and implicit (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) as well as the ‚
< automatic firing of overlearned associations‛ (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). Type 2
processing, in contrast, requires significant working memory and ‚involv[es] cognitive
decoupling and hypothetical thinking‛ (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Stanovich and Toplak
(2012) suggest that in order to reason hypothetically human beings must be able to create
temporary models of the world or situation in order to rehearse actions or outcomes.
Moreover, they need to be able to maintain awareness that these models are representations
and therefore not real, holding them separate from real-world events or conditions
(Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). Hypothetical reasoning is not possible without this cognitive
decoupling ability. Thus, type 1 processing, which is automatic, is less resource intensive
than type 2 processing. Evans and Stanovich (2013) suggest using the term intuitive for type
one and reflective for type two kinds of processing.

Moreover, there is evidence that there are differences in how emotions are processed in each
of these relatively independent systems of cognitive processing (Evers et al., 2014). People
do become aware of their habitual default patterns for emotional reactions, but doing so
depends on the development of type two processing. Many reflective models78 —while
moderately acknowledging emotion primarily in regard to critical incidents or puzzling,
surprising events — tend to privilege the cognitive aspects of reflection and offer the
possibilities of engaging in type 2 processing. Indeed, pausing by engaging in processes of
reflection is sometimes a key intervention so that a person does not act on the automatic side
of emotions and reasoning initiated by type 1 processing, which is fast, holistic and

Autonomous in this context refers to cognitions that rely on automatic systems in the brain (Stanovich, 2011).
Included would be some processes of emotional regulation and some aspects of problem-solving. (Stanovich &
Toplak, 2012)
78 I am referring here to the following reflective practice models: Fook & Gardner’s 2007 critical reflection model;
Redmond’s (2004) reflection in action model and Schon’s reflective practice model (Schon, 1983). An outline these
and other significant reflective practice models utilised in Australian social work education is outlined in
Appendix A.
77
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frequently heuristic, and can be biased towards conditioned and implicitly learned
behaviours.
Yet, even type 2 reasoning is shaped by our learned dispositions, habits and emotional
repertoires. There are different chains of reasoning that are coloured by the habits of
emotion already possessed by individuals (Mar, Oatley, Djikic, & Mullin, 2010). These
chains of reasoning lead to radically different responses to the same event. For example,
backward chaining79 tends to be inwardly focused. Thus backward reasoning is more
associated with emotions of sadness. Forward chain reasoning is action oriented and more
associated with anger, sparking the need to do something about a situation. People develop
habitual orientations to either forward or backward oriented reasoning (Mar et al., 2010)
because the effects of a narrative can last long past the actual event or reading about the
event (Mar & Oatley, 2008, cited in Mar et al., 2010). This does not mean they cannot do
both. The minor song above suggests that even using well established reflective practice
models, people will bring with them particular habits, dispositions, and repertoires of
emotion. If that is true, then a one size fits all approach to reflection is probably not possible
or even desirable. Some practice models are aimed at exploration of these personal
repertoires (see for example Ruch, 2000) and others may be more aimed at contributing to
social change and addressing injustice and power dynamics (Fook & Gardner, 2007). This
suggests that the role of the educator requires knowing what models to use when and for
what purpose.

Chorus
It's a new dawn
It's a new day
It's a new life
For me
And I'm feeling good
(Muse, 2001)

Backward chaining is reasoning backward from a stated conclusion and forward chaining involves ‚ <
reasoning forward from a premise towards a conclusion <‛ (Mar et al., 2010).
79
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Verse 4: Reflecting back, looking forward<
A little forest bathing80 in amongst the Karri81, crunchy gravel track<just birdsong, breeze
amongst the trees<its early morning. The camp is asleep < [ off stealing a little time to myself
- mmm<so okay time for an inventory I am 40 today<sigh<thought I would be slimmer, thought
I’d have given up cigarettes by now<didn’t keep that promise to myself huh!<okay so no joy
there<er taking inventory is not that great if you have not achieved anything you promised yourself
you would] Turn right on the track, red seed pods laid out in various comforting fractal
patterns; setting up a beautiful contrast against the orange gravel, brown dirt and green
moss on the forest floor [well there must be something good since I turned 30 – great now I am
really thinking in decades, ok ok well what have I achieved?<Wow the place is well overgrown since
last I was here< lovely smell<] There are logs lying fallen over the floor along with a deep
covering of pine needles. The sequoia stand is up ahead and the way is slippery due to fallen
leaves, bark and tree branches from the NSW Eucalyptus stand, very messy tress. The
Sequoia stand was planted 70 years ago making it a quiet grove perfect for sitting and
thinking, breathing in the smell of the moss and pine needles. [the kids are growing up so
fine<mmm<okay what else< mmm well I did study all through that decade<and got my honours
in the end<well that’s a big deal because this time ten years ago I hadn’t even started going to
Uni<and now a new job teaching<+ A likely sitting log presents itself, resting there, the sun
comes down in broken streams catching dust and small insects in its path [okay sooo I am
excited and scared! It’s like a dream come true<I still can’t believe it! A whole year contract as
associate lecturer<don’t know after that, trying me out I guess<my own classes oh god what will I
teach? Ok then time is up, time for brekkie pancakes and a new day with the family. You know if that
can happen in one decade what could happen in the next ten years<oh er I’ll be 50 shake of head - er
let’s get through one decade at a time<+ Taking a different track on the way back to
camp<stones along the creek bed invite a closer look. [I take a black rough pebble home with me
as a reminder of the day and the small pleasure of getting up early to steal a little time.]

Forest bathing is a Japanese term for spending time in forests for the purposes of relaxation and stress relief.
The phenomena has been studied in Japan (Parallelus, n. d. ).
81 Karri is a species of Eucalyptus found the South West corner of Western Australia (Australian Geographic &
McGhee, 2012, n. p.).
80

128

Bridge
The transition from practice into academia has significant resonances with the transition
from university to practice. Social work academics, until recently, were often employed on
the basis of their social work practice experience. This meant they generally achieve higher
education qualifications while also learning to be an academic (Agbim & Ozanne, 2007).
Learning to be an academic — never mind a scholar — takes time and in recent years this
development of teaching skills has become the focus for many higher education institutions
(Dall’Alba, 2005; Kandlbinder, Peseter, & Higher Education Research and Development
Society of Australasia, 2011). Some aspects of practice, are of course, transferable to the new
context. For example, good interpersonal skills, the ability to work independently or in a
team, writing reports, presenting information in PowerPoint formats, participating in team
meetings, working a photocopier and filling in forms.

I experienced the transition as a fairly smooth one because I was surrounded by a small
number of colleagues willing to share their time and effort into mentoring me into this new
community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Taking your first class, being responsible for
creating learning opportunities, unit curriculum and designing assessments is akin to being
thrown in the deep end of the pool. Some aspects of the job built on previous experience in
practice while other aspects took much longer to learn and required explicit attention and
effort. It was the performative aspects of the role that exercised my reflective capacities
most. What happens in the class spaces? I started a journal pretty soon after commencing as
a lecturer.
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Verse 5: An encounter with students
Students in XXXX Class asked me today in class what I want to see in their reflective papers.
Actually they asked me how many references, what should the format be and what should they write
about. I said I would like them to write about their experience of being on [social work field]
placement and to include literature where relevant and where the literature supports and expands
their ideas about their experiences. I said it can be written in essay format or in report format but that
I wanted them to be consistent with the form they choose. The class got that heavy feeling< like a big
chasm had yawned open in the floor, felt my distance from them telescope out, leaving me on one side
and students on the other. They became a sea of faces, no longer individuals but now a mob. We had
been going so well up to then, dammit! And of course I got nervous then, found myself repeating the
point, not once but a few times in different ways, hoping to close the gap<a little voice began to shout
in my head<‛LYNELLE stop talking it’s really not helping.‛ The tutorial ground to a halt;
completely petered out<students filed out mostly not looking at me. No-one approached me after
class like they usually do<I had failed to give them something. Ok so what happened? What is it
about this assessment? Is it the length, the subject matter? What, what? Maybe it’s me? I am not sure
I know how to explain it? What if it’s impossible to do? Oh great, fantastic I have set an impossible
task! Perhaps I should try writing one myself<how hard can it be?
(Teaching Journal entry 19th September 2007)

Bridge
Setting assessment for students is challenging. Assessment is situated within the moral
order of the discipline or profession (Ylijoki, 2000) and comes to represent disciplinary
methods of addressing the content, knowledge and skills of the profession. Reflective
practice assessments are problematic because there is little agreement on what makes a good
reflective paper or report (Ryan & Ryan, 2012). If this was the case for higher education in
the 1990s, then it was even more difficult to locate systematic approaches or descriptions for
designing and grading reflective assessment originating from within the social work
discipline. I could locate agreement that reflection on learning was important (Boud &
Knights, 1996; Gould & Taylor, 1996; Rossiter, 1996; Yelloly & Henkel, 1995) and the general
idea that students should develop this capacity. Even Boud and Knights (1996) point out in
their discussion of course design that ‚ < we are conscious that we are dealing with a topic
that has attained the status of being a ‘good thing’ and something which some teachers
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regard as self-evidently worthwhile‛ (p. 32). This was my experience on returning to lecture.
Reflective practice was seen as a method for unlocking student engagement with the idea
that knowledge is constructed and for considering their place in this constructive process.
And yet when I graded reflective papers students seemed to make little or no links to this
idea. They did not see themselves as active constructors of knowledge, nor did they
particularly relate their learning to wider concepts and theories. Overall the papers
remained primarily descriptive. In contrast, if I asked for papers that critically analysed a
topic and included the requirement that students write in first person and incorporate their
own perspective, the papers tended to make this link more explicitly. It did not seem to
matter what year students were in either. I began to question what I was looking for in these
kinds of assessment. What was the link then between reflective practice and critical analysis?
What was I looking for in these papers?

Verse 6: Staff discussion
“Students just don’t seem to get it!” E 82 flings herself into the chair opposite me [sigh –just
trying to eat my lunch here - my chest tightens and I feel my face stop moving, it settles into what I
hope is a pleasant mask. I hate these conversations, which start with what students cannot do, don’t
do, or worse always do wrong. I wait...one…two…three…just breathe in, out…]
“I don’t think they read enough or pay attention enough…I mean, I give them instructions on
how to do it, this time I even did a workshop on it in class but when I get the papers, well I have just
waded through 35 x 1500-word-descriptions of what they did in class…. no links to theory…no
connections to materials from class, actually there was barely a reference.” [I think just breathe out,
breathe in, E just wants to have a vent…]. E looks at me with exasperation…“I don’t know…it’s so
important for them to learn critical reflection…”
I say “Actually why is it so important?” My colleague stops short and looks at me

I have utilised initials to stand in place of names and these initials are not signifying single individuals, nor are
they disguising individuals through de-identification. Indeed E could, in fact, be me at one point and the reaction
I am describing may have been someone else. I am using the initials to indicate fellow singers and musicians who
have contribute to this song. I have constructed these fellow music-makers out of discussions with various
others, observations and imaginary dialogues between myself and others which I have engaged in over the life of
the study. I am not assuming a straight reporting of some essentialist identity but rather using the notion that
any idea about voice can be rendered problematic. Indeed the representation of others, never mind the self
remains fraught with tension, especially with regard to the issue of voice (Mazzei & Jackson, 2009) and who may
be speaking for whom (Fine et al., 2000)? This is an issue taken up in more detail within the exegesis at the end of
this chapter.
82
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“Well if they can’t reflect on their practice how will they understand their impact on others, how
will they work for social change?” She shakes her head at me [aah okay then breathe out and…] I
nod and say “Right, sure, of course…yeah I know...[let out my breath, lean forward…] “sometimes I
have trouble explaining reflective assessments too.”
E looks at me and shakes her head. I have misunderstood. “No, I don’t have trouble explaining –
students just don’t listen” She shrugs and gets up to leave. [I nod, of course, sigh uh-huh…]

Bridge
Conceptions of learning (Samuelowicz & Bain, 1992) and how students learn are important
shapers of attitudes towards students amongst teaching staff. These attitudes can have
significant impacts on the climate of the teaching. Wider university processes can affect ‚ <
core aspects of academic culture, values and identity such as autonomy, collegiality and
their status as professional experts‛ (de Zilwa, 2007, p. 560) which in turn can create climates
of distrust (Lindenberg, 2000). Innovative methods of teaching and learning oriented
assessment are less likely to be implemented in climates of distrust according to Carless
(2009). Learning to teach may mean unlearning some things as well.
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Chorus
I am an arms dealer
Fitting you with weapons in the form of words
And don't really care which side wins
As long as the room keeps singing
That's just the business I'm in, yeah
(Fall Out Boy, 2007)

Verse 7: Learning from a maestro?
“Thank you everyone, we might begin I think” The class starts to settle, although a few are still
shuffling bags and papers, coming in to find a seat, while others are still talking, catching up after the
semester break. I am sitting with paper and pen out, ready, alone. This is my second semester here
as a student but the fourth for everyone else. I don’t know anyone in the class. The lecturer starts to
move around the class, standing close to those talking, just waiting. The chairs and tables are in a
circle and everyone can see everyone else. At least we have desks in front of us. The lecturer is in the
middle of the circle, central. A hush descends as she walks around, standing lightly next to people
who haven’t yet given over their attention. People begin to fall silent. The process takes a bit of
time. She is seems very patient. “Welcome to XXXX studies, I hope you all had an enjoyable break
and have come back refreshed for this second semester.” She says this quietly, so quietly that we all
have to strain to hear. She is clearly comfortable in the space, and the class finally begins. The
process has taken about 20 minutes. This has been enlightening but I am impatient. Can we begin
already?

Bridge
Critical pedagogies (Freire, 1972; Gore, 1992) and critical social work ideas (Adams,
Dominelli, & Payne, 2002; Fook, 1993; Leonard, 1997; Pease & Fook, 1999) were a significant
stream of thought within the school when I was a student. These ideas sat somewhat
uneasily alongside social work methods, knowledge and skills informed by social work
history (Gitterman, 1996; Hollis, 1964; O’Connor et al., 1998; Perlman, 1957; Turner, 1996).
This meant that lecturers could teach more by their inclination and enthusiasm for relevant
theories and ideas during my undergraduate education. The climate of the school became
characterised by conflict between lecturing staff for the hearts and minds of students and by
battles over the ‘truth’ about social work. The student body generally split into factions
based on their inclinations for different approaches as well. I remember some of the effect of
these differences.
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Chorus
Don't wanna see those eyes
Don't wanna take that ride
No I'm not driving down your sentimental highway
Don't want to be nostalgic
Don't want to be nostalgic
For something that never was
(Joan As Police Woman, 2014)

Verse 8: Student worries<
I’ve got to decide whether to go back to social science, this *social work+ isn’t for me… nothing
I’ve learnt up to now seems at all useful to social work. I feel so out of step with the cohort
*class+ and when I try to talk about what’s happening … no-one seems to get what I’m trying
to say…that it’s not the course, that maybe it’s me and then I find myself in these
conversations with people defending the course, saying well maybe you are too intellectual
for this course because it is practical after all and so on… which just makes it all
worse…because I am sure I can be practical but I thought we were here to also think about
things…I feel so frustrated that thinking about everything can be so wrong… (Third year
student journal entry, 2001)
The consequences of a fractured curriculum can be profound for students. It impacts on
their identification and commitment to their profession. Heggen and Terum (2013) use the
term coherence to describe the process of synthesis between the practical and theoretical
aspects of a professional education. This occurs through four main mechanisms, according
to their research: theory-practice interaction; teacher-student interaction; peer-interaction
and supervisor-student interaction (Heggen & Terum, 2013). The residual effects of this time
of conflict were still evident when I joined the teaching team in the later years. There were
three main drivers behind the eventual rapprochement of these different approaches to the
professional project of social work (McDonald, 2006). Internally, the University governance
arrangements became more managerial and thus more centralised with regard to the
oversight arrangements of curriculum teaching and learning. The second is that at the
national level the AASW began advocating for a more systematic approach to practice
standards (Lonne, 2009) and began implementing changes that would eventuate in
prescribed content in social work programs. The third major change was through the
adoptions of critical ideas within professional literature. Ideas such as a focus on human
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rights, acknowledgement of the social construction of knowledge, the existence of structural
barriers such as gender, ethnicity, class, and anti-oppressive practices, which had been
fought so bitterly over in the 1990s, became mainstreamed within the corpus of texts
available to students. The outcome was that the curriculum became more coherent for
students, with lecturing staff also being more accountable for delivering the learning
outcomes and assessment advertised to students through unit outlines and the University
handbook and required by the national accrediting body. The climate improved.

Verse 9: A student reaction to a unit plan for social work theory
DESCRIPTION
This unit introduces students to critical theoretical [okay what is this? Is it the same as
the ‘critical’ theory in sociology?] thinking in social work practice. Students develop an
understanding of the social construction of theoretical thinking in relation to culture,
race, gender, age [yep, this is good perhaps this is where those earlier units will come in
handy such as sociology & community development], and regional and remote location.
Students are introduced to the structure of theoretical thinking to develop skills and
knowledge in theoretical positioning in relation to social work practice. Students are
given an overview of the history of social work [good I want to know about this]
theoretical development and the major ideological [is this like political ideologies
because that’s something I do know about already – or is it different?] influences on
modern day social work construction. Students develop beginning skills in direct
social work practice [good, good this is what I want to know for placement] as these relate
to their theoretical knowledge development.
LEARNING OUTCOMES
On completion of this unit students should be able to:
1. identify the domain and nature of social work [uh-huh looking forward to this]
with particular reference to the nature of rural and remote social work practice;
2. articulate the predominant ideological and theoretical influences in social work
[which are what?], including Aboriginal ways and Aboriginal terms of reference
[okay that’s good, maybe I can use what I have learned in that first year unit here];
3. describe the social work interventions [what is an intervention?] that are
informed by these ideological [again?] and theoretical positions [er, which
theories?];
4. consider the implications of the interventions for anti-oppressive [what is this?]
and in particular, anti-racist practice [mmm…I have heard of this in that unit we
did on community development];
5. articulate an understanding of the nature of the social work process across the
range of client systems - individual, interpersonal, group, community and
organisation [no idea what this means?];
6. demonstrate competence in basic social work intervention processes and
skills;
7. articulate an understanding of the value of action research for developing
social work skills and naming tensions and challenges inherent in the theory
and practice of social work [not sure what this means; will find out I guess?];
8. Explore the relevance of the teaching and learning approach to social work [?].
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UNIT CONTENT
1. Introduction to a paradigmatic [what?] framework for social work theory and
practice.
2. An exploration of the implications of the various paradigms for what is
considered to be social work.
3. The nature of social work, its purpose and value. [yes good, good]
4. The nature of rural and remote social work practice and the body of theory that
informs it. [is that different from rural and regional policy?; okay more to learn]
5. An introductory exploration of the relationship between social work theory and
practice. [not sure what that means]
6. Introduction to the need for a radical theory of practice [radical theory?] and an
exploration of what it might consist of with particular reference to anti-racist
social work [oh right now I get it].
7. Basic intervention skills in the social work process. [yes yes yes! I want to know
what to do so I don’t make a fool of myself on placement]
On-Campus Assessment
Journal of reflective practice
40% [I keep a journal already but what does this mean I
really hope it’s not like that earlier unit where we had to
mark each other’s journals? K is still not talking to me
after that experience…]
In class skills assessment
40% [What will I have to do?]
Student presentations
20% [okay another presentation; but universe - please
don’t let it be in a group!]
[Source: Recreated from my margin notes on a unit plan in third year before commencing my first
field practicum.]

Bridge
While Heggen and Terum were interested in the conditions for optimising student
commitment to a profession, what the student does as an individual is the focus of a paper
by John Biggs (2012) based on his earlier seminal Australian work on constructive alignment
(Biggs, 1996). The idea is that if the learning outcomes, assessment and learning activities are
working toward the same end then the student is enabled to engage in higher order
learning. This is sometimes characterised as deep learning (Clare, 2007; Ramsden, 1992). The
issue of learning to teach and perform meant that in the first few years of coming into the
role my focus was not on what the student was doing particularly. Rather, my focus was on
my performance as I was trying to learn the craft of teaching. This created some dissonance
between my values about student centred learning, active engagement in learning and what
I was actually capable of delivering at the beginning. Fortunately students are on their own
journeys and they bring their own agency. Occasionally they share it.
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Verse 10: A student visit
S came to see me today. She wanted to discuss the class XXXX. She was so angry with me and she
told me it was because of that reflective paper I’d set in XXXX class. S said “I was so angry about that
paper. I had the worst prac experience, you know I barely got through, my supervisor spent most of
it suggesting I need therapy, and even worse picking at me in supervision so that I barely had any
skin left by the end…I was starting to wonder if he wasn’t right, maybe I do need therapy. He said I
had no self-awareness, and had family of origin issues …when I tried to ask what that meant he told
me I was being resistant and should think about what that suggests about my lack of awareness and
suitability of social work … anyway I thought okay I just have to get through, I can’t afford to fail the
prac, I mean I am on a scholarship and I have kids to feed. I need to get finished. I kept thinking just
get through, just hold on. I thought I will never have to think about this experience again!” S paused
for breath…”And then what happens? I get back to Uni and I get into your class and you make me go
back and examine it in minute detail for an assessment.”
She looked so beaten for a minute. I felt for her. I could see the experience of placement had been
really painful. I was about to apologise when she said “thank god you did, although I spent most of
semester being furious at you…writing about it helped put some perspective on it… The paper
helped me look at what I did and what happened. I came today to apologise – I know I was really
difficult in class and I wanted you to know why…”
I was stunned and I just sat there – I told S I was grateful she’d taken the time to let me know about
it and I shared that I had been wondering about the assessment and the class, especially being new
to teaching. I wasn’t sure what it had all been about. Well you just can’t tell, can you? I thought it
was about me…but it’s nothing to do with me…You can’t tell what is going on sometimes… (Teaching
Journal entry, 2008)

Bridge
Not all learning is pleasant and not all teaching is either. Learning and teaching the skills of
higher order thinking is to engage in hypothetical reasoning and higher order mental tasks
including thinking about the thinking taking place. This is a function called metacognition
(Anscombe, 2009; Fox & Riconscente, 2008). There are debates about whether each part of
the brains’ processing system (discussed previously) results in different kinds of
metacognition (Arango-Muñoz, 2011). Arango-Munoz (2001) outlines how some discussions
of metacognition associate it with mindreading and the theory of mind as well as
psychological concepts that help explain the self and others. Another perspective is to
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consider metacognition as a form of executive function that monitors the environment using
the emotions systems to do so (Arango-Muñoz, 2011). In other words, one component is
concerned with ‚ < knowledge of cognition<*whilst the other is about+ regulation of
cognition‛ (Muis & Franco, 2009). Both perspectives are supported by empirical experiment
and therefore for the purpose of this discussion it is possible to assume that both kinds of
metacognition co-exist and that both contribute to human learning and reasoning.

Educators have been very interested in this function and it has considerable links to beliefs
about knowledge (Muis & Franco, 2009). It is considered to be a key route to development of
higher order reasoning skills, or in educational terms critical thinking. In terms of teaching
Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) suggest that along with factual, conceptual, and procedural
knowledge good teaching requires the planning for opportunities for developing
metacognitive knowledge in students. A key route to this is reflection on learning tasks,
engagement in a broad array of different kinds of assessment and providing opportunities
for students to choose strategies for meeting the assignment tasks (Anderson & Krathwohl,
2001). These may be incorporated into planning teaching activities.

Metacognition and the associated development of higher order cognitive processes are
resource intensive for the individual. Fortunately, as parts of the role become routine this
frees up resources for other aspects of learning and/or teaching. This explains why the first
semester or year is often very hard for students as they learn different strategies to apply for
different tasks. It is the same for learning to teach or indeed going into practice for the first
time. Given this it is sometimes hard to hold on through the discomfort some assessment
can create for students. I found this was more possible to do if I was clear about my rationale
for setting the particular kind of assessment. I was not always clear until after I had run an
assessment. It was not the student evaluations at the end that always pointed this out.
Grading student assessment is an important impetus for engaging in reflection on teaching
and assessment design. Reflective assessments were and are still the most likely to initiate
such introspection and reflection, more than any other kind of assessment.
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Verse 11: Seeking advice – the role of talking with others.
[I knock and wait; I want some advice…I like to ask G because they have lots of experience, best of all
they are willing to share; I almost never feel stupid with them either] Can I talk to you for a minute? I
have a problem with a paper a student has submitted and need to talk it over with someone? “Sure,
do you want to get a cup of tea?” that would be great! “okay so what is it about?” “… well I set a
reflective paper assessment in __________class and it’s come in as a 1500 word criticism of my
teaching practice. It’s pretty personal actually down to delivery, making lots of assumptions about
my lack of social work practice in the area of the unit which I actually discussed and this is the reason
why we have had so many guests this semester! I am not sure I can mark it to be honest given the
content and I am not sure what to do…the student and I have seemed at loggerheads often in the
class — frankly we have had some tussles in class about various things …in fact I have been rattled
more than once by the student glaring at me from the side— they have always seemed very angry
and I guess now I know why! The student does not think I am qualified to teach her anything! [I stop
as I realise I am speaking faster and faster and louder than one probably should in the tearoom…]
“Okay so what was the paper supposed to be about?” [I take a breath and feel myself start to calm
down a bit]. “We did an exercise in the first week asking them to write down what they know or
understand about _______________and they give them to me to hold on to. I returned them later in
semester. Students were asked to write a reflective essay on what they have learned in the class
using their first impressions as a place to reflect back on. You know I really think [the student] is
entitled to write about her experience of the class and if this is her experience then what can I do?
That’s not the problem really…my problem is I don’t think I can mark it fairly because I feel attacked
in it…as well as feeling as though her point about my practice experience makes my assessment of it
difficult. She is claiming her own experience in this area as more relevant as I have less experience
than she does. [another breath, head shake…my stomach starts to burn…what am I doing here trying
to teach?…it’s ridiculous …]. “Oh I see…no I can see what you mean? You want to give it a fair
hearing as an assessment? [nodding, leaning forward] “Yes I want her to have the best shot; she
may have points to make that are valid and important to her learning. And I set the assessment up
after all and if that is her experience then it should get a fair hearing right? I might not like it but I
also might not be able to mark it...” “mmm…yeah I see the problem” [In silence we sip our tea]

Bridge
Writing reflections came easily to me even as a student. I have always kept a journal and
indeed my student journal and personal journals are a neat mash up of the personal,
professional and political. I always used this space to think out loud to myself, to see what I
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thought about situations, ideas, theories, problems, and working with others. It became a
great resource for me in developing my thinking about the ideas I was presented with as a
student. I took it into practice with me; however, I kept a journal much less, and found
instead that talking about situations with trusted others was a quicker and easier process
than writing, especially when time is at a premium. This is not surprising really. Eraut
(1995), in a significant paper outlining some issues with aspects of the Schon model, makes
the case that these activities probably form different kinds of reflection. Eraut suggests that
Schon’s reflective practice model fails to distinguish reflective activities, and, moreover does
not pay attention to the different kinds of resources, time and cognitive required for
reflecting-in or reflecting on action (Eraut, 1995). Generally I saved the writing for really big
critical incidents.
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Chorus
Cause I need an interventionist
To intervene between me and this monster
And save me from myself and all this conflict
'Cause the very thing that I love's killing me and I can't conquer it<
(Eminem (Feat. Rihanna), 2013)

Verse 12: Imposter syndrome and reflective practice (featured solo)
Y’know that fear everyone says not to worry about – the one we all share? Y’know, the one about
being found out to be a fraud? What is it? Aaah<oh yes imposter syndrome (Clance, Dingman,
Reviere, & Stober, 1995) <the fear that one day everyone will realise you really don’t know anything
at all? That you have been pretending all along, using clever smoke and mirrors; that you are in the
building taking up space that a real [fill in the blank] could be using. This is the feeling that any
minute now someone will tap you on shoulder and say what are you doing here? <it’s apparently
particularly high for academics and possibly PhD students; higher still for women across many
professional roles. Yeah well I got tapped on the shoulder – yeah it happened to me for real<publicly
outed to my colleagues and to my boss<and you know it’s both as bad as you might have imagined
and it’s not as bad at all<
This email below was sent to the Dean and Faculty manager in addition to all members, including
myself, of the social work program. The person also sent it to sessional staff and research assistants
working in the program at the time. The email was untraceable as it was sent from an email address
created specifically for the purpose.
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Dear Mr ______ and Mrs ________
I have been adised [sic] that you may be the best people to address this concern.
I would like to congratulate you for installing the very latest information sharing device into this wonderful campus. This device
is very accurate and the text to voice feature is absolutely amazing. I have never come across anything like this before and
have often wondered where did you get it from. Is it the latest model from China or just an existing model that has had a
software update from Korea? For the past month, I have been thinking of a suitable name for this device and after much
discussion with a few others, have decided to call it the "RoboLecturer"!!! Yes that’s right the "RoboLecturer". I think you very
well know that I am referring to one of your social work lecturers. Yes that’s right again, I am referring to Lynelle Watts the
course co-ordinator.
Where would you like me to start? Yes, I am a current social work student that has after much thought decided to speak up
about an injustice to not only the social work profession but the students who have to put up with third class education. I have
decided that I will have my say today and I do realize that there would be consequences for me if I was to sign this letter.
After all, some of us are aware of a silenced social work student already. They can often be seen walking around campus with
their head down now. Another doing of the RoboLecturer! To avoid the same fate and manage to complete my social work
degree, I have decided to not sign this letter today. I will make contact again after graduating and be willing to sit and share
my absolute anger and frustration with this issue. So to avoid the potential silence, I have copied this letter to many many
people.
I pay good money to learn about social work and get upset and angry when the information being provided is repeated directly
from a text book or the internet. RoboLecturer is well known for the being the best drone that your social work course has to
offer. By some students but most importantly by some social workers in town I hear. If I wanted to learn social work from a
text book then I would sit in the library every day and soak up the knowledge like RoboLecturer. What happened to that fine
mix of theory and experience? What happened to the social work experience I thought you had to have in order to lecture at a
university? Is this just an ecu method? Has RoboLecturer even worked as a social worker? NO I’m told would be the answer to
that one, another fact that has become evident over the past year or so. But you already know that!
I just found out that you have also planted an employee of the social work course in one of my units. I’m sure this person is a
student as they seem to be reading texts and listening to the lecturer. Why don’t you replace RoboLecturer with this student,
you have nothing to lose, NOT -HELLO. You have installed RoboLecturer instead! RoboLecturer is unable to expand on the
content and it’s funny to watch her fidget and go red in the face when a student asks her for more detail. RoboLecturer gets
angry, I can see it in her eyes when unable to answer the questions. RoboLecturer the drone who repeats the information in
the text book. Do you want us to start referring to her as that? Oh that’s right, we already do! I would like to offer some
options to resolve the problem.
A; Replace RoboLecturer with the final year student (not serious, you need to do something here)
1; replace RoboLecturer with one of the other staff in the social work course
2; send RoboLecturer out on a field trip as a social worker for a year or two, make it three.
3; get serious and listen to the feedback, ask the students who finished in 2008 and 2009. There are a few who would like to
speak up after they will get their paper in April.
4; ignore it and it will go away – do you really think so?
5; refund some of the unit fees
As I have said, I am willing to visit your office and discuss all of these concerns. I am not available to do this until I have the
graduating paper in my hand as there will be consequences I’m certain. When I can call myself a social worker, I will keep my
word and contact you at that stage as I’m not going to risk any further disruption to my study. After all, my destiny is secured.
I do know that you will be thinking about what to do with this letter. A local social worker told me that it is not right and that
we should all band together and oppose this problem like they did a few years ago. I’m saddened to think that there are others
that discuss this also and continue to remain silent. I will break this silence.
I thank you for taking the time to read about my concerns. I only hope that you do something about it. I pitty [sic] the poor
first and second years coming through the course. They will work it out, just give them time.
Concerned Student.
Source: Email sent to Dean of the Faculty and all staff in Social Work program on Friday, March 26, 2010
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I think this might qualify as a critical incident (Fook & Gardner, 2007). I thought about getting
a t-shirt< robo-lecturer. This was a bid to try to inject some humour into the situation and
was only possible a few weeks later after I went through a pretty significant reflective
process. My immediate reaction was to feel hurt more than anything. Then really exposed.
The email exhibited a certain genius in the way it managed to catch all my sensitive spots
about my own sense of what teaching is and about social work; ideas about legitimacy as a
social worker in the field and in academia. I had been a mature aged student when I came to
study after working in human services in the area of income support. I spent approximately
three years in practice as a social worker and then I came back to lecture as an associate
lecturer83. The email got to me because underneath I agreed with some of the points being
made. What was I doing undertaking a job with no formal training in teaching, not too long
out from graduating myself? The email called into question my own sense of these purpose,
legitimacy and competence. And it was painful.

I spent the aftermath trying to empathise with this student; trying to understand the
extremities for the person that might have pushed them to such a course of action. I
wondered a great many things. Did my teaching push them too hard, not hard enough? Was
I not as approachable as I thought I was? Is it true that I am all book, and no practice? Was it
a bad thing to be frank about using others’ expertise and practice wisdom so the class can
draw on a wider range that just mine? Maybe I should have not expressed this? Am I too
open? Not open enough? Is this a case of that damn Johari window (Mohan, 2008) where
others can see things about me that I can’t see? If so, are these points then legitimate and
who would I check with? What do I need to change here? Maybe the student is right – my
one talent [reading] which made coming to University such a dream come true for me and
seemed to make me a good fit is actually not enough to be going on with as a lecturer?
Maybe I do need the 20 years of Social Work practice to be legitimate after all? A few days
after a colleague said to me ‚I don’t know how you are still here after a thing like that! I
wouldn’t have been able to teach again‛ By that stage I could actually say I felt a little sorry
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the student hadn’t had the courage to come and discuss it with me. I like to think I would
have done my best to listen and understand.

That didn’t mean that the incident did not take its toll. It was months before I felt able to
sense how a class was going<Colleagues would ask me how a class went and I would say I
don’t know because I really didn’t. When this email came I had thought my classes were
going well and that I had good rapport with students. I had not detected any serious
problems at all. And now I realised that you really don’t know<I also spent months waiting
for more emails to come; a wider campaign amongst students to ensue. I had seen that kind
of mobbing (Hugaas, 2010) happen to others. Was it my turn, I wondered? Nothing
happened and gradually I came to think it was just one student. Okay so someone did not
like my teaching style. I started to relax a bit back into the teaching.

Women particularly, it seems to me, pass the imposter story around to each other (Sanford,
Ross, Blake, & Cambiano, 2015), although men do feel it too. I think people usually say this
stuff in response to doubts you might have ventured about your own fitness to have the job,
do the lecture, or perform the task, be the coordinator. If they are kind they will say it’s all in
your head, don’t worry about it, everyone shares the same fears and reassure you that they
are certain that you can do whatever task they are requesting. You then agree to it despite
your own doubts. I am thinking now it’s probably best not to express these doubts to people
who are trying to get you to do things, especially if it means extra work for you (which it
usually does).

Bridge
The first part of Verse 12 above presents an example of reflection-on-action (Schon, 1983, 1987)
where the purpose is to make sense of the action and event after it has occurred. The second
part is written from reconstructed parts of discussions about it — my journals and voice
recordings that occurred up to six months later. So the Robo-lecturer event was well in the
past. Here it has been written as though being spoken to an audience and in some of the
original journals it is written that way as well. According to Eraut (1995), this concept of
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Schon’s reflection post action is less problematic than that of reflection-in-action84, which
Schon spends considerable time setting up as a form of professional artistry. Reflection-inaction occurs as action is unfolding, according to Schon (1983). The problem is that given the
cognitive resources required it is likely that reflection-in-action is reflection using the faster
route of type 1 processing. Moreover, it is likely to use the kind of metacognition that allows
for the scanning of activities as they are unfolding (Eraut, 1995), also associated with faster,
less resource-intensive processes. Eraut (1995) suggests that while university does not have
to perfectly replicate the conditions of practice it should provide links of relevance enough
so that learning is able to be transferred (Billing, 2007). Transferability of practices,
knowledge and skills learnt at university is an important issue for educators. Time factors,
willingness to engage in reflection without the need to meet assessment requirements, and ‚
<the post qualification routinization of professional work‛ (Eraut, 1995) all impact on how
people move between these contexts.

Chorus
Five and one half, it doesn't mean I don't care
Sick from the guts of another interesting quote
'Bout the time I left you for dead
I have a theory based on nothing
It's absolute crap, it's so compelling
Publish me now, I'm a genius
Face full of fruit, wow
Ball Park Music, (2014)

Verse 13: Student journal entry
Sometimes I think I am only a person created out of books and the things I have read. I mean I am
not convinced that anything I think did not first get germinated in something I have read or heard
outside of myself. Sometimes I wonder if I am a person at all…it’s probably a good thing I have a
body really otherwise what would I be, a brain full of other folks ideas right? Sometimes I don’t know
what’s mine to have thought…or what is an idea that comes from somewhere else…it’s a bit scary.
University makes this worse… before University I wouldn’t have thought to wonder how do I know
that? Let alone where do I know if from? I just would have known it, period. And it wouldn’t have
mattered to anyone I knew then where I knew a thing from – for sure they wouldn’t have asked me
except to work out if they should have watched the news. In fact, most of the time people were not

Reflection-in-action is said to occur as the action is unfolding in relation to novel, surprising or troubling
occurrences and is triggered by intuition that signals that something has occurred outside of the routine (Schon,
1983).
84

145
interested in much I had to say anyway. Not much has changed there really. I thought at University
people would want to discuss ideas but I find people are still not much interested in ideas, or
discussing them. And something else has changed, when I do write papers or discuss readings or
ideas in class, I now have to account for where I get them from and then reference them back to the
sources. It occurred to me that none of these ideas are actually mine; that everything I think may be
traced back to someone else. And then, of course, I find I have picked it up as a habit too because
now when I talk to non-university friends, I occasionally forget not to ask them where they know
stuff from. They get a bit uncomfortable and sometimes even riled up. When I talk to University
friends they want to know who said my point before me so they can assess its truth-value. I am
wondering if it might be safer not to speak about anything anymore (Student Journal entry 2001)

Bridge
How then to teach adults and how to teach reflective practice? Building on Perry’s (1970)
work on intellectual development in the college years, there have been a range of research
programmes pursued to answer the question of adult intellectual development (Baxter
Magolda, 2004; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl,
2010; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; King & Kitchener, 2002; Pintrich & Hofer, 2002). The
relationship of an adult to knowledge emerges as a key marker of development. It should be
said that most of these theorists accept the premise of stages of development imported from
their use of Piagetian models for cognitive development. Nevertheless, the models
developed are instructive in what they have to say about the impact education has for adults
moving from states of certainty about knowledge to states of uncertainty and/or an
understanding that knowledge may be tested and assessed for veracity, truth or relevance
(King & Kitchener, 2004). This work suggests that adult approaches to ill-structured
problems can be discerned through their assumptions about knowledge.

The main way ideas about adult learning have found their way into social work is through
education theorists interested in transformative learning (Belenky et al., 1986; Brookfield,
1993; Brookfield, 1995; Brookfield & Preskill, 1999; Luke & Gore, 1992; Mezirow, 1990; J.
Mezirow, 1991). Early Australian models of critical reflection (Fook, 1999) were influenced
by Mezirow (1990; 1990; 1998) and Brookfield (1993; 1995). Take Mezirow as an example. He
did more than just base the model on Piagetian ideas about cognitive development;
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Mezirow also linked his model to broad range of philosophy and social theory. In his model
Mezirow (1991) adopted the idea of communicative rationality from the work of Habermas,
interpretive hermeneutics via Gadamer and then firmly based his schema in what he calls
meaning based perspectives, that are largely informed by phenomenology (Mezirow, 1991).
Brookfield (2009) is equally interesting in that his model privileges the notion of critique
based on social theory informed by the Frankfurt School and other critical theorists. Indeed
this can be seen in the approach to critical reflection Brookfield outlines in a 2009 paper
where he says that:
For reflection to be considered critical it must have as its explicit focus uncovering, and
challenging, the power dynamics that frame practice and uncovering and challenging
hegemonic assumptions (those assumptions we embrace as being in our best interests
when in fact they are working against us). (2009, p. 295)
While these are all worthy and different kinds of critical reflection (Tully, 1989), to properly
engage with them requires the development of basic foundational of critical thinking skills. By
this I am referring to critical thinking as being a habit of mind as Whetten (2002) describes it
and where it involves:
< that mode of thinking – about any subject, content, or problem– in which the thinker
improves the quality of his or her thinking by skilfully taking charge of the structures
inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards upon them. (Paul & Elder
2001, cited by Whetten, 2002, p. 50; my emphasis)
In a recent study on assessment in an Australian Bachelor of Social Work course Watts and
Hodgson (2015) examined the relevant literature on critical thinking and distilled the
following as foundational critical thinking skills:
(1) construct and test hypotheses, or compare and contrast explanatory and predictive
theories;
(2) systematically evaluate their thinking, assumptions and perceptions;
(3) detect and critique bias and ideological and other distortions in everyday
discourse;
(4) identify and assess logical and propositional arguments including the use of
evidence and reasoning in establishing claims to truth; and
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(5) understand and apply skills in deductive and inductive reasoning. (pp. 7-8).
It is possible to see that detecting and critiquing bias is one of a number of skills needed to
assess claims about truth, knowledge and evidence. There is a distinction that can be made
between instruction and support to learn the skills to engage in critical thinking and being
taught that all knowledge is constructed and therefore subject to ideological and value
distortions on the basis of vested interests. Such a critique of ideology is the product of
previous critical thinking undertaken by people who had the good fortune to have been
instructed in the hard business of learning to use critical thinking. Without these
foundational critical thinking skills, or habits of mind, I wonder if we might be missing the
opportunity for teaching social work students such skills.

Is this because as a discipline we presents some knowledge as certain and/or self-evident
therefore not subject to critical analysis and other knowledge as open for the critical thinking
where the process is concerned with uncovering bias and hidden assumptions? If so as a
discipline we run the risk of turning the problems of practice and living into well-structured
problems for which some theories provide an answer. In doing so, might we not undermine
students access to important opportunities for engaging in hypothetical reasoning and thus
the kind of limit testing we are hoping they will take into professional practice?
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Verse 14: Speaking back to an earlier self85
Labouvie-Vief (1990) offers a sequence of three levels of adult logical development. The first is the
intrasystemic level where one’s experience is a single abstract system, usually with conventional
language, symbols and norms that ‘emphasise certainty and stability’ (p.69) [I am not sure about
stability…I remember being hungry for something, I liked to read lots of things…really I remember feeling like I
did not know anything at all once I came to university – nothing I had learnt before coming was relevant at all].

The person does not yet have a reflective language for their experience and can function within this
single abstract system. The second level is called intersystemic which acknowledges multiple
viewpoints. [I think this is where people stay – multiple viewpoints but no way of working out better or worse
explanations – isn’t that a problem? I want more certainty than this – are all ideas equal then? When I say I
want to know this it becomes a problem of character – a lack of tolerance of uncertainty instead of wanting
better arguments for particular positions. Is all reality equal?] Language develops that can discuss conflicts

between systems such as self and other, mind and body, inner and outer. The last level is integrated
whereby these binaries are transformed and the tensions between them utilised in ways that allow
for the valuing of ‘historical change and contextual diversity’ (Labouvie-Vief, 1990, p. 69). [The gold
standard – this is clearly the best stage from Labouvie-Vief’s outline. Integration is highly prized in social work –
integration of placement experience with university content; practice and theory, self as a professional and the
work; knowledge and skills, values and practice…the list is fairly extensive. When I first read this work by
Labouvie-Vief I wondered how would you know if you have reached this stage in your thinking. Who will tell
you? Can you determine this yourself? And what if you can’t? I think all three forms of thinking are still possible
– depending on the context…] The experience under examination here suggests that one can retain

earlier conceptual levels and that the possibility exists that under times of stress one can move to
earlier ways of seeing issues. This suggests that integrated levels of knowing are not static and with
one forever, they too are subject to reworking and re-storying for the sake of a coherent narrative of
one’s life story (Benhabib, 1992).
Excerpt from original autoethnography conducted in an undergraduate research methods class in 2001 (Watts,
2001)

Chorus
Herald what your mother said
Reading the books your father read
Try to solve the puzzles in your own sweet time
Some may have more cash than you
Others take a different view, my oh my, heh, hey
Des’ree, (1994)
This is a process if inserting text from the present into a piece written much earlier in order to speak back with
what one has learned, or through a different perspective. The earlier text formed part of the autoethnography
conducted as a third year social work student in a research methods class.
85
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Finale
The purpose of this autoethnographic exploration was to consider my own processes of
learning and teaching reflective practice. In doing so I hoped to raise questions about some
key assumptions at work in the current social work literature on reflective practice and
critical reflection. In this brief section below I offer some conclusions developed out of this
line of inquiry.

First, learning is complex and requires time and scaffolding. While this is hardly a brilliant
insight, the autoethnography has pointed to the significance of transitions between
university and field and back again. Parallels may be drawn between the process of learning
undertaken by new students and those teaching for the first time. The processes are similar
and both require scaffolding in ways that assist each group to navigate and stretch beyond
their existing understanding and knowledge, either prior to university study or from
practicing as a social worker.

The psychological literature is fairly clear about the cognitive resource requirements needed
for different kinds of thinking and processing. There is little acknowledgement of this body
of knowledge to be found within Australian social work education literature. The emphasis
on teaching students critical thinking in Australian social work rests on assumptions drawn
from critical theory, rather than this extant literature on the workings of cognition. Thus, little
attention has been paid to explicitly teaching critical thinking that would scaffold students
into developing the deeper and more complex epistemological positions required for
engaging with critical theory. This may be a missed opportunity for social work as it might
provide the conditions that would make engaging in critical reflective practices more likely
for students. Explicit instruction in critical thinking skills is needed in order to develop the
kind of higher order reasoning that would facilitate engagement with critical theories that
are in themselves complex arguments built by people fortunate to be trained in logic,
rhetoric, argument, and ethics.
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Lecturers, too, must engage in testing the limits of their own knowledge. Due to the
cognitive resources required it is easy to see why this may be something difficult for new
lecturers, or even overburdened experienced academics, to do. It is nevertheless important
for academic staff to resist the temptation to fall back into well learned and rehearsed
approaches to the problems and cases presented to students. If lecturers and tutors are not
prepared to test the limits of their own assumptions about knowledge and reality, then it is
unlikely they will be in a position to mentor, support, develop and facilitate this kind of
learning in others.
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Inte rlude 5
A u t o e t h n o g r a p h y a n d b e i n g i n t h e f r a me
One of the key things about undertaking autoethnography is being vulnerable. Going over
old journals, listening to old recordings and remembering what it was like to be a student at
the same time as I was walking the halls and corridors of the same institution was at times
disorientating and sometimes disturbing. I found myself resisting the process, wanting to
paper over and avoid engaging in the emotional aspects. I did not much like coming face-toface with these different aspects of myself. I found, in those pages, a self-righteous,
complaining, intolerant and overwhelmed student who frequently bit off more than she
could chew. Fortunately in the accounts I also encountered times when I had been a friend, a
colleague, a sister, a daughter, a wife and a mother as well as a student.
In the original autoethnography I explored my biography and my excitement about coming
to university and how I immersed myself in the thinking that had gone before me. I thought
that access to the library was the greatest gift I could imagine and I was determined to make
the most of it. I saw study as such an opportunity to participate in a conversation about
knowledge and the big questions about how to live well and how to help others.
At a certain point in my course (third year) the relevance of these philosophies and social
theories ceased being discussed, and only rarely were links explicitly made between social
work theory and what I had learnt already. There was a new body of knowledge to acquire
that came from social work proper. The problem was that in other parts of the course the
focus had turned to critiquing the assumptions, theories, and knowledge of this professional
knowledge I was hoping to acquire. It was as though I had been offered a glimpse into a
way of thinking and seeing the world, only to be told that this way was misguided,
modernist and thus not to be trusted. Instead the focus became centred on me as a person,
my position as a woman, my class, my ethnicity, my psychology, my identity and my
relative privileges. What I was unprepared for was how disorienting this would be to my
desire to be a social worker. I understood the bodies of knowledge (sociology, feminism,
cultural studies) from where this critique and focus emanated and as it was one I was
familiar with, it seemed true and was therefore difficult to critique or even withstand.
Looking back over the journals I can see how seduced I was into well-learned and wellrehearsed ideas during that time. I bought many of those early assumptions and lessons
about critical social work perspectives and reflection that I had learned so well during those
years into this research, and in particular the autoethnography. It’s only through this process
that I finally managed to engage with some of that ‘other’ social work theory and history
that I did not engage with earlier. It’s modernist, but it is instructive nevertheless.
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Cha pter 6
T r a c k 2 : P o l i c i n g t h e g a p b e t we e n t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e ( a
p o s t -r o c k a n t h e m )

Prelude
In this chapter I present a description of
the emergence of reflective practice in
social work education. The purpose is to
Autoethnography

address the research question of how
reflective practice emerged in social
work education in Australia. The chapter
is presented as a post-rock instrumental

Reflective
Practice in
Australian
Social Work
Education

anthem in two parts with three bridges

Archaeology

Qualitative
Interviews

and a finale (conclusion). This account
has been arrived at through the use of an Figure 7: Archaeology
archaeological analytic, described in
album notes (chapter four) above. Just to recap briefly, I conducted an archaeological
analysis to trace the objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and strategies in order to
understand how reflective practice emerged within the discipline of social work in
Australia. I start this ‘track’ by presenting a version of this history, which describes the
emergence of reflective practice as a continuity of long held debates and ideas about the
goals and purposes of the social work project (McDonald, 2006). I do this to illustrate and
contrast the way in which total histories focus on continuities across ideas, events and time.
This first part is written with the sources included in order to include the continuity of the
oeuvre and the book (see album notes four - chapter four).

The bridges of the chapter outline interesting aspects of the findings of this line of inquiry
and include graphics to illustrate different aspects of the archaeology. Bridge one outlines
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the emergence of reflective practice in relation to the development of schools of social work
in Australia and sector reform of higher education. This was arrived at through the
documentary analysis of sources in the ‘archive’. The second bridge outlines the bodies of
knowledge that became important to the transformation of reflective practice into the critical
reflection model that was taken into AASW document and standards. The third bridge
discusses some of the sources of data included in the archive. The archive sources are listed
in Appendix D.

The second part of the anthem (in this chapter) presents my archaeological description of the
phenomena of reflective practice and its transformation into the contemporary critical
reflective model. The description has been written without the attribution of sources. This is
an attempt to show the analytic decoupled from the background meaning that is made
possible by the syntheses described in chapter four and which operate through the total
history in the first section. This second account shows the emergence of the model within
Australian social work education and its relation to the intensification of subjective practices
experienced by social workers, particularly with regard to policing the gap between theory
and practice.

I am aware that the issue of sources is fraught. While rendering the account this way
satisfies the archaeological intent of the study, to do so nevertheless is counter to accepted
standards of scholarly work. After all, the attribution of authorship is seen as a key way in
which the veracity and validity of work is assessed (East, 2010). In order to offer something
of a middle ground a table of the source materials utilised in the archaeology has been
included as a bibliography in appendix D.

Part 1: Trapping our own culture86
Social work has always occupied a space of contradiction. As early as 1975 at the 14th
National Conference of the Australian Association of Social Workers, held at Monash
This section title is a nod to a remark of Foucault’s (and reported by Kessl (2006, p. 93)) where Foucault is
describing Bachelard’s attempts to trap his own culture.
86
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University in Melbourne, Max Cornwell, in the context of his discussion of developments in
social casework, is moved to lament that this area of practice was already under attack. Not
by the state or by clients of social work services, but by fellow social workers intent on
reimagining the practice against a preferred practice modality informed by radical ideas
coming from overseas and being applied in Australia. Cornwell raises a caution about this
kind of internal belittling of what in his view may be hard-won expertise. Schwartz suggests
that in social work:
*T+here are some human issues that are never laid to rest. They are ‘solved’ by the best
minds of every generation, yet they remain troublesome, suspended, permanent
centres of uneasiness. These issues tend to persist in the same form in which they
began – as polarised absolutes between which we are asked to choose<the dualisms
make it necessary to create religious solutions rather than technical ones, those where
faith is more important than fact and strong belief is its own justification<*W+hat
ensues is a kind of ‘family quarrel’ which takes on a ferocity not ordinarily wasted on
strangers. (Schwartz, 1974, cited in Cornwell, 1975, pp. 130-131)
In social work these issues coalesce around the purpose of social work and the relation
between private troubles and public issues. Epstein (1999) suggests that this is part of the
culture of social work, not least its position as an applied profession using the social sciences
as its knowledge base. Indeed, Epstein (1999) suggests that as a result of this social work
emerges as a Janus faced profession due to its need to ‚<influence people, motivate them to
adopt the normative views inherent in the intentions of social work practice‛ (p. 8). But this
influencing must be done without authority; without being seen to be influencing. Epstein
suggests that this is the communicative art of social work; its own technology. The art of
‚non-influential influencing<a polished style evolved to conceal this basic dissonance
within social work<it is common to state the intentions of social work as helping people to
accommodate to the status quo and as challenging the status quo by trying to bring about
social change‛ (Epstein, 1999, p. 9). The dissonance was evident as early as 1974 leading
Schwartz to report that, in the words of a US graduate student on finishing their social work
degree, ‚This school has taught me to be a good caseworker; and it has also taught me to be
ashamed of it‛(Schwartz, 1974, cited in Cornwell, 1975, p. 133).
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Epstein speaks from the position of being at the centre in that this analysis comes out of the
history and experience of social work in the United States (Epstein, 1999). Even so, there are
significant parallels with the Antipodean experience, even as there are some differences.
There were enough resonances for Cornwell to pick up the perspective of Schwartz and
translate as relevant to his survey of the Australian social work experience of casework.
Thus, a similar dissonance can be found and it generally translates into a question that social
workers may pose to themselves and each other, asking what kind of social worker one is: an
agent of care or of control87? The difference from the US and Australian experiences rests
mainly on welfare state arrangements, which shaped the kinds of settings social workers
occupy as a profession.

This conflict became more acute within social work generally as the consensus for the
welfare state crumbled across the western world over the latter part of the 20th century and
into the early 21st century (McDonald, 2006). Kessl (2009) explains that the significant
dismantling of the consensus regarding the welfare state in advanced liberal democracies
contributed to the ‚process of transformation [that] reassembles ‘the social’ and has direct
implications for social work (p. 308). This transformation has been well described by Rose
(1996, 1996) and others (Gilbert & Powell, 2010; Gray, Dean, Agllias, Howard, & Schubert,
2015) and is said to have occurred in earnest across almost all OECD countries from the
1970s, albeit at different rates of change depending on the specific conditions in each country
(Kessl, 2009). The changes to the welfare state saw the importation of free market ideologies
and processes, which would substantially transform social work practices.

These transformations have been variously described under the term neo-liberalism. Neoliberal rationalities are a broad church (Dean, 2014). Indeed Brenner, Peck and Theodore
(2010) suggest ‚’neo-liberalism’ has become something of a rascal concept – promiscuously
pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested‛

This is a common rhetorical question often posed to indicate the different aspects of social work practice – it is
not intended to imply that only two kinds of social worker exist.
87
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(p.184). Political economy analysts have used the concept to describe it as ‚< variously<a
bundle of (favoured) policies, as a tendential process of institutional transformation, as an
emergent form of subjectivity, as a reflection of realigned hegemonic interests, or as some
combination of the latter (Brenner et al., 2010, p. 183). Social work has a propensity to use the
term neo-liberal in discussions of the realignment of hegemonic interests; the way it has
contributed to institutional transformation and to point to the way policies favour or include
free market ideologies (Baines, 2006; Bay, 2011; Lonne, 2009; McDonald, 2006).

This crisis within the social work profession did not really permeate the Australian scene
with much force until the latter part of the 1980s (Camillieri, 1996; McDonald, 2006).
Explanations for the crisis were and are often described through the term economic
rationalism (Burchell, 1994b; Pusey, 1991; Stokes, 2014). Economic rationalism can be seen as
an ideological term (Burchell, 1994a) and was utilised to describe the deregulation of the
economy and along with it the use of market mechanisms for regulating resources. The
adoption of this term had the effect of focussing social work theorists and commentators on
the way in which the policy programs of government imported free market ideologies.
There were, however, significant differences between the actual implementation of market
mechanisms in Australia to the manifestation of this so-called ‘new right’ policy in
Thatcherite Britain or the Reaganism of the US during a similar period (Stokes, 2014).

Moreover this ideological uptake and focus on the idea of marketisation may have
contributed to the profession missing some of the more subtle transformations occurring
within the sphere of the ‘social’. Burchell (1994a) suggests that Pusey’s sociological analysis
was largely maintained at the level of general principles and so was based on examining
economic rationalist policy as a form of elite interests and this served to cement its status as
an ideology of the elite. Pusey’s analysis can be seen as a new manifestation of conflict
theory focussed on the existence of a power elite (Mills & Alexander Street Press, 1956). This
is an old argument familiar to social work educators and was therefore taken up by social
work theorists with gusto (Ife, 1997; Rodley, Rees, & Stilwell, 1993). This focus on the
ideological content of economic rationalism may also have prevented social work from
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developing a more fine-grained analysis of these changes as specific practices, techniques or
technologies of neo-liberalism.

The changes to the arrangements for welfare in Australia escalated across the 1990s and into
the early 2000s (Camillieri, 1996; Lonne, 2009). While social work commentary describing
these changes continued to be offered at conferences (Australian Association of Social
Workers, 1995; Dodds, 1995a; Dodds, 1995b), practitioners were describing the material
effects on how they did their work and how they saw their mission being changed by the
widespread adoption of New Public Management (NPM) techniques (McDonald, 2003).This
had the effect of dashing many hopes built by various social movements across the 1970s
and early 1980s in Australia. The pain of this was felt greatly by those educated across those
hopeful years (Ife, 2006; Palmer, 2014). Many of these people later occupied positions as
social work educators; studying again for higher degree qualifications but in a vastly
different landscape than that described by Pease about the 1970s (Pease & Fook, 1999).

Social work commentators and analysts, influenced by the social theory ‘turns’ of the period,
found significant resonances in social theory under the broad rubric of postmodernism.
These ideas described fragmentation, diversity and the loss of grand narratives associated
with modernity (Bainbridge & Williams, 1995; McDonald, 2006) Social work academics
returned to the question of the professional project and revisited the problem of what social
work is for (McDonald, 2007). Practitioners found their work increasingly subjected to
scrutiny and their professionalism being questioned by a focus on evidence, outcomes and
processes of accountability (Lonne, 2009). This introduced increased competition for jobs in
the marketplace of the ‘social’ with social work jobs with the title of social worker rapidly
disappearing (Healy & Lonne, 2010). Academics in a higher education sector subject to the
same economic rationalist forces experienced many of the same processes and questions
(Adams, 1998).

The crisis in social work mirrored the change in wider economic and social policy which
significantly affected the way in which the delivery of social services operated in Australia
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(Capling, Considine, & Crozier, 1998; Jamrozik, 2009; Pusey, 1991). The writings and
national conference programs in Australia from the late 1980s through to the late 1990s show
heated debates about the relation of social work to the state (Encel, 1989; Ife, 1995; Jamrozik,
1989); and the methods and appropriate focus of social work education (Healy & Fook,
1994). This dissonance became grounded in local, specific conditions through the
documenting of the experiences of Australian social work academics, practitioners and field
educators. During the same period there was an upsurge in the publishing of home-grown
textbooks and articles devoted to understanding and describing Australian social work
practice (Chamberlain, 1986; Fook, 1993, 1996a; Fook, Ryan, & Hawkins, 2000; Thorpe &
Petruchenia, 1990; Wearing & Marchant, 1986). Previous to this most of the descriptions and
ideas about social work had been mainly imported from social work academics and
practitioners writing about the context of the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK).

The extended discussion and debate about the purposes, aims of social work and place of
social work in the future occurred over the space of almost two decades in Australia and it
happened later than it did for our overseas colleagues. The discussion was largely complete
by the middle 2000s as a consensus had emerged in Australian social work about the
purposes of the profession. Thus a human rights discourse became linked to a social change
agenda informed in large part by critical theory (Healy, 2005; Ife, 2001). By the mid-2000s
this consensus also enabled a new push from the AASW, backed by an increasing workforce
of private practitioners, for prescribed content in social work courses, the adoption of new
accreditation standards, and a revival of the need for social work to be a registered
profession in Australia (Lonne, 2009). This reinvigoration and renewed professionalism also
occurred in the context of competing in the marketplace of the ‘social’ for a place at the
helping table with other ‘psy’ disciplines (Rose, 1996a) such as psychologists, welfare
workers, community health nurses and increasingly occupational therapists and chaplains.

In this context it is perhaps not surprising that new models for understanding and
explaining social work practice were needed. These ‘new’ models incorporate beloved ideas
already in circulation in the profession in a process that makes enough of the model familiar
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while introducing new ways of approaching the problems of practice. These processes leave
traces that Foucault discusses as systematising propositions (Foucault, 1972). What this
means is that in terms of discourse and in the formation of concepts one of the procedures is
the combinatory process of incorporating already existing ideas, schemes or descriptions into
a new whole. Examples of this can be seen in the incorporation of systems theory,
psychoanalysis and problem-solving, all quite distinct modalities of practice and generated
through distinctive arenas of thought, into a single model called the Life model
(inSocialWork®, 2008). Other examples of this kind of systematising of propositions can be
seen in the translation of casework into task-centred approaches and radical social work into
critical approaches.

Reflective practice emerged at this time as a way of developing theory from actual practice;
later it would be offered as an alternative to the evidence based practice movement that
emerged across the same period (Healy, 2014; Pease, 1993; Taylor & White, 2006). Setting up
reflective practice as an alternative to evidence based practice occurred through the
transformation of an early model of reflective practice advocated by Donald Schon (1983).
This transformation would incorporate social work specific elements into the new model
including that earlier dissonance regarding care versus control. Moreover, it would seek to
provide a mechanism through which practitioners, students and educators could reinscribe
this dualism into process suited to interrogating the theory-practice gap described by Schon
(1983) as a problem of technical rationality.

Before this transformation, reflective practice was aimed at bringing self-awareness to a
practice problem for the purposes of problem-solving or evaluating practice against the ends
of helping the service-user or client (O’Connor, Thomas, & Wilson, 1991). The goals of the
helping process were considered to be rational, systematic and involving service user input
in regards to decisions for intervention (Perlman, 1957). Criticisms of this approach would
use the notion of technical rationality to reject it (Fook, 1999; Morley, 2004) and to build a
space for a different conception of practice which included the practitioner-self more
centrally in the process. The use of self would now be in service, not just for the client or
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service user, but also for the practitioner. Consideration of the hidden assumptions of the
practitioner would take a much more central place in linking theory and practice.

This model of reflective practice would reject the rational, systematic approach to practice in
favour of a process that is holistic, cyclical and creative (Fook, 2013). It was aimed at learning
from practice and took up Schon’s challenge of developing an epistemology of practice. The
model would connect practice as art rather than as science. Thus, the reflective practitioner is
an artist as opposed to the notion of a practitioner-as-scientist. To conceive of practice as art
involved the incorporation of the idea of the unknown and uncertainty. The transformation
of reflective practice included the idea of unconsciousness (Barbour, 1984 cited in Pease, 1993,
p. 67) by suggesting that the problems of practice might be reinvented by considering the
implicit assumptions of practitioners. Hence, in many accounts of this developing model the
need for a way to link action to theory is first supported by extensive claims about the
problematic nature of this gap between espoused theory and actual action (Fook, 1996a,
2013; Morley, 2004; Pease, 1993). This unconsciousness can be seen in the work of Schon
where he suggests that there are areas in which practitioners are blind to their own
behaviour. Taking this further, theory championed by practitioners could be at odds with
actual behaviour they display in practice. This point is rehearsed frequently in work
inspired by the critical reflection model in discussion here.

Reflecting on social work practice thus became an exercise in confession of the ways in
which practitioners and later students are unconscious (Chambon, 1999). Rarely is practice
that is seamless, ethical, well executed, advanced, expert or even positive, involving
satisfaction, pride, or virtue used for reflective practice exercises. These instances are viewed
as less fruitful to learning, not least because seamless practice gives little pause to
proceedings and thus tends to the routine. Instead, it is the shadow side of social work
practice that is of interest in reflective accounts. This is the place of experience, learning and
art. The place where the darker side of human experience — those moments of uncertainty,
anger, sadness, disgust, revenge, righteousness, apathy, exhaustion and depression — act as
stops to the flow of competent or expert practice. These are the places that must be governed
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and these are the areas that practitioners must be responsible for and learn from. These links
between ‚transgression and unreason‛ (Foucault, 1984, cited in Chambon, 1999, p. 68)
normally occupying the private spaces of an individual are now a mechanism to the creation
of the ‚moral subject‛. The moral social work subject is one that can lay bare their theoretical
assumptions and in doing so bridge the gap between practice and belief by developing a
micro practice theory for their practice after each critical incident. Social workers did not
escape the intensification of neo-liberal programmes of rationality; these subjectifying
practices would be incorporated into a model of practice. We would do it to ourselves and
we would call it resistance (Morley & Dunstan, 2012).

The predominant model of reflective practice that emerged in Australia in the early 1990s
became known as the critical reflection model (Fronek, 2012). In this model reflective
practice accounts begin with a description of practice or experience using concrete details,
outlining who was there, what the setting was like, and including any personal or
professional issues relevant to the incident (Fook, 2013). This is not the reflection. This is the
confession on which the reflection is to work. Stage one includes questions about
assumptions, feelings, biases, theories held, behaviour, the kinds of language used,
expectations which may be met or unmet and, lastly, the role part one has played in the
events are all outlined and deliberated on as an aid in stimulating reflective thinking. Here,
the purpose is to lay bare the implicit assumptions held about the critical incident by the
participant. During the next stage of the reflection process the self reflecting becomes the
centre of the inquiry. The biography of the participant is placed under scrutiny for all the
ways in which dominant structures in society find expression in the social beliefs of
individuals (Fook, 2013). This is the second stage of the process. This turn of the dial focuses
on the difference between what one thought one was doing and what actually occurred. This
is to insert a question between the experience described and the self who experienced the
incident. This is to introduce a space between behaviour and intention; practice and theory.
It also opens a space for confession with regard to unconsciousness or lack of awareness.
The space between practice and theory and the need for self-awareness, of self-responsibility
and accountability are thus mutually dependent.
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It was not always so stark. This responsibilisation of the self of the practitioner is not as
evident in early accounts of social work in Australia (Lawrence, 1975). There appears to be
more of a consensus that social work was authorised in the purpose and work it did within
and for the state (McDonald, 2006). The emergence of responsibilisation in social work in
Australia is part of the emergence of wider rationalities of government that have
characterised Western Liberal democracies (Rose, 1996b). Rose posed the question: what is
liberalism from the perspective of governmentality? In answering Rose proposes that
liberalism introduced a ‚series of problems about the governability of individuals, families,
markets and populations‛ (1996a, p. 39). Moreover in attempting to address these problems
while also enshrining a limit to political authority the need for the ‘social’ arises within
liberal states of which Australia is one. This is an arena where government is conducted
through the operation of norms established and co-arising with the deployment of expertise.
Rose (1996) explains ‚Political rule would not itself set out the norms of individual conduct,
but would install and empower a variety of ‚professionals‛, investing them with the
authority to act experts in the devices of social rule‛ (Rose, 1996a, p. 40). Moreover, the very
subject at the centre of this governmental process would be transformed through the
operation of the welfare state from ‚an individualising moral normativity *in the 19th
century+<into a subject of needs, attitudes and relationships‛ (Rose, 1996a, p. 40; my
addition).

Social work practitioners with the aid of expert educator/practitioners would also be enabled
to partake in a process of interrogating needs, attitudes and relationships. Indeed Burchell
(1996, p. 34) was moved to suggest that ‚we do not need a tariff to ask whether an increase
in our capabilities must necessarily be purchased at the price of our intensified subjection.‛
Indeed, such intensified attention to the capacities of practitioners to reflect on their practice
can be seen as a response to the need for accountability as well as an activity aimed at the
development of practices of resistance. Herein lays the contradiction at the heart of the
Australian version of reflective practice in social work.
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This emergence coincided with the need for accountability for social work practices. As
Kessl (2006) terms it self-awareness has always been discussed within the profession; it is
about how this self-awareness was transformed through a practice which intensified the
subjective practices of the self within the context of social work as a profession. This selfawareness had previously been in service to the helping relationship and was seen as crucial
to relationships with clients. This has not changed in practice. The way in which it has
become tied to wider rationalities of governance and conduct has changed however. Thus,
the tenor of this self-awareness transformed. Now this self-awareness is about the
practitioners’ well-being (Fook, 2013) as much as it about struggles to work with service
users. Critical reflection in this model at least, was to institute a process for ‚<the liberation
of the individual (subject) as the result of successful pedagogic intervention‛ (Kessl, 2006, p.
96).

Bridge – Surfaces of emergence
Despite the problems with using a time frame and a notion of history that is linear I have
constructed a graphic (Figure 8) that depicts the emergence of the reflective practice
including the subsequent critical reflection model. Figure 8 shows the development of social
work schools in Australia and is drawn from data available on the AASW website
(Australian Association of Social Workers, 2015) about the establishment of schools of social
work. This graphic only includes the establishment of Bachelor of Social Work courses.
Reflective practice was tracked by the year of publication of significant texts and sources
starting with Schon but then focussing on Australian authors and official AASW
documentation. The table of source data is also included in Appendix D. Another source of
data represented here is that of sector reform in higher education in Australia, which
emerged as a significant contextual factor in many of the sources in the archaeology. This
was well discussed in key conference papers (Leitmann & Crawford, 1995) and other
sources about higher education (Adams, 1998; Fredman & Doughney, 2012).
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Figure 8: Emergence of reflective practice in Australian Social Work education

There are a few things that emerge as significant. The development of social work was quite
slow for a number of years but each instance of higher education reform seemed to result in
new courses being established. There are probably many drivers for this but discussion of
them is somewhat beyond the scope here. It is possible to see that many of the same reforms
experienced by practitioners were being felt through reform in the higher education sector.
Another factor to take into consideration is movement of staff between universities. This
was not possible in states where there was, for a long period of time, just one university with
a school of social work. This was the case for a long period of time as Figure 6 demonstrates.
Western Australia is a case in point. The first school was established at the University of
Western Australia in 1974 but it would be another eight years before a second school was
established at Curtin University in 1982. This is significant because the movement of staff,
engagement in cross institutional supervision of higher degrees by research, and research
collaboration are important ways in which ideas and models are passed around. This also
creates important networks. Thus, in the case of reflective practice and the emergence of the
predominant model Victoria emerges as an important surface of emergence. This is because
it enjoyed the highest number of schools of social work in relatively close proximity until at
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least the early 2000s. Moreover of these schools only one, the University of Melbourne, did
not start its life as an Institute of Advanced Education. Many of the staff who established
schools and/or taught in the newly formed Dawkins universities were themselves either
students of advanced colleges, or had started their teaching careers in those institutions
(Bevilacqua & Hyams, n.d.; Fook, 1993; Pease & Fook, 1999; Social Work Network Deakin
University, n. d.; Thorpe & Petruchenia, 1990)

Reflective practice could be said to have been rather slow to take off if mapped back to the
publication of Schon’s work in 1983. The transformation of reflective practice into the
current critical reflection model may be pinpointed by the publication in 1999 of Transforming
social work practice – Postmodern critical perspectives edited by Bob Pease and Jan Fook. In The
reflective researcher (Fook, 1996c) which was published three years earlier the first explicit link
between Schon’s model (Schon, 1983) and reflection as an approach, not just to research but
also to practice, (Fook, 1996a) was made. The groundwork for this had been laid earlier
during Fook’s research on radical casework which linked traditional casework methods to
radical and structural social theory (Fook, 1990, 1993, 1996b) and another longitudinal
project researching social work expertise by Jan Fook, Martin Ryan and Linette Hawkins
which took place from 1990 to 1994 (Fook et al., 2000; Hawkins, 1996; Ryan, 1996). Social
work, it seems, was ready for another way of considering professional practice and theory
and there were now more opportunities for these ideas to spread with the growth of schools
of social work as well as an increasing market for Antipodean produced publications on
social work practice.

Part 2: A history of the present – mapping contingencies
An archaeological narrative
It could be said that reflective practice was transformed into a required skill of the ‘good’
social worker through a need to find something new to teach practitioners. Jan Fook (2007)
tells the story ‚about the same time I was becoming unhappy about the cultural expressions of social
radicalism, I became involved in developing a new postgraduate [social work] advanced practice
program. I realised, to my consternation, that I could not peddle the usual material (update on
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practice theories), since a good number of the potential students had only recently completed their
undergraduate study (taught by me), and I could hardly teach the same material again.‛ In fact this
is not the first time a major model of social work practice emerged from the need of
academics to respond to their organisational context. Alex Gitterman (inSocialWork®, 2008),
in a podcast discussion marking the 30th anniversary of the Life Model of Social Work Practice
(Gitterman, 1996) recounts how the collaboration that led to the model arose. It appears the
Department of Social Work at Columbia needed to reduce the amount of courses (units)
students were undertaking in addition to finding a way for students to integrate methods.
At the time (1972) the Department was divided by methods so the Dean at the time chose a
team to work on the problem based on them being reasonable and easy to work with.
Gitterman was working on the team that taught group-work methods and his colleague
Carol Germain was working with the faculty teaching the casework methods. They designed
a first year course that acted as a rapprochement between these two main approaches to
social work. This experience began a long-term collaboration between Gitterman and
Germain which resulted in the creation of the Life Model. The Life Model has since become a
major model of social work practice in the United States (Germain & Gitterman, 1980). In
much the same way the need to establish a course in professional practice began a
significant collaboration between Jan Fook and Fiona Gardner which would result in the
establishment of a critical reflective practice movement in Australian social work.

A useful reflective practice model already existed within other disciplines such as education
and nursing. For social work the reflective practice model emerged in that arena where
social work practice is explained and described to others; it surfaced first in academia. It
would not have been taken up if social work academics authorised to speak about social
work education had not adopted some of its core ideas in relation to social work practice.
This model resonated with social work academics because at its core there was a critique of
formal knowledge, in particular abstract and technical theory. This critique resonated
strongly with the disquiet about abstract formal theory associated with science that social
workers had already developed and/or adopted through their engagement with practice
and/or practitioners. The early reflective practice models in social work were informed
largely by this existing model.
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The critical reflective practice model was aimed at developing a ‚specific and technical‛88
expertise. But for what? This specific and technical expertise was developed to interrogate
the gap between theory and practice that practitioners and educators may be unaware of.
This gap points to forms of unconscious behaviour and this unconsciousness is a source of
dismay for social work educators, students and practitioners. Moreover, the field in which
the development of such expertise would operate was firstly in the fieldwork component of
social work practice and learning. Later this would expand to all forms of social work practice
and learning, retaining a special resonance with field work however. Thus, social work
academics were the early adopters and developers of this specific and technical expertise,
not practitioners. It would be dispersed to practitioners through workshops and specific
training processes.

Schools of social work in Victoria were particularly influential to the spread of the critical
reflection model of practice. There are significant reasons why. The merger of universities
and colleges of advanced education created imperatives for the conduct of research amongst
many academics that had been situated in colleges where the emphasis was more on
teaching. Many of the academics working in Victoria had been affected by this
amalgamation. Moreover the growth in social work schools and schools offering welfare or
human services courses, often operated by the same staff, had primarily occurred in the
colleges rather than the universities. As these amalgamations occurred many staff in social
work and welfare programs experienced pressure to upgrade their qualifications. Many of
them had obtained positions due to their extensive experience as social work practitioners.
A group of social work academics were working and studying across at least three or four
key universities and formed part of a study group grappling with social theory and met
regularly in Melbourne. This group was particularly interested in postmodernist ideas.

Staff from the former Institutes now experienced pressure to research and publish in
addition to carrying significant teaching loads. Staff from the university sector also
This is the idea that as a discourse enables and constrains ways to view particular ‘problems’ or ‘issues’ within
a field it is also at the same time often providing ‘solutions’ in the form of techniques; thus ‚specific and technical
expertise‛ often emerges at the same time as a problem is defined and located (Graham, 2011, p. 670).
88
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experienced changes such as higher teaching loads with no lessening of the imperatives of
publishing and researching. The other pressure was the change in universities to more
business-like processes, which carried with it pressure to expand and grow new course
offerings. The higher education sector was still shaking itself out from the effects of
reductions in funding. At the same time higher education experienced significant growth in
student numbers associated with the reform agenda instituted by the Labor governments of
Hawke and Keating. This pressure would see many of these same academics go on to
publish several influential textbooks that would further disseminate this model of practice.

Bridge 2 – Bodies of knowledge
The critical reflective practice model did not necessarily displace so much as become grafted
on to existing methods of social work practice, especially methods that include problem-solving
techniques, self-awareness, and ideas about the unconscious. Later versions incorporated
ideas from radical social work; structural ideas and postmodern concepts such as
deconstruction and power/knowledge. Early in the formation phase, however the main addition
to the existing education model was the use of critical incident technique, developed in
psychology in the 1950s and which had been adapted by Australian social workers
undertaking research on the development of expertise and skill in social work. Figure nine
represents some of these aspects:
Critical
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Intelligence;
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Figure 9: Existing and new knowledge utilised for the critical reflective model

The reflective practice model eventually became known as the critical reflection model
through its adoption of social theory informed by critical theory, particularly of the feminist
and structural kinds.
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Enunciative modalities
Individual speaker status, institutional and technical sites and subject positions
There are three groups who would become positioned to speak about the gap between
theory and practice, each with different levels of status and authority: Academics with
extensive practice histories; practitioners who supervise students or practitioners who have
occupied social work positions which embody professional notions of what real social work
is and field education coordinators and students who have experienced field placement. Not
all of these speakers enjoy equal status in speaking of the gap between practice and theory.

Interestingly, the gap is described by academics and researchers more than practitioners. For
practitioners there was little or no gap; there is the practice and the skills to do it.
Knowledge is seen as practical and driven by need that arises from the context. Practitioners
are more concerned with the problems of practice: working with clients; agency politics;
funding issues and the need for activism in terms of increasing access to services for clients
who were being left behind due to the myriad of social problems they were contending
with. Practitioners may hold a perception that learning in the formal social work curriculum
is sometimes less relevant to practice, they nevertheless value academic social work
education for its status with regard to social work as a profession. The part played by
practitioners in the adoption and dispersion of reflective practice was not as developers of
practice theory, but rather as confessors. Even so, practitioner stories remain an important
element in the spread of training of the model. These stories supply authority and remain
important to the development of this social work critical reflective practice model even
today.

In addition to the stories from practice delivered by practitioners participating in training in
the model, there were also significant practitioner subgroups that were instrumental in its
dispersion. These were practitioners keen on pursuing postgraduate studies. Up until at
least 1975 social work services were primarily casework services and tended to occur in
agencies situated in the public sector. There were significant changes to the arrangements
for welfare occurring across the Australia. Changes to funding arrangements, job titles, and
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new services ushered in new accountabilities. Public sector functions were increasingly
outsourced to a growing non-government sector, which certainly offered opportunities but
in quite different industrial circumstances. Job security and tenure became a significant issue
for social work practitioners. There was also a need for new skills to fit this changing
industrial landscape. Due to the growing non-government sector practitioners found
themselves requiring skills in sourcing funding, designing programs and interventions,
managing and evaluating programs in addition to advancing practice knowledge in areas
already viewed as traditional such as interpersonal and communication skills, casework and
group work practice. Practitioners also found themselves needing to account for their
practice in ways they had not previously experienced. Debates about the nature of the
practice and knowledge of social work became invigorated by practitioner tales of this
changing landscape.

Growth in postgraduate Social Work courses in Australia had been very slow until the
introduction of a Master level qualification in social work in 2008. For the most of social
works’ professional existence in Australia the majority have undertaken education at the
undergraduate level. The four year undergraduate course only became as standard from the
1970s. This level of qualification was considered sufficient for a good career with reasonable
advancement within the Australian welfare sector. This perception changed with the
transformations to the sector resulting in increased competition for jobs amongst welfare
professionals. One group stands out as particularly relevant to this competition that is
psychologists. Social Work practitioners found themselves competing with psychology
graduates, often holding master level qualifications.

Two other groups are also significant to being able to describe the problem of the gap
between theory and practice: field education coordinators89 and social work students,
especially those undertaking field placements in their final years of a social work course.

Field education coordinators are responsible for the delivery of the field education also known as workintegrated learning. This involves extensive negotiation and close networking with practitioners, agency
managers, and students for the purposes of creating field placements. Field education coordinators are typically
employed for their extensive practice experience (Zuchowski, Hudson, Bartlett, & Diamandi, 2014)
89
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Thus field educators with strong connections to the field, academics who maintain
connections with practice and practitioners who supervised social work students were all
significant authorities able to describe and speak on the gap between theory, associated with
learning in a formal academic setting and the kind of learning that occurs in the ‘real world’
of social work practice. Field education coordinators often found themselves situated
between practice and academia and thus felt criticism from both sides for being seen as
either too academic or too practice focussed. Reflective practice would not significantly
permeate social work undergraduate education beyond field placement for some time. It
was the early 2000s that it began to permeate social work curriculums more broadly in part
due to its adoption into practice standards and accreditation documents.

Practice research is another site from which this model of reflective practice emerged. There
had been little research undertaken in social work; even less on understanding the
knowledge base, practices and skills of students and practitioners. The first site was a study
on knowledge and skill development, the first of its kind in Australia. Here the basic use of
the critical incident tool was combined with recall to ask practitioners and students what
knowledge they used in their work. The impetus for this study was to interrogate what
impact beliefs and theoretical assumptions had on the actions of social workers in practice?
Not much as it turns out. There was a significant gap between what practitioners and
students considered theoretically and how they behaved in practice.

The key point here is that the critical reflection model did not specifically emerge as a
practice model from practice. Very few accounts of reflective practice were produced by
practitioners prior to this period. In fact, descriptions of practice by practitioners were, and
possibly still are, quite rare. They were mainly found in conference papers. Thus,
understanding practice reflection on practice emerged from sites concerned with learning
and where practitioners intersected with academics.

172

Bridge 3: Outline of the data sources and processes
One of the processes that I undertook to trace the emergence early in the process was a
comparison between two complete sets of unit outlines from two different undergraduate
curriculums from different universities in Australia. The sample was one of convenience.
One set was lent to me by a colleague. The other was a set of unit outlines from my own
course. These were useful documents that set out the textbooks and articles recommended to
students. The universities are in different states of Australia; one is a large metropolitan
university and the other post-Dawkins new generation university. The unit plans
collectively span 1996 – 2003 whilst the complete data set of texts spans range from 1964 –
present. For the construction of the archaeological narrative the span of texts is 1986 to the
present. As for the unit plans they were considered because the analysis of the other data in
the original corpus suggested a change to the language of practices within the field of social
work and I sought to establish a reference point by looking at the texts in use between the
two programs. The main practice modality that changed was problem-solving methods.
Casework processes were retained but were then radicalised in Australia (Fook, 1993).

Finale
This narrative has demonstrated the way in which reflective practice emerged in social work
education and how this occurred within a wider intensification of practices for interrogating
the gap between practice and theory. It is possible to trace the transformation of an earlier
professional emphasis on self-awareness and problem-solving into a reflective practice
model that incorporates practices aimed at interrogating this gap between theory and
practice. Key speakers for this emerging trend were originally field education social
workers, academics with extensive practice experience and students on field placement. The
assumptions of the model are now incorporated into education and accreditation documents
for the social work profession in Australia. Far from emerging through practice, the
predominant model built on an existing framework for reflection but incorporated a number
of other bodies of knowledge important to the social work discipline. These were critical and
radical perspectives, feminist theory and post-structural ideas such as deconstruction and
ideas about the relation between power and knowledge (Fook & Askeland, 2007; Hickson,
2013; Morley, 2004; Morley, 2011).
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Further, the predominant critical reflective model is sometimes proposed as a way of
resisting dominant discourses and finding ways to change workplace practices by the
interrogation and deconstructing of participant assumptions (Bay & Macfarlane, 2010;
Hickson, 2011; Morley, 2008; Noble & Irwin, 2009). Similarly, it is also possible to consider
this critical reflective model as a technique of the self which emerged as a response to
neoliberal logics that include an intensification of the subjection of social workers. In this
sense the model can be seen as a form of resistance aimed at social worker self-determination
(Karakayali, 2015). Even so it perhaps is not as transformative as might be imagined because
the model only applies to deconstruction of already specified dominant discourses and
structures introduced through informing theoretical knowledge.

Social workers may need to include more forms of critical reflection beyond just critique and
deconstruction as this would broaden their repertoire for thinking differently about some
problems. In terms of education the model was firstly dispersed through higher education
networks which included educators, students and people engaged in higher degree research
study in social work. While it emerged from field education and from practice research the
model was dispersed to other parts of social work curricula through the publication of key
textbooks, conference papers and training sessions. The other mechanism was through the
networks of academics within social work education who offered post-qualifying advanced
practice training.
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Inte rlude 6
What is a statement?
What is a statement? This it turned out was a key question for the conduct of this line of
inquiry. My first mistake was that I did not begin my process of constructing the archive by
reading the original work by Foucault. That would have been sensible. Instead I based my
construction of the archive on secondary sources, specifically work by Gavin Kendall and
Gary Wickham (1999) and Linda Graham (2011). These texts were informative and from
them I gleaned the idea that that one
should adopt two key stances in
conducting this type of analysis: the first is
that of scepticism and the second is not to
attribute claims to their author. The
problem is that neither text really
expanded in much detail about why these
stances are crucial to the achievement of a
certain way of looking at texts and
practices (or words-and-things; see
Graham, 2011). Achievement of this
different vision is akin to changing
perspectives; as though you are looking at
a vase instead of two faces in the figure
Figure 10: Figure/ground object known as the Rubin vase
adjacent. My experience with the data set I
had constructed was very much like looking
at the vase even as I understood I should be seeing ‘faces’. I conducted the analysis starting
with explaining the inclusion/exclusions of each of the text, asking why I had included them
and keeping notes on that process. I then conducted a thorough read and annotation of the
sources I had included. This was very frustrating as I found I could not see anything but kept
getting particularly engaged with the content and meaning of the texts. I could not seem to
locate the ‘statements’ needed to trace the emergence of reflective practice as a discursive
object or formation. What was I looking for? What is a statement? Statements are in fact a key
building block of discursive formations and these act in a somewhat recursive fashion when
working in an archaeological way: one looks for statements to discern discursive formations
as a key to understanding the positivity around said statements (Bernauer, 1990; Foucault,
1972). Confused? I was.
It seemed to me that even after some time at this process I did not have a good
understanding about what a ‘statement’ in the Foucauldian sense might be. Perhaps my
archive did not contain any? I began to think the problem was with the construction of my
archive. Did I have the right sources? Had I included enough materials? Was I looking in the
right places? How would I know they were the right places? It turned out that the issue of
knowing what a statement is and whether it is in your archive was the right question to ask. I
started reading Foucault’s work. It helped.
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Cha pter 7
Track 3 – Singing together about reflective practice in
Australian Social Work education – A Choir

Prelude
This album track presents the
last inquiry of the research and
Autoethnography

aims to address the question:
How is reflective practice
utilised in learning, teaching and
practicing social work? The
chapter has been envisaged to be

Reflective
Practice in
Australian
Social Work
Education

Archaeology

Qualitative
interviews

a choral piece of music which
utilises the many voices that
contributed to this aspect of the

Figure 11: Qualitative interviews

research. The chapter is written
with a verse and bridge structure. The track also has two main parts, a prelude and finale.
As mentioned earlier, I conducted a series of qualitative interviews with social work
students, field educators, academics and practitioners. The key question being explored was
how reflective practice is utilised in learning, teaching and practicing social work? My
interest here is to go beyond my own experience and the discursive landscape explored in
previous stages of this research in order to enquire into how it is used, or not, within the
field of social work in Australia. This line of inquiry occurs within this context.

Descriptions of the process of this stage are outlined in chapter four, however, a brief recap
of the key detail might be helpful here. There were 14 participants interviewed in this stage
of the study. Participants ranged in experience from a first year social work student to a
practitioner of 30 years’ experience in the field of social work and as an educator. All
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participants, even those who were identified as students, had some experience in practising
human services/social work. All participants were eligible, either as practitioners or as
students in an accredited Australian social work course, for membership of the Australian
Association of Social Workers. The fields of practice identified by participants were diverse.
This chapter describes the results of the overall analysis beginning with the values, attitudes
and beliefs about reflective practice expressed by participants. The outcome of this analysis
is discussed in section one of this chapter.

The assumption of this inquiry is that the use and value placed on reflective practice within
the social work discipline can be seen as emerging from the intersection between the needs
of social work practice and that of education. This is a finding from tracing the emergence of
the language of reflection through the archaeological phase of this research (see chapter 6).
Previous to this, practice was often described in psychoanalytic (Epstein, 1994) or problemsolving terms (Perlman, 1957). Reflective practice has become a professional language and
thus I was interested in conducting an analysis that would assist in ‚discovering the cultural
knowledge that people use to organize *sic+ their behaviors and interpret their experiences‛
(Spradley, 1980, cited in Saldaña, 2012, p. 157).

The aim through this layer of analysis was to locate the cultural knowledge about reflective
practice that students, practitioners, educators and field educators are using. I have used this
in order to map the relationships between key ideas about reflective practice. In this kind of
analysis the goal is to identify the semantic relationships in order to trace the meaning and
practices utilised by participants in the conduct of reflection in relation to social work
education and practice. In my case I chose four different semantic relationships. These are:
means-end; rationale; location; and function,90 as this best addressed the question of the
research. These four relationships are discussed below in part two of this track. I close with a
discussion of the findings in relation to the research question of this part of the research.

Means-end relationships specify where X [reflection] is a way to do Y. Rationale relationships describe the
reasons for engaging in behaviours where X is the reason for doing Y [reflective practice]. Coding for location
relationships is a way to consider where the action or activities of reflective practice occur; and lastly function
relationships outline what activities are used to do reflective practice (Saldaña, 2012, p. 158).
90
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Part 1 – singing about our values, attitudes and beliefs towards reflective
practice.
Prelude
All participants discussed reflective practice in relation to their values as a social worker.
This was a very strong theme across all the interviews. As a result, it seemed important to
apply a further level of analysis to values generally. In this case therefore, there are three
main levels through which to consider reflective practice in relation to values. The first is in
the form of how important it was to participants as individuals, concentrating on reflective
practice as something they do in their practice. Values also encompassed commentary about
what it contributes to them as a practitioner. Consequently, statements were coded as values
where they could be said to represent ‚<the importance we attribute to oneself, another
person, thing or idea‛ (Saldaña, 2012, p. 111). Ideas or activities associated with reflective
practice and where it was spoken about as important were thus coded as a value.
The second level encompassed attitudes towards its use in practice or for learning. An
attitude in this context is any ‚<relatively enduring system of evaluative, affective reactions
based upon and reflecting evaluative concepts or beliefs, which have been learned‛ (Shaw &
Wright, 1967, cited in Saldaña, 2012, p. 111). Participant comments that represent evaluative
content or feelings about reflective practice related to ideas learnt through practice or study
were thus coded as attitudes. Beliefs constituted the final level. In this respect beliefs are
‚<part of a system that includes our values and attitudes, plus our personal knowledge,
experiences, opinions, prejudices, morals and other interpretative perceptions of the social
world‛(Saldaña, 2012). Participant commentary was coded where the expressed beliefs were
about the way reflective practice contributes to the profession through building knowledge
about social work practice.
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Adjacent is figure 12 that
represents the movement from
interview transcript to initial
codes to values, attitudes and
beliefs through to the final
themes that emerged in the
process. The darker boxes
represent the emphasis on that
particular theme from within

the participant accounts. The

Figure 12; Values, attitudes and beliefs about reflective practice

main themes with regard to
values were the usefulness of reflective practice for knowing yourself and building empathy for
others. In terms of attitudes the main themes are that reflective practice is important for
accountability for practice, for critical thinking and for learning. In terms of beliefs the strongest
themes to emerge were that reflective practice was a way to build practice wisdom,
understand the construction of knowledge, and enact professionalism. The rest of this section
will discuss these themes in more depth and with illustrations drawn from the voices of
participants in the way of direct quotes.

Verse 1: Values
‚<its sorting out what your heart’s feeling and what your brain’s telling you‛ (Participant
nine, practitioner).
Knowing yourself
Participants were very clear that reflection was viewed as key to understanding oneself as a
practitioner and also as a person. Self-awareness and the link to practice has always been an
important part of social work practice and education (O'Connor et al., 1991; Ruch, 2000).
Reflective self-awareness is one of a number of elements also valued within the Australian
Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics (Australian Association of Social Workers,
2010a; see also Pawar & Anscombe, 2015) as a core part of demonstrating professional
integrity. Participants saw reflection as a key route to developing this knowledge of
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themselves and their practice. For some participants it was closely tied to self-awareness of
their emotions, levels of energy and resilience in undertaking what can be stressful work:
<I find that [its] really important to be doing both within the interaction of the [encounter] –
of the patient and the client themselves and sort of < constantly checking back in to what’s
happening here? What am I feeling? How am I portraying that? What am I looking like
outwardly? (Participant five, practitioner).
And it also placed their identity as a person at the centre of the work to differing extents:
< [I] think being reflective is an individual thing as well, not just a social work professional
thing. It comes down to the individual too<so, for me, a big part of reflecting involves myself
(Participant one, educator).
Gillian Ruch (2000) points out that ‚*T+he importance of acknowledging the whole person
and their ‘multiple subjectivities’ (Peshkin, 1988) in professional and educative arenas is a
pivotal characteristic of reflective practice‛ (p. 105, source in original). Ruch makes this
assertion in the context of a study that considered four different kinds of reflection:
technical, practical, critical and process (Ruch, 2000). Technical reflection in this schema is
related to technical rationality described and well criticised by Schon (1983, pp. 21-30); it
refers to the use of external sources of knowledge in order to solve problems (Ruch, 2007).
Practical reflection by way of contrast may be related to knowledge derived from practice
rather than imposed from the outside and according to Ruch (2007, p. 661), is most related to
the reflective practice model of Schon (1983, 1987). Critical reflection is associated with the
Habermasian project of emancipation by means of communicative action (Habermas, 1970)
and this means looking at ‚<structural forces that distort or constrain professional practice‛
(Ruch, 2007, p. 661). Lastly, process reflection is based in psychodynamic principles and
includes a focus on the conscious and unconscious aspects of practice. Self-awareness of the
kind expressed by the participants here included elements of all four kinds described by
Ruch.

The use of self-awareness and the link to reflective ability for resilience has also been
demonstrated in a UK study with social work students by Grant and Kinman (2011) where
they found that reflective capacity was linked to higher levels of overall resilience. The
Grant and Kinman study also considered emotional intelligence, social confidence and
empathy as important qualities that contribute to resilience. Participants in this study
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discussed it in relation to being able to know one’s own strengths, challenges and triggers
with regard to practice. Hickson’s (2013) research, too, suggested there is a link between
emotional intelligence and reflective ability; however, this was tied to an ability to ‘survey’
one’s practice in such a way as to expose hidden assumptions and values that might be
inimical to good practice.

Further, this link translated for some participants into the idea that knowing yourself is to
have an awareness of how assumptions and attitudes from the social worker’s own history
might shape responses to clients. For example:
That whole issue of, who are they? Why am I having this reaction to this person? Is it them or
is it actually something I’m bringing to the interaction? (Participant one, educator).
And
<I didn’t obviously realise that in the earlier years but somehow or another I’ve always
reflected on what is it that I bring to this? (Participant thirteen, educator).
It can be seen that these responses connect to modes of thinking, which link the personal and
political (Fook, 1990). Indeed, a number of participants explicitly called their process a form
of critical reflection characterised by deconstruction and reconstruction. As this participant
says:
<I always think about construction deconstruction reconstruction. And that’s really about
making the implicit values, beliefs and assumptions explicit < so that’s been a real focus for
me (Participant fourteen, educator).
And:
<,I’m+ still < drawn to the critical reflection language. I guess for me, it’s about self and
situations in relationship to other factors (Participant six, educator).

This emphasis on critical reflection includes paying attention to the cultural aspects of
interactions. Bender, Negi and Fowler (2010) point out that ‚*I+ncreased practitioner selfawareness also involves the understanding of personal ethnic and racial background (or
roots) within a socio-political and historical context<this entails the critical exploration of
personal familial history within geographic, cultural, relational, and societal contexts‛ (p. 36).
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This was seen as an important aspect of being aware of the impact the worker can have for
clients. Thus, closely related to knowing yourself, was the theme of empathy.
Empathy
<*including+ the lived experiences from a consumer and family members<is about trying to
build empathy and step into the shoes of the other < (Participant thirteen, educator).
In the study by Bender and colleagues, participants saw empathy as crucial to developing
culturally responsive practices (Bender et al., 2010). Participants in this study discussed
reflection as a way to being able to stimulate empathy, and by doing so, bring care into their
practice. Empathy was expressed by this participant as:
<putting yourself in somebody else’s shoes, that’s also I think really important, it’s one thing
to look back and think oh yeah, or say to somebody ‚Well, why did you do that?‛ But it’s
alright then saying this happened in the past < but you don’t actually physically try and,
imagine yourself in that position or try and feel how that would’ve felt I think again, if it’s just
words it has to have meaning to it. So reflecting but I think < there has to be some sort of
emotional thing going on in there (Participant seven, student).

Another practitioner saw being critically reflexive about their own position and that of the
people they work with as a form of understanding that allowed them a way to stand in
solidarity with others who may be very different from them:
I mean, ultimately I think what critical reflexivity does for me is [that] it expands my
awareness and understanding. It really deepens my empathy and my willingness and openness
to have empathy, and it gives me lots of surprises [and] it keeps me curious about my practice.
I think it’s why I’m still an enthusiastic social worker (Participant six, educator).
In conclusion, reflection was seen as important to building both self-awareness and
empathy. These attributes were considered routes to a wider set of values about working
with vulnerable people, identifying injustice and being aware of one’s own social location
and privilege. These ideas about wider elements of justice were found to be core beliefs and
thus emerged more strongly within that category. These will be discussed below; however,
in the next section I turn to consider the main themes identified with regard to attitudes.
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Verse 2: Attitudes
‚<reflection is untangling trickiness‛ (Participant six, educator).
Accountability
The predominant attitude expressed by participants about why reflection is important was
accountability for practice judgements and actions. Some tied this to the use of evidence in
practice, particularly in settings that are statutory:
<it probably makes social work different to other disciplines because I think it’s essential to –
for us to be able to recognise in ourselves and in others what’s – what’s a value judgement,
what’s not, what’s evidence, what’s not, how do we develop arguments which are critical and
arguments which are convincing and that we feel okay about assessments< that we [consider
how we feel] about giving if we’re not reflecting< on how other forces and influences within
ourselves and outside of ourselves actually impact those things (Participant four, practitioner).
Increased requirements for accountability for practice decisions by social workers, and in the
human services generally, have been on the agenda for some time. Scott, Laragy, Giles and
Bland (2004) suggest that ‚A range of factors in the current context of Australian
professional practice created the impetus for *the development of practice standards+<
including increasing pressure for the profession to take responsibility for articulating ethical
and ideological principles of practice, and a workplace environment demanding increased
accountability” (p. 613). Connell, Fawcett and Meagher (2009) consider this emphasis on
accountability as part of a wider neo-liberal logic. They suggest that:
Under neo-liberalism, this principle [fractal organisational logics] holds down to the
lowest level. Individual workers are treated as firms, expected to follow a profit-making
logic; and are held accountable to the organization in these terms, through
‘performance management’ schemes. Both organizations and individuals are required
to make themselves accountable in terms of competition. (Connell et al., 2009, p. 334)
Thus it is, perhaps not surprising, that participants valued reflective practice as a
mechanism of accountability as it may act as something of a currency within the space of
organisations subject to marketisation forces.
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Other participants were more explicit in tracing accountability back to being able to provide
reasons for their thinking and thus to be accountable and learn from mistakes. This was
strong theme amongst student participants:
I think that reflective practice is thinking about what you’re actually doing or what you’ve done
and then learning from, not so much it doesn’t always have to be mistakes but just learning
from you’ve done or what you see other people doing and then building that into your
knowledge (Participant seven, student).
And in response to the question ‚what other purposes do you think reflection may have?‛
Kind of evaluating and it’s < keeping you accountable in a way, to reflect on your work, < if
you’re reflecting on a poor mark and you have to look over it, you can’t just throw it out to the
side, you actually have to keep yourself accountable that you did get that poor mark and you
really have to think why did I get that poor mark, what could I have done differently, where can
I get help to do better and what could I have done better...? (Participant twelve, student)
Lastly, accountability for some meant assessing their strengths and challenges as a
practitioner and ensuring they are able to improve their performance:
In helping to assess my own skillset and what is strong and what’s not (Participant eleven,
practitioner).
Critical thinking and learning
Not as strongly emphasised within the overall category of attitudes but still present as a
theme, was that of critical thinking and learning. Participants considered reflection as a key
part of being able to think critically about what they are doing or learning. Critical thinking
in this respect involves processes such as questioning the status quo within a practice
situation, using evidence, thinking about what could have been done differently within
regard to practice decisions, or what can be challenged within the process for better
outcomes for clients. An example from the data illustrates:
[It was} probably a couple of years ago just taking out a student and she – we went to a house
and – it was the wrong address or something and then we sat there in the car and we talked
about the implications of going to a wrong address and we probably talked for about 20 minutes
on what that could mean and how that could unfold for the people there and the implications of
leaving a *Government car+< or all that stuff about what could happen just from simply going
and doing something where somebody gave us the wrong address. And she was able to then go
on and actually use that – the breakdown of all the things that could happen when you – bung
in a load of policy and legal implications and social implications and family implications around just one of those very simple things that *happen+<(Participant four, practitioner).
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I turn now to consider the themes that emerged from within the category of beliefs. Beliefs
encompass both attitudes and values held by individuals but this category also includes the
value participants place on reflection as part of their understanding of social work as a
professional project (McDonald, 2007).

Verse 3: Beliefs
Practice wisdom
‚<it’s *reflective practice+ the spinal column of it. I think everything else hangs off it and I
think it’s probably what makes – and I haven’t studied other disciplines so I don’t know < but
I think it probably makes social work different to other disciplines because I think it’s
essential<‛ (Participant four, practitioner).
The strongest theme in this category concerns the way in which reflective practice is a key
component to the development and sharing of practice wisdom for social workers. Another
theme concerned reflection as important to understanding the way knowledge is uncertain
and constructed – this theme I have called construction of knowledge. The two themes are
related but distinct approaches to what knowledge is utilised in practice. In the accounts
from participants the key difference was the link between knowledge and power. It should
be said that participants influenced by current critical reflection models (Fook, 2002; ook &
Gardner, 2007; Fook et al., 2000) tended to link practice wisdom and ideas about power and
knowledge together in their discussion of beliefs with regard to reflection.

Sheppard (1995, p. 279) offers a definition of practice wisdom based on his interest in
knowledge use in practice:
<the accumulated knowledge social workers are able to bring to the consideration of
individual cases and their practice in general. This would appear to have three main
and distinct potential sources: knowledge gained from ‘everyday life’, derived from
the process of living in society and interacting with others; knowledge gained from
social science, specifically research and ideas; and knowledge gained from the conduct
of social work practice
Chui and Tsui (2008) also suggest that practice wisdom ‚<involves the actualization of
social work values‛ (p. 48). This is to say that social work practice involves the exercise of
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significant judgement under conditions of uncertainty (Chu & Tsui, 2008; Parton, 2000;
White, 2009). Other authors characterise social work practice as a form of phronesis (Petersén
& Olsson, 2014; Tsang, 2008). Phronesis, as mentioned previously, is considered to be a form
of practical reasoning which ‚<takes into account local circumstances, particulars, and
contingencies; weighs the tradeoffs; and is iterative — repeats itself, and the aims may
change in the process of deliberation.‛ (Tsang, 2008, p. 134):
Q: Do<do you use reflection in your current role (Interviewer)
A: <Yeah all day everyday I think – it’s very hard to separate out your work with your clients
and your work with your colleagues or your - or other stakeholders that ... you have linkages
with, but lately I have worked in<Everything falling apart is either an opportunity for growth
or a lost opportunity and history to be repeated (Participant three, practitioner)
This practitioner went on to talk about the way in which reflection had provided the biggest
benefit in terms of how to work with client and worker vulnerability:
<With my clients I think my greatest achievements through reflection have been in boundaries
and self-care. I think that when you have very, very vulnerable clients you have to constantly
reflect on your interactions and you have to consider so much. I think that’s what social
workers do so well. The look at power and strength and vulnerability and really
try<(Participant three, practitioner).
Given this link between the expression of practice as a conjunction of context and the
expression and of values, it is not surprising that practice wisdom has been at the centre of
debate within the profession, not least due to it often being held in contrast to knowledge
considered scientific or instrumental (Cheung, 2015). Early debate about the use of theory in
practice was initiated by Sheldon in the UK (Parton, 2000) and Parton suggests that it has
been one of the most enduring tensions amongst social workers as professionals. Parton
(2000) suggests that this tension turns on the contrast between ‚scientific and the more
humanist, client-centred approaches to practice‛ (p. 450) and was played out through
debates about methods of social science and the schism between positivists on the one hand
and interpretivists on the other (Sheppard et al., 2000). This tension was later to manifest as
the contrast between evidence based practice (Plath, 2006) and critical reflective practice in
Australia (see chapter six). The emphasis on evidence and judgement can be seen in
participant responses about reflective practice:
<Every single assessment that we do whether it is a – safety and wellbeing assessment, a
carers assessment, a review of a safety and wellbeing assessment and we’re assessing all the
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time, all the time< Because – we all – we have to reflect on how we are as people every day
coming to the office (Participant four, practitioner).

Further, in a much cited article based on her doctoral research considering knowledge
utilisation, Julie Drury Hudson (1997) suggested practice wisdom is but one amongst five
types of knowledge used. Hudson defines practice wisdom as:
Knowledge gained from the conduct of social work practice which is formed through
the process of working with a number of cases involving the same problem, or gained
through work with different problems which possess dimensions of understanding
which are transferable to the problem at hand. (p. 42)
In her discussion Hudson concedes that along with procedural knowledge, and values and
ethical knowledge social workers tend to utilise practice wisdom rather than formal
theoretical knowledge or even scientifically grounded evidence in their practice.

Practice wisdom is developed and passed on from experienced practitioners to more novice
practitioners through discussion, modelling and supervision. Moreover, it is seldom codified
in writing or research (Hudson, 1997). Statements that indicated the use of reflection for the
purposes of reasoning about practice, accounting for decisions or developing knowledge
about situations were included under this theme of practice wisdom. Sometimes this use
emerged in the discussion between interviewer and participant:
Q: And you clearly use it [reflective practice] in your teaching, as well as modelling it.
(Interviewer)
A: I do.
Q: Do you do a lot of think aloud yourself, with students? I’m thinking about this – that kind
of modelling?
A: Yeah, absolutely, absolutely. And I – sort of one of my teaching mottos is, I’ve learnt a lot
from mistakes, so I share lots of my mistakes with students, from practice, from what I’m doing
at the moment – I mean I’m always purposeful in it, but I do – it’s very relational teaching for
me which involves reflection, as well because I’m reflecting on, would this be likely to be
beneficial for some people in the room < (Participant six, educator).
Thus practice wisdom entails the use of opportunities to demonstrate thinking aloud and
reasoning with others. O’Sullivan (2005) suggests that there are two competing ways in
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which practice wisdom is seen within the profession. One is intuitive, based on personal
knowledge and is sometimes considered to be idiosyncratically developed from practice
unique to the practitioner. The other way it is viewed is as a form of sound judgement. The
second way of thinking about practice wisdom is closer to the idea of phronesis mentioned
above.

O’Sullivan (2005) goes on to propose that the development of sound practice wisdom should
allow for opportunities to ‚<make reasoning explicit‛ (p. 229). His view is that not only are
there are different kinds of reasoning: (analytic and intuitive) but that these require
distinctive processes of development. Analytic reasoning ‚< involves the capacity to
analyse and synthesize information into hypotheses about particular situations‛ (O’Sullivan,
2005). This process was highly prized amongst participants and there are indications that
this thinking aloud occurs through discussion between experienced practitioners and less
experienced colleagues, within supervision between workers, educators and students. All
participants valued the opportunity to learn from and with others; a point that will be
further explored below. The next theme to emerge in terms of beliefs was how reflecting on
practice can be seen as one of the marks of social work professionalism.
Professionalism
There was not one kind of professionalism expressed by participants; instead a number of
different positions can be seen under this broad theme. What groups them is a notion of the
professional project (McDonald, 2007) in which social work is engaged and thus participants
are also engaged, albeit from different positions across a spectrum from practitioner to
educator to student. Kessl (2009) explains that there are a number of different kinds of
professionalism linked with reflexivity and the position of social work within various kinds
of welfare states in developed countries. The first kind is that of the expert ‚who (despite
their academic and experiential credentials) were being made increasingly accountable for
the effectiveness of their intervention with clients‛ (Kessl, 2009, p. 308). This kind of
professionalism has seen increasing calls for the use of evidence in practice. For participants
in health settings or with significant experience in health social work this push for evidence
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was particularly keen. The reliance on a notion of expert associated with a more clinical kind
of social work was considered by others as a somewhat traditional notion of social work.

The second kind of professionalism is one which is concerned to outline social work that is
responsive to current political climates and is, in Kessl’s view connected with a significant
critique of the current welfare state arrangements. This kind originates within the broad
sweep of critical theories (Kessl, 2009) oriented to social change. In addition, this kind of
professionalism sees the role of the social worker as transformative, not just for individual
clients, but in wider terms with regard to social conditions. This involves using knowledge
in a way that contributes to social change beyond change for individuals. An example of this
kind of professionalism, linked to reflective practice, may be seen in this quote:
<It’s about a whole lot more < including things like making links between knowledge and
power and the ideology and deconstructing those notions and how they impact on the way we
practice (Participant ten, educator).
The third kind of professionalism outlined by Kessl is that of radical constructivists where the
emphasis on professionalism is of the sort developed through the acquisition of practice
wisdom associated with development of tacit knowledge (Kessl, 2009). In fact all three
notions of professionalism have developed in the context of the welfare state. The welfare
state in Australia has been subjected to many of the same neo-liberal logics — often
translated in social work parlance as forms of free marketisation (Connell et al., 2009) — as
that of overseas welfare states. What has made social work vulnerable as a profession
compared to others such as medicine or law is the placement of social work within
organisational contexts (Kessl, 2009). In Australia social work has been particularly
vulnerable due to its lack of registration and its tenuous hold on the human services sector
as a whole (Healy & Lonne, 2010).

Participants expressed the value of reflective practice for developing clear and thoughtful
practice that can mean good outcomes for their clients. This was highly valued as a core part
of the using reflection to develop expertise:
<we’re constantly going back over what we’ve done in the past and how we can do it better in
the future. The children I particularly deal with, I deal with a lot of – obviously a lot of <
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children. We < currently have 74 children in our care, and they’re in tier 2 care [intensive
out-of-home care]< So of those – yeah, we have the same people going round the same circles,
and if you don’t reflect back on what you’ve done in the past you’re just going to repeat what
you’ve done and probably not achieve anything. (Participant two, practitioner who is also
studying social work)
Aspects of reflective practice were thought to become automatic and intuitive:
<And I think there’s certainly an active component to it but I think certainly a lot of what I’m
doing is on a more of a subconscious level just because it’s sort of become embedded into the
kind of practitioner that I am (Participant five, practitioner).
Construction of knowledge
Participants distinguished between kinds of reflective practice. For a smaller group there
was a belief that reflective practice was aimed at addressing their immediate concerns about
doing the work. Other participants discussed reflective practice as a process aimed at
deconstruction of the very creation of knowledge and power within practice situations.
Participants who held this latter view tended to be educators. This discussion centred on
critical reflection as a form of deconstruction of assumptions about knowledge and power
with a view to transforming situations and practice. The belief of this group was in the
power of this kind of reflection for emancipation. An example of this position is described
below:
...And reflective practice to me wasn’t the reflexive or the critical reflective practice that we,
that I came to know more here at [University X]. So there was talk at [University
Y]<around kind of being aware of your practice, that kind of knowing and doing and action
oriented. But it was, to me it felt a little bit less political, and then when you came to
[University X]<I felt it was far more contextualised, far more engaged<(Participant ten,
educator).
This participant explicitly discusses the difference between reflective practice and critical
reflection:
I think for me pivotal moments were when I worked at *University A+<that whole program
was firmly situated and grounded in critical social work theory and so really reconnecting with
critical theory then had a significant impact on my ability to work with students then after that
to challenge those values, beliefs and assumptions to make you know well what was implicit in
that, what was informing that. So I think just summarise what those significant moments being
an educator grounded in critical theory that then prompted further reading and exploration of
the literature around critical not just reflection but critical reflection and I think that’s the
difference. There's lots of literature on reflective practice but for me it was [that] I want to go
into critically reflective practice (Participant fourteen, educator)
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Practitioners who considered knowledge as constructed and related to power relations
tended to see understanding this as important to issues of educating students to contribute
to wider professional ideals concerned with social justice. The link to critical theory provides
these participants with an important reason for concentrating on the way in which
knowledge and power are intertwined.
Minor Bridge - Conclusion
In terms of values, attitudes and beliefs about reflective practice in social work, participants
saw it as an important and in some cases crucial, marker of a competent professional social
worker. All people expressed its value for social work education and practice. The main
themes with regard to values were centred on its use for individuals particularly in terms of
knowing the self and building empathy for situations in practice. Here it is possible to see
the significance participants placed on its use. It should be said that the sample were selfselected and resulted in people who already had an interest in the topic. Also, no-one in the
interviews expressed doubt about the practice. Much in line with Hickson’s (2013) research,
no-one said they were not reflective themselves but could readily point to its absence in
others.

With regard to attitudes the main themes here were how reflective practice offered
participants a language for accountability for their actions and reasoning. In addition it was
important as a process for critical thinking and learning from practice situations. Within the
wider politics of human services and the impact of neo-liberal programmes accountability is
a something of a fraught issue (Laragy, Bland, Giles, & Scott, 2013), however, this was not a
connection explicitly made by participants in this research. Their focus remained on the
value of reflective practice for the conduct of their work within the organisational contexts
they find themselves occupying.

Lastly, beliefs about the value of reflective practice centred on its use for building and
sharing practice wisdom and representing this wisdom in professional terms within the
settings which social workers are concerned. Some differences emerged amongst
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participants. These centred on the purposes of reflection within social work with one group
considering it important for developing and sharing practice wisdom and another, albeit
smaller but influential group seeing its purpose to be for the deconstruction and challenging
of how knowledge and power operate within social work practice. The second group tied
the use of deconstruction to wider aims with regard to social work’s role in social change
and transformation, whereas the practice wisdom group were more interested in its use for
immediate practice goals. Despite this it is clearly a language for describing the way in
which action, thought and care come together for social workers.

Interval
As discussed in album note four above I conducted a domain analysis that traced four
relevant semantic relationships within the participant accounts. This is presented in part two
below. Briefly, domain analysis is a method of analysis which embeds the assumptions
derived from ethnoscience and is considered interpretative (Sells et al, 1997) with regard to
how it considers the cultural knowledge associated with the topic of reflective practice. The
first relationship I considered was reflective practice as a means to something. The second
relationship concerned the reasons offered by participants for undertaking reflective
processes. The third relationship focussed on the activities (called functions in this
relationship) that participants discussed as important mechanisms of undertaking, learning
or teaching reflective practice. The final relationship considered was that of the locations and
activities where reflective practice occurs for participants. This section is completed by an
examination of these themes with an overview of the meaning systems and language (Sells
et al., 1997) with which social workers describe their experience of reflective practice in
Australian social work.
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Part 2 Reflective practice

Means-end relationships are those that
signal the aim of an activity. The figure
adjacent represents the main themes
that emerged from the analysis of what
participants indicated reflective
practice facilitates for them. The darker
borders indicate the weighting of each
theme within the overall accounts. I
will begin with a discussion of the

Reflection is a way to...

Verse 2.1: What is it for? Means-end relationships

Learn from
practice
Think differently
Know yourself as a
practitioner
Be accountable

Figure 13: Means-end relationships

theme learn from practice. I will discuss
each in turn.
Learn from practice
By far the strongest themes concerned how it enabled social workers to learn from the
activities and events of practice. As one practitioner put it:
So being reflective in your practice was one of the most important things to do, that I’d never
< actually really done that before [social work]. I would just do my work and, and that was it,
as where now I think, I’m always thinking about, did it go well? How did I do it? What was it
about that case that I came away not feeling so good about? So you’re constantly thinking
about [practice] (Participant one, educator).
And:
And it’s figuring out the questions that you need to ask of yourself and the questions that
you’re – the negative questions if you like (Participant five, practitioner).
While all participants talked about reflection on practice as a way to learn, for educators
this learning from practice was more closely tied to the integration of theoretical concepts
into practice:
The < purpose of that role was the reflections like how are they understanding what they're
doing and the ethics of that and integration [of] theory into practice (Participant ten, educator).
So this kind of learning from practice was not just operational but for educators, more than
any other group, learning from practice incorporated the use of theoretical ideas to explain
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practice as much as leveraging procedural knowledge (Hudson, 1997) on what to do in
situations. The educators discussed formal kinds of knowledge more than did either
practitioners or even students. In their discussion this was often tied to the term ‚critical
reflection‛ and that to be critically reflective was of a different order than just using
reflection on your practice:
I don’t use the term reflective practice, I use reflexive or critically reflective, to use the
difference between – Yeah to me reflective practice is more about looking inwards, but more
about looking inwards to me. But reflexive is more about my positioning in society and how
that’s constructed (Participant ten, educator).

In fact all educators in the study mentioned the term reflexivity and used it in relation to
discussions of a wider sense of themselves as part of structures and power relations. All
educators also discussed the need to work with students actively to instil this kind of
orientation to being reflective. Hickson (2013) describes how much of the reflective practice
literature suggests that there might exist a span of reflection that ranges from little or no
reflection to reflection to the achievement of critical reflection (Fook & Gardner, 2007; Wong,
Kember, Chung, & Yan, 1995). Participants in the study by Hickson (2013) however, suggest
that this may be unhelpful. It appears that their reflective practices were instead focussed on
the problem or situation being experienced. Somewhat in contrast to these findings from
Hickson (2013), this study found that there was some element of a span. However, this span
was confined mainly to the accounts of educators. It was not addressed within the
practitioners or with student descriptions. One participant demonstrated an awareness of
this by suggesting it may be an effect of the educator role, particularly in regard to field
education:
Yeah, well I think being an educator brings it to the fore. I don’t think that I would have the
language and maybe the literacy around critically reflective practice that I have now if I wasn’t
in this position. I might have some language [about it] if I was still in practice but it wouldn’t
be maybe as developed as it is now. So I do think this environment [has] invite[d] me to think
about it (Participant six, educator).
Student accounts demonstrated that reflection was a means to learning from and engaging
with materials in their studies:
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<I found that [writing about a skills demonstration] really interesting and [it helped] to
really < highlight positives and negatives. And I suppose not to focus on the negatives as well
but to look at the positives of your work (Participant eight, student).
And as another student suggested:
<I think the actual whole learning experience itself < involves a lot of reflection< the units
that I’m doing now I’m finding that my brain is automatically dredging stuff up that I did in
first year units and it’s oh, hold on a minute that happened then. And then there’s also just the
way that I approach things, I think to myself oh no, hold on a minute when I plan things that
way that didn’t really work so I’m not going to do that again this time I’m going to such and
such... it’s what you’re actually learning, it’s how you’re learning it and you have to think
about your approach to learning as well (Participant seven, student)
Having said that another student linked reflective practice as being about changing their
practice:
<it shouldn’t work like this because last time it worked like that so that’s how you should do it
and then you’ve sort of pigeon holed yourself into something or a way of doing something and
you don’t really want to be doing that because you’ve got to be open to constantly be learning
all the time and not be afraid if things change, for you to change and for you to do something
else (Participant two, student).
Thus, for this participant, reflection on the events or situations was a means to changing the
way situations may be approached in the future and was explicitly tied to learning. This
brings the discussion to the second main theme that resulted from the analysis: thinking
differently.
Thinking differently
The idea of reflection as a means to think differently was discussed by participants and the
term thinking differently encompasses a wide range of critical thinking descriptions. I have
used this term much in the way Tully (1999) does when he discusses it in relation to the kind
of critical reflection that attempts to consider the ‚apparent limits of thought and action in
the present‛ (p. 91). Participants talked about reflection as a process that enabled them to
consider limits and possibilities. To think differently in this context is to think about one’s
thinking actively (reflexivity) in addition to testing and acknowledging the limits of this
thought and action. Thus, participants discussed reflection as a means to questioning:
< Where are my biases? What is it that I need to be thinking about differently? What else is it
that’s happening in the wider broader world when we look at – at people’s messy realities of
their lives and how those trajectories impact on their lives and where is my place in that or
otherwise (Participant thirteen, educator).
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Or indeed to change their minds and trouble their own assumptions:
<my biggest point of reflection in the unit was, I felt confident to be able to deliver [the
content] because of my practice work and also teaching in other areas, but my biggest reflection
was around the fact that of 36 students three were male, and that we were going to be spending
a lot of time and the literature was going to talk a lot about males’ use of violence against
women and children, and [I] identify as a feminist, and I noticed that sort of, well I guess
they’re just going to have to deal with it; that was my first response, and I reflected on it, and I
thought, oh that’s really curious it’s a really curious response. But on one level, on an
intellectual level, yes that’s correct, but will that engage them and bring them in, given that the
material inadvertently will [also] marginalise < them (Participant six, educator)
Other participants discussed reflection as a way to rehearse different ways of acting in
similar situations; to consider the meaning and to interpret events in practice. They also
used it to locate and understand theories that might be applied in practice; to slow or
suspend the action of practice and lastly, consider the opinions of others about what has
happened. This last aspect is particularly illustrated by this point:
So because we all came from different thinking backgrounds or paradigms and so we reflection
happened when we were considering what each other was saying<it’s about discussing it first
as well and consulting people or considering all the options. What could go right, what could
go wrong, who might be the best person to assist or who would you consult<reflection doesn’t
always happen just at the end, it can happen at the start (Participant one, educator)
Or as this participant discusses:
<as a social worker you have to be reflective in every aspect of your career, just reflecting on
what you’ve done or how you could’ve done it better, what you could’ve done differently
(Participant twelve, student).
In sum, with regard to thinking differently, participants considered reflection as a means to
thinking differently not only about practice but also in terms of testing the limits of
possibility within practice situation. I turn now to the third main theme in this section on
means-end relationships, reflection as a means of knowing oneself.
Knowing yourself
Other themes to emerge from the analysis were concerned with reflection as a way to build
knowledge of the self as a practitioner. Knowing yourself as a social worker is something of
an axiom in the profession. Indeed these authors of an introductory social work text
consider it an essential first step to exploring what brings people into the profession
Chenoweth & McAuliffe, 2012). In fact, Chenoweth and McAuliffe tie self-knowledge in
their text explicitly to transformative learning as that which ‚< engages the learner
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intellectually, emotionally and socially<moves the learning beyond the attainment of
factual knowledge into his or her own experience, thinking and meaning-making<‛ (Giles,
Irwin, Lynch & Waugh, 2010 cited in Chenoweth & McAuliffe, 2012, p. 26). There are, in fact,
several uses of the term with different associated meanings according to Larrison (2009).
These different uses of the term are conscious, intuitive, purposeful, and therapeutic. While
they might all be traced genealogically in terms of their differences each definition does
appear to share a common conception of the use of self as the ‚ < integration of the
clinician's professional knowledge, coupled with the person's individual characteristics that
are present in the therapeutic relationship‛ (Larrison, 2009, p. 10).

The link between transformational learning and reflection has been made explicit in some
Australian social work literature (Bay & Macfarlane, 2010; Morley, 2011). Not all participants
discussed reflective practice in transformative language and in instances where this did
occur, it was mainly in the accounts by educators:
I think people can say yeah I reflect on my practice but what does that look like? It might be that
it's not as deep as it could be for it to actually be really useful or for it to be transformative
because I know when I was in *previous role+< we had a framework for that and people
needed really needed to work through some things to work out what they needed to work out
(Participant three, practitioner).

Participants considered reflection as a route to understanding how they think and feel about
practice situations, clients and service users and indeed their hopes of making a difference in
the work they undertake. This is closer to Cournoyer’s (2008) suggestion that:
[A]t a minimum, social workers must understand how their personal beliefs, attitudes,
and ideologies might influence or interfere with their professional activities<*and+
develop ways and means to recognize and personally manage maladaptive patterns of
thinking, feeling, or behaving that might interfere in <providing high-quality social
work services (p. 47).
Knowing yourself as a practitioner was discussed by some participants as connecting their
personal and practice lives together:
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<it was to be really reflective around thinking about what makes you a – a person first and
what makes you a social work student and what makes you a social work practitioner and how
those things interlink and try and kind of really get to that – that end game (Participant five,
practitioner).
Reflection was seen a way to do this so that aspects of the self can be managed and brought
together:
<So, I think my own personal development work through counselling and therapy opened up a
reflection in myself [and gave me] that willingness to look at self (Participant six, educator).
And:
I think it’s definitely a skill that we really need to be built on because we need to be doing it in
our personal kind of as an individual we need to be doing it<(Participant eight, student).
Participants also discussed reflection as a means to thinking about how one might be
travelling in terms of the kinds of work social workers do, recognising that the work itself
can be traumatic (Alkema, Linton, & Davies, 2008):
<we have to reflect on how we are as people every day coming to the office. How’s – I kind of
have a little list in my [head] – how’s my resilience today. How am I scaling that with myself
and if my resilience is high up I know that I’m going to be a much more professional worker
(Participant four, practitioner).
The term resilience did not arise with the majority of the participants but the conditions that
assist with being resilient certainly did. These conditions were having good team
relationships with others, as discussed by this participant:
<I’ve just learnt a lot about teams and human service organisations and how people cope with
conflict or how people cope with change and how people interact with each other and I’ve gotten
to the point where I can honestly say now that probably for the first half of my career, probably
for the first five years I couldn’t step out of looking at individual people, now I’m at a point
where I tend to look at things from – at a systemic level and then often it’s nothing to do with
the people, or very little to do with the people and I find that’s much more useful< (Participant
three, practitioner).
Others discussed supervision that is supportive and safe and developing emotional literacy
(Morrison, 2007) to support their practice as crucial to the ways they attended to their
resilience and self-knowledge:
I think good reflection has a comfort – it has an emotional literacy, it has a comfort with
emotions, it can ride with all of that, it doesn’t overstate them, it doesn’t understate them, it
[just] situates itself, you know<(Participant six, educator)
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Lastly many participants discussed also debriefing in the context of paying attention to
worker well-being. Below is how one practitioner explained this in the context of working in
a busy hospital and offering care to people whose relatives were dying:
<we all need to take a moment here and just sort of reflect on what’s happened and did we
work as a team and what worked and what worked for that family? We really need to be
informing our own practice so that it can go further<(Participant five, practitioner).
To summarise this theme it is possible to consider reflection as a means of knowing oneself
in terms of beliefs, knowledge and indeed emotions and well-being. The link between wellbeing and self-knowledge is also evident in reflection as a means for accounting for practice.
Accountability
Accountability as a theme from the analysis of means-end relationships remains a relatively
minor theme here even if it emerged as a significant attitude and has been discussed above.
The difference here is that accountability is discussed as a means of ensuring ethical and
caring practice with clients consider the use of power in practice and accounting for practice
actions. This is probably not surprising as accountability is enshrined as a practice standard
(Australian Association of Social Workers, 2013b). In the practice standards this translates
into being open about the source of judgements, declaration of any conflicts of interest,
recognition of how personal factors might impact on practice and seeking support from
others with matter as required. Many of the participants expressed these notions in relation
to reflection as a mechanism for locating these conflicts, need for support and for being able
to lay bare practice judgements, decisions and actions.

Accountability is also mentioned in the Australian Code of Ethics for social workers
(Australian Association of Social Workers, 2010a) and here it is linked to professional
integrity as a value. Indeed, for some, accountability was directly tied to the sense that social
workers need to claim their professionalism:
<we [social workers] are skilled professional people and we need to own that and if we’re
going to own that and hang our hat on it and say - ‚We deserve to be paid professionally.‛
[then we] need to actually back that up with something substantial and – and for a big part of
that for me is about encouraging people to reflect on their own practice... (Participant five,
practitioner)
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While for others reflection meant being able to trace the reasons why situations were as they
were:
<the evidence and deconstructing that and trying to make it fit to help understand what – and
help explain the new situation I guess that’s more about interaction and about deconstructing
human interaction and my human interaction and the effect that I have on situations
(Participant four, practitioner).
For others it was a way of accounting for decisions so as to avoid mistakes in the future
and/or learning from the past:
<I think it’s important as well because our history as social workers has shown that we have
made mistakes, the stolen generation being one, the most obvious. But that’s perhaps why we do
reflection *now+ because as a profession in the context of history and time we’ve made some
errors< (Participant one, educator).
Lastly, reflection was tied to accountability for some participants it acted as a process of
building awareness of the assumptions and privileges that may be operating:
[asking] what are the stated and hidden assumptions, like we’ll often work with an article<in
class [to] try to draw out what’s not stated here < what’s privileged and what’s not privileged,
who has a voice, who doesn’t have a voice<(Participant six, educator).

Minor bridge 1 Conclusion
In summary four themes emerged from the data with regard to a means-end relationship
about reflective practice. These were:


reflection is a way to learn from practice;



think differently,



know yourself as a practitioner; and, finally



to demonstrate accountability for values, judgements and actions in practice to
oneself, colleagues, clients and service users.

In the next section I will consider the themes that emerged from my analysis of the
reasons/rationales participants gave for using reflection.
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Verse 2.2: Why undertake reflection? Rationales for using reflective
practices
Why do social worker practitioners, educators and students use reflective practices? Here
the analysis centred on reasons offered for undertaking reflection, paying particular

significant. As with the means-end figure the
darker border represents the relative weighting
of the theme in relation to the others. I begin
the discussion by considering the first theme of
improving practice performance before outline the
subsequent themes of ensuring ethical behaviour;
generating new perspectives and managing
yourself.

Improving practice
performance
Ensuring ethical
behaviour
Generating new
perspectives
Managing yourself

is the reason for doing
reflection

attention to how participants expressed this. Figure 14 below shows four main themes as

Figure 14: Rationale for engaging in reflection

Improving practice performance
Participants considered reflective practice to be important to being able to learning from
practice and from others. In this respect, participants discussed learning from watching
themselves, receiving feedback from others about their performance, and then using
reflection to consider what they need to change or work on for improvement in how they go
about the work of helping and advocating for clients or service users. As one practitioner
saw it reflection was useful:
< Identifying areas that I need to upskill in, and finding lateral pathways for [improving]
tha[t] if you were just ploughing on and focusing ahead, you wouldn’t find (Participant eleven,
practitioner).
Another participant considered it helpful to incorporating new knowledge with what is
already known:
So I sort of drifted into the job and because I didn’t have any background knowledge in human
services at all the idea of – actually almost the idea of reflective practice is a quite strange thing
anyway < particularly < in this area. And being taught to think back on what you’ve done
and how your practice is and what you’re doing and whether you’re doing the right things
probably came from the mentor group that I had at the time, which was a very good group of
managers (Participant two, student with considerable practice experience).
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Overall this theme really picked up on the way in which reflection focuses attention on what
one is doing or have done in practice with an eye to improving this into the future. This was
considered by all as a primary reason for being reflective. Indeed, some practitioners who
identified as ‘doers’ saw reflection as burdensome in the face of their inclination to just get in
and take action. For example:
And that’s been a difficult part for me, because I’m a do-er, I just want to just do it, I don’t
want to sit around and talk about it and chew over it for hours on end. Yeah, because that
process itself is quite tiring. It’s like you’re continuously going through a counselling stage
(Participant nine, practitioner).
And
I’m a doing kind of person and P *final year field educator+ taught me very valuably that
thinking is a big part of social work and though he never said we need to think, it was just
being around him and we’d do a lot of debriefing after sessions and a lot of forward planning,
and it slowed me down, because before that I would have just been right, I need to get on the
phone and I need to do this, and I need to do that. And that really might not have been the
right direction, but also would have expended a lot of energy that might not have been
necessary< (Participant eleven, practitioner).
Even in these cases the participants considered reflection as important to ensuring ‚good‛
practice and to learning from practice for improvement.
Ensuring ethical behaviour
This theme emerged primarily in terms of an ethic of transparency and ensuring that
practitioners were able to see and work with the impact of themselves on others, whether
that is colleagues or service users. An example of the significance attributed to
understanding the impact on others through reflection is well captured by participant six in
relation to a question about whether they had experienced instances where someone was not
reflective:
<And I think it’s the most difficult student supervision experience I had. I mean it wasn’t a
performance thing in terms of [a] fail. That’s what made it more complicated because if there
had been performance issues it could have been more straightforward. And my sense was that
the [student behaviour of] not reflecting on self and [their] impact on others, including
clients, was a sort of defensive stance. [I thought] that there was quite a lot going on for her,
and I’m not wanting to pathologise her in any way but there was just so much historical
material that hadn’t been touched that it was really unsafe to take the lid off it< (Participant
six, educator).
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For this participant it was perfectly possible for the reflection to be targeted at others and not
oneself. However, ethical behaviour for this participant included being able to work with
one’s own impact on others. Ethical behaviour is also linked to discussion with others about
practice, formally or informally, through debriefing or supervision. In terms of ensuring
ethical accountability and behaviour there was a strong link made by participants about the
importance of others to reflect with.

Reflection on practice was also seen as a route to fulfilling a wider social work mission with
regard to social justice and advocating for system change. This was also tied to an analysis of
power that several participants considered crucial for ethical practice behaviour with
vulnerable clients:
<you’ve got to hold yourself accountable, your team accountable and assess whether you’re
doing the right thing for your client. And they deserve the best, they’re in disadvantaged
marginalised oppressed positions and their knowledge maybe limited, they’re limited in some
way or another and we’re there to support, advocate and fight for their rights and deliver what
they deserve. If we don’t debrief, and if we don’t reflect on what we’ve done as an individual, as
a team, as an agency, then how are we supposed to provide for them what they deserve?
(Participant twelve, student).
And as another participant also explains:
< awareness of those power structures and structures of oppression. So it was [being] aware
of those structural issues<[that makes you] a critically reflective practitioner < if you
weren’t aware of them then [shrugs]< (Participant eleven, educator).
The next theme picks up on the issue of knowing in practice, which this participant
mentions in terms of ‚structures of oppression‛.
Generating new perspectives
This theme is about linking knowledge to practice rather than thinking about learning from
practice in the previous theme, which was concerned with improving performance.
Participants all discussed reflection as a way of learning but many also tied it to generating
knowledge as well as integrating knowledge already learnt. In this respect the whole gamut
of Hudson’s (1997) different kinds of knowledge were discussed by participants, however,
locating and using knowledge explicitly required reflective thinking for participants.
Participants valued intuition but they also valued formal ideas for generating a range of
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different ways of viewing a new problem or situation in practice. As expected, educators
were more able to explicitly link to theoretical and formal knowledge but practitioners and
students also demonstrated the importance of this.

The relevance of kinds of knowledge has been studied by Fook and colleagues when they
considered the development of expertise in the 1990s (Fook et al., 2000). Fook and her
colleagues distinguished between formal or substantive knowledge and procedural
knowledge and developed a stage model of experience to expertise ranging from student to
expert practitioner. Substantive knowledge in their schema consists of theories, situational
rules, and knowledge that could be considered domain specific to an organisational context.
Procedural knowledge, on the other hand, is practice, generated knowledge about ‚how to
practice‛ and develops through experience in situ (Fook et al., 2000, pp. 180-181). Experts
tend to use a combination of both kinds of knowledge. Generating new perspectives denotes
where participants discussed reflection as a way to locate their substantive knowledge
whereas the earlier reason for reflecting concerned learning from practice situations more
explicitly. For example:
How can I link that back to the theory that I know about? Grief and loss and those kinds of
things < It’s sort of that – that aspect but also really going away afterwards and really taking
the time to kind of think about [it]? (Participant five, practitioner).
Managing yourself
Lastly, a minor theme emerged that reflection was important to managing yourself in practice.
Reflection in this sense was primarily tied to dealing with the uncertain nature of the work
and the kinds of feelings and pressures this introduces for social workers. As this
practitioner suggests:
<You have to keep on top of so much stuff particularly in workplaces like mine where time is
money. If you delay a patient submission – a patients discharge by a day because you didn’t
kind of have it together then that’s cost the hospital eight hundred dollars because that person
hasn’t gone home and they needed a bed overnight<So from that point of view there’s already
so much that you have to be at the top all the time. I sometimes question the capacity just to be
able to have that little bit of extra space in your head to kind of think about it which is – not so
much a time thing but [more]< a kind of a mental capacity (Participant five, practitioner).

204
Others described how reflection assisted with managing the emotion and stress that comes
with change:
<it’s very hard to separate out your work with your clients and your work with your
colleagues or other stakeholders that you have linkages with, but lately I have worked in – well
through my whole career I’ve worked in teams and some of them at some point just turn to shit
< Everything falling apart is either an opportunity for growth or a lost opportunity and
history to be repeated (Participant three, practitioner).

Minor bridge 2 Conclusion
In sum the main rationales for reflecting in practice were primarily devoted to improving
practice performance. Participants also considered reflection as an important route to
ensuring ethical practice behaviour and for using knowledge to generate new perspectives.
Lastly, participants also identified it as important for managing the uncertainty and being
responsive to changing practice environments. In the next section I will consider the main
themes that emerged in relation to locations and spaces that participants identified as
important to undertaking reflective practices.

Verse 2.3 Functions through which social work practitioners, educators and
students conduct reflective practice
practice reflection with writing also
featuring as an important aid to its
occurrence for participants. I chose the term

Talking
Writing

talk because this could encompass both
formal and informal kinds of talk. Minor

Recollection

themes were the use of processes of
recollection and thinking; however, these
have been discussed within the themes of

Thinking

is used for reflection

Talk emerged as the main way people

Figure 15: Functions that assist with reflection

talking and writing. Not all talk was equal
and so I will discuss in detail what features of talk participants identified as important to
reflection for the kinds of outcomes discussed above. Just as not all talk is the same, so too
there are diverse forms of writing that assist with the conduct of reflection for participants
interviewed here. There are significant links between all four themes and so the separation
of them is primarily for illustration purposes.
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Talk91
Participants identified talk and discussion as the key activity that assisted with their reflective
practice. This talk and discussion is described as occurring with a range of others within
various practice settings. For example, regardless of whether the participant was a student,
educator, or practitioner they described talking and discussion as key to reflection on events
and situations about which they were concerned or in which they were interested. The talk
is purposeful in that it was described as oriented to thinking or understanding practice
and/or learning. This is not surprising on some level as Tsang (2007) points out that ‚Social
work started as an oral mode of inter-personal practice in alleviating individual and social
problems, from the early days of the late nineteenth century‛ (p. 52).

In addition participants discussed the kinds of talk they undertake as a form of reflective
dialogue with others which I discuss below. However, dialogue was also discussed as
something that can occur with oneself and this is the link to recollection and thinking as
minor themes in this area of function. Participants saw talk with themselves as a way of
organising their initial ideas and thoughts. As one practitioner explains:
Another way that I reflect for example yesterday I had a very intense and difficult meeting in
[name of suburb] and actually met 2 people on my own and when I came out of the hour and
a half long meeting – my head was swimming a bit so when I got into the car I put my iPhone –
I recorded just some initial thoughts on my iPhone because I knew that I was going – heading
straight to another meeting. I was [not] going to have time to write anything and so I just had
to record what my initial thoughts were just to help organise some thoughts in my head and
once I [had] kind of spoken them I might not listen to that again (Participant three,
practitioner).

Participants also saw it as an important process for considering their assumptions, values
and actions and for this educator this happened as a first step in dialogue with herself:
And for me that’s where the reflection happens, it’s about being, when we reflect it’s about the
time that it happened, the place, the people that were there and for me it’s about considering all
those factors even on a small, smaller scale because that could’ve impacted the way that I
practiced<(Participant one, educator).
I have used the term talk for this theme in acknowledgement of the words utilised by participants. In this
section it will be used somewhat interchangeably with discussion and dialogue unless otherwise specified by an
explanation.
91
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Tsang (2007) also explored this talking with oneself as a form of dialogue. Dialogue can be
defined in a number of ways depending somewhat on the discipline or domain of interest.
Social work accounts have not been of much assistance with a definition as Tsang (2007)
laments. This is because even though it is considered crucial to learning and practice it has
not often been defined with much clarity in social work accounts. In light of this, Tsang
moves to give a definition based on the work from teaching by Barbules (1993, cited in
Tsang, 2007, p. 684), where dialogue is ‚<a process of discovering, exploring and
interrogating to achieve understanding or agreement‛. Thus, dialogue is often considered to
occur between two or more individuals, there is still a view that people engage in internal
dialogues as well as engaging in external dialogical practices (Hermans, 2001). Internal
dialogue is defined as ‚dialogue directed to oneself, involving only one person, acting as
both ‘speaker’ and ‘listener’‛ (Ho, Chan, Peng, & Ng, 2001, p. 395).

Returning to experience and thinking about situations was often discussed by participants.
In addition, there were indications that engaging in internal dialogue was important to at
least some participants:
<if I’m in an interaction with<with a patient or a family or even a colleague and it doesn’t sit
comfortably and I don’t know why. I know that’s a real – that real physiological reaction that
just [happened]– I don’t feel right about this and I really take the time after that – I’ll go and
get a coffee and I’ll find somewhere to sit. And I’ll just sort of have a think about it and I’ll
really sort of work through that. And I’m sure if anyone kind of came across me they would
probably find that quite unproductive of my work time. But actually for me it’s really vital
because then I can really get a sense about what happened and then I can go and address it<
(Participant five, practitioner).
And as this participant described it:
< But yeah, I do, I spend a lot of my evenings thinking, I don’t watch telly much and I spend a
lot of my evenings just sort of playing things back and going oh that worked < And just
finding things that you might miss (Participant eleven, practitioner).
Indeed Hermans (1999, p. 72) describes this idea of a self that speaks to itself as a dialogical
self ‚which can be described in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I
positions.‛ Ho (2001) describes the ability to engage in dialogue with oneself is a major
cognitive achievement leading to the ability to thinking about one’s thinking and thus to
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engage in metacognition92. In the view of Ho and his colleagues (2001) internal dialogue is a
precursor to the development of metacognition but its existence does not guarantee the
presence of metacognition. Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolo and Semerari (2008, p. 780)
suggest that ‚Over the last five years evidence has begun to converge suggesting that the
ability to think about one’s own thinking is closely related but not reducible or synonymous
with the ability to think about the thinking of another.‛ Thus social dialogue is also
required.

Social dialogue, or external dialogue, as it is described by Ho et al (2001) as ‚< otherdirected [and] is interpersonal, referring to dialogue that the self-engages in with other(s)<‛
(p. 395). This is the predominant kind of dialogue discussed by social work participants in
this study. This is probably because internal dialogue may be less socially acceptable to
discuss. In this study all participants discussed the importance of talking about practice,
cases, their learning, decisions, incidents and feelings with others at some point during the
interview. This may not be surprising in the context of social work particularly.

The use of discussion and case studies has been a method of instruction and learning within
the discipline since it began in the United States (Milner, 2009). Australia is no exception and
many of our methods of instruction and practice have been imported from overseas
(Chamberlain, 1986; Lawrence, 1975). According to Milner (2009, p. 40) case method
instruction has a number of functions which:
<illustrate various stages of the problem solving process, <expose students to the
challenges of working with diverse populations,<describe social work intervention
methods, introduce ethical dilemmas, simulate practice situations, and<conceptualize
practice in a variety of contexts.

Metacognition is being able to think about one’s own thinking in addition to thinking about the thinking of
others. Dimaggio et al (2008) suggest that although these operations are often discussed as metacognition or
mentalising they are not entirely the same thing and involve distinct albeit related processes. It is thought that
metacognition requires opportunities to know one’s own thinking but also to develop insight into that of others.
They suggest that these ‚capacities affect one another‛ (p. 780).
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Moreover, this use of case discussion often translates into learning in the field from others
within field placements and later through supervision and guidance of more experienced
others through engagement in communities of practice within organisations and
professional networks (Edmonds-Cady & Sosulski, 2012). Students, practitioners and
educators all discussed talk with others as central to their conduct of reflective practices.

Who these others might be is outlined in the next section on locations but suffice to say
participants were primarily referring to dialogue as that which occurs between colleagues,
other professionals and student and supervisors rather than dialogue between social worker
and client or service user. There was one exception to this — which I mention primarily
because it was an exception — and this was the only participant who discussed reflection
with clients as part of their practice:
<Yeah, well a couple of my cases are reunifications, so we – I make my clients – we sit and we
talk, and some situations there will be a breakdown about whatever, and I will talk to the clients
and say, ‚Well, you need to think about that,‛ and we call it reflect, but I say, ‚Well you think
about that, and think about why that happened, and how better we can do that, and I’ll talk to
you in a couple of days.‛ And then I’ll ring them back and we’ll have a conversation about it.
Because I think it’s good for, not just me to reflect about my practice, but if they reflect about it
because that will improve my practice if they come back and say, ‚oh, well I think we should
have done it this way or that way – that would have suited me better – and I was a bit upset
about that,‛ I want them to be really open and honest (Participant nine, practitioner).
Talking with others has an important role in the development of ‚critical, accountable and
knowledge-based practice wisdom‛ (O’Sullivan, 2005, p. 223). Moreover, this appears to be a
key way in which knowledge for and about social work practice is created, tested, refined
and disseminated at least amongst the social workers interviewed in this study. Writing is
another function that assists with developing reflective thinking and it is to this discussion I
will now turn.
Writing
Writing emerged as the second strongest theme with regard to activities that assist with or
function to support reflective practice. A number of participants said they kept a journal and
for some this had been the case even before studying social work:
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I think that there probably is an element of that. I think that’s – I’m a bit of journaler and a bit
[of a] let’s sit down and have a bit of a chat about this type of person I guess. And that’s I
think what one of things that naturally lead me into [social work] (Participant five,
practitioner).
A journal was something they used to aid their thinking about things that happen in
practice:
<so I personally, myself, I have a journal<And I write a lot of my stuff down<its own my
reflection<And it’s – [mine] I don’t share it< Because it’s about me and how I feel about
some of the situations. Yeah, so I just write it out, and then it’s out there, and then I can go
back – I’ll do it every Friday afternoon after I finish work.I’ll sit and type it up, and then I’ll
look at it and read over what happened< And see if I’ve made some changes< (Participant
nine, practitioner).
And as this participant explained:
< it's like pause at the end of every day to spend 10 minutes just writing down what happened
and what sticks to you or what challenged you and sit with that. *it’s good to+ question that
and then take [it] forward in some way<(Participant fourteen, practitioner)

As mentioned above, dialogue is often a process with oneself and it is likely that much of
what gets captured in writing processes that involve a personal journal is this internal
dialogue. Several participants suggested this was an important route to self-understanding
about their role and practice. One participant suggested it was not just writing that assisted:
<I have – I probably reflected more on my practice than – I can’t imagine anybody reflecting
anymore than I have – it’s really interesting where I got to because I use reflective journaling
type tools, diagrams and even just getting pen and paper and drawing something or writing
words<(Participant three, Practitioner).
The point this participant is making is about the use of different kinds of processes that
could aid reflection and these could include drawing or writing poetry.

This point is echoed by Fook and Gardner (2007) who report that there is increasing interest
in using arts-based practices to aid reflection beyond formal or free writing. The benefit of
arts-based practice may be in providing access to emotional layers within students in order
to foster reflective ability through ‚<creating disturbance in the mind of the student and of
enabling the student to handle that disturbance<‛ (Barnett, 1997, cited in Ixer, 1999, p. 522).
Moreover Trevelyan, Crath and Chambon (2014) suggest that the idea of creating a felt
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difficulty has ‚<figured prominently in this pedagogy‛ (p. 14). This pedagogy includes
simulated exercises in addition to role plays and processes involving music, art and
literature in which students participate and then reflect on through writing and discussion.
Many participants discussed the use of these kinds of processes in their interviews especially
as they recalled their time as students.

Thus writing assignment work was described as part of the process of learning to be
reflective:
<but I remember particularly in fourth year we had this fantastic unit which was all about
practice – in fact I think the unit was called reflective practice and it was brilliant, we had a
really, really good tutor and I really got a lot out of it. I really enjoyed and we did a lot of
journaling and a lot of different written reflection work mostly (Participant three, practitioner).
Educators also discussed setting assignment work for students to address learning reflective
practice:
[I] ask the students to – or suggest to the students that they –[k]eep a journal or use their
<tablets as they do now or word docs anything that you can find and even if you make dot
point notes each day write something or most days try to write something of your experiences
for the day. Try and write something about yourself in those experiences and what the
challenges or otherwise have been? What the joys are? So that they’re – trying to get them to
explore more of their inner self in<that as well as their practitioner self in it and it just helps
them to begin to articulate the differences and where they converge or otherwise (Participant
thirteen, educator).
And another educator discussed how the assignment was reflective without being called
reflective and that it, in her mind, achieved something in terms of integrating theory,
practice and the student identity in the context of being set as a final assignment:
One of the assignments that they do in a unit in second year called citizenship is, it's a final
assignment and it's about their journey – so we teach them social theories, what else do they do,
so they do functionalism, structuralism and post modernism, feminism and they learn all about
it in the beginning, and then at the end they have to talk about their sort of citizenship journey
integrating one or two or three or whatever, the most relevant theories. And that ends up being
like an activity around critical reflection; you know again that I think works really beautifully.
And people can use whatever means they want to. So last year I read this one that was, had
paintings and photos and was beautiful, it was absolutely beautiful. I read another one that
was a person talking about how their child was removed and you know all of those kinds of
experiences and how coming to social work now what that meant. So I think there have been
some really successful, that’s a way again where if you said to the students, oh was that a
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critical reflective essay, they'd [say] no it was an essay about me but it was [critical
reflection+<(Participant ten, educator).

Much of the writing discussed by participants was primarily concerned with skills
development and the learning required in field placement. Some participants explicitly tied
it to the purposes of preparing and participating in supervision:
<I think probably was a really important practice [to be] organised, so my expectation and the
sort of agreement with the students was that they would [send] their written weekly reflection
before their supervision session so that we could if we needed to< we could explore that if they
wanted to but that was part of<the preparation<was really important so that we could go
deep and then other things would come up that were different to that and we could engage with
those as well but having that expectation that this will be part of your weekly practice and we
have this time and it's set. [I found] that really helped tremendously the practice of reflective
practice generally but also then the critical reflection that happened<(Participant fourteen,
practitioner).
Consequently, for participants in this study, journal writing was primarily used to enable
insight into individual experience and meaning making. It then served to create a space for
understanding any insights that arise and link these to actions going forward. For one
participant this was particularly important:
<I presented at a *Name of conference+ I think it was July/August 2013 and a lot of it was
about [about] the move from reflective practice to changing<my external supervisor *said+ at
the time said ‚You can reflect and reflect until the cows come home, but what you need is
behavioural change‛. That was a really, really incredibly pivotal moment *for me+< that
realisation that reflection has to [be and do] more than reflection. And I think a lot of social
workers can reflect and they don’t know how to take that leap <to make the change from
reflection to action (Participant three, practitioner).

There were some differences between student accounts of the function of writing for
reflection. This group of students struggled to outline examples of where they had been
explicitly taught about reflection; or even required to undertake it within assignment work.
This may be a limitation in terms of where the students were drawn from and probably
indicates something about the particular way in which assessments are described. For
example, only one of the student participants could recall an assessment that was
specifically called a reflective paper or essay.
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< So we had an assessment that was based on an interview and so we were to conduct a one on
one interview with a case study – a scenario and then we were to write and reflect on that piece
< (Participant eight, student).
Yet in discussing reflection broadly all students could outline what it was, how it worked,
and how it related to their learning and engagement with materials in their studies. As none
of the students had yet experienced a field placement they did not discuss its relevance in
that context, but rather, concentrated on the experience of it in relation to writing
assessments.

This is not the case with other participants in this study. Both educators and practitioners
discussed writing for the demonstration of reflection on learning and integration of the self
with the theory and practice of the profession. Moreover, these participants all described it
in relation to activities undertaken during their own field placements, supervision of
students or in instruction to students post field placement when students return to
university. Thus field placement is a significant site in which reflective learning and
exchange takes place, and writing and discussion form a significant part of this display and
process within social work education. This raises a question of pedagogy. Field placement is
a very familiar form of pedagogy within social work as a profession and was originally
conceived as an apprenticeship whereby ‚<students learn to practice the profession
through an apprenticeship supervised by expert practitioners.‛ (Wayne, Bogo, & Raskin,
2010, p. 330).

The apprenticeship model of field placement was largely adopted in Australia but has since
fallen out of favour (Cleak, Hawkins, Laughton, & Williams, 2014) as field education
programs moved towards an ‚<articulated model of teaching social work practice, which
relies on providing clear learning objectives that offer congruence between the theory and
practice‛(Savaya, Peleg-Oren, Strange, & Geron, 2003 cited in Cleak et al., 2014, pp. 50-51).
Cleak and her colleagues (2014) suggest instead that ‚Reflection, conceptualisation,
integration of theory and practice, and future planning occur largely through field educators
and students’ review and discussion [italics added] of students’ practice material and
feedback about the students’ performance<‛ (p.51). Moreover, discussions of the issues
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surrounding teaching and learning within field placements and education have been ongoing within Australian social work since the earliest beginnings of the profession (Spencer
& McDonald, 1998). There have been significant debates in the United States about whether
field education is a signature pedagogy93 for the profession of social work (Boitel & Fromm,
2014; Larrison & Korr, 2013; Wayne et al., 2010). Even though this same debate is not
substantially occurring within the Australian Social Work literature with regard to field
placement, the significance of field placement as a site of professional socialisation and
learning cannot be overstated at least in the view of participants here.

Interestingly, writing was not as strong a theme amongst participants in this study as that of
talk, nor was it as strongly emphasised as it was by participants in Hickson’s (2013) study
exploring how social workers learn and use reflection. How to account for this difference?
While the questions asked in both this study and Hickson’s are remarkably similar, the data
analysis methods are different as are the sample of participants. Thus, it may be an outcome
of the analysis focus, which in this case, considered semantic relationships more closely than
the meaning offered by the narrative analysis described in the Hickson study. Also, the
majority of the participants who participated in Hickson’s (2013) study were social work
bloggers who were already writing as a form of reflection. Lastly, in another stage of the
study by Hickson the inquiry included interviews with social workers who had learned a
particular model of critical reflection which explicitly includes written reflection as part of
the critical incident process (Fook & Gardner, 2007). It might be said, therefore, that the
participants’ in the Hickson study were already predisposed to journaling and writing as
particular form of reflection.

In contrast the participants in this study were recruited for their identity as social workers
who were practitioners, students or educators and who were eligible for membership with
the AASW. It was not known before the interviews what kind of reflective practices

A signature pedagogy is the ‚characteristic forms of teaching and learning<that organize the fundamental
ways in which future practitioners are educated‛ (Shulman, 2005, p. 52). Moreover, Shulman proposes that these
pedagogies include instructions to novices on how ‛<to think, to perform, and to act with integrity‛ (Shulman,
2005, p. 52, italics original).
93
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participants undertake in their study or practice. The only indication of interest in reflection
may be the self-selection of those who chose to participate in the study. The different kinds
of participants probably accounts for the diverse responses to some of the questions asked in
the course of the interviews as well as the different emphases on the functions that support
reflective practice.

Minor bridge 3 Conclusion
To summarise, then, talk with oneself and with others is the predominant activity through
which social workers are reflective. In addition, writing is also an important mechanism for
reflection and this takes diverse forms from personal and professional journals, essays and
reports for assessment work at university and on field placements. Field education is a
significant site of reflective learning processes as this emerged as the most noteworthy
examples offered by a majority of participants. Case-based discussion within university
settings also emerged as an important opportunity to engage in reflective thinking. This was
offered by both students and educators by way of giving examples of learning and teaching
reflective practice. Two other activities were mentioned explicitly by participants; these were
the use of recollection and engaging in thinking. As these occur in the context of dialogue with
oneself or others both functions were discussed as part of these principal themes rather than
as separate themes. In the next section I will outline the locations that reflective practice
occurs and conclude the chapter with a brief summary of the main findings from this stage
of this stage.

Verse 2.4 Location: Where are the spaces and locations for doing reflective
practice?
This section will present a description of the locations and spaces identified by participants
as important for enacting their reflective practices. In an earlier paper published in Child and
Family Social Work, Ferguson (2009) discussed the performative aspects of social work
practice, albeit in the context of a study into home visiting by child protection social
workers. Ferguson (2009, p. 471) suggests that
< Not nearly enough attention is given to the detail of what social workers actually
do, where they do it and their experience of doing it < This in turn means neglecting
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the movement and flows of bodies, emotions, information and power involved in
doing the work and conducting relationships.
When analysing the data here I was struck by the way in which participants talked about
where they undertook the practice of being reflective and how tied that was to the
organisation of their workplaces and the activities across quite diverse settings. Thus, the
goal for this part of the analysis was to offer a picture of the locations for reflective practice
as explained by participants and to tie these to concrete practices as much as possible. To do
so is to offer juxtaposition to the previous sections in this chapter where the emphasis has
been more squarely on the cognitive and normative (values, attitudes and beliefs) aspects of
participant accounts of reflective practice. Here the focus is on the movement of bodies,
locations, and non-discursive factors that contribute to the presence of reflection in social
work practice and education.

I found myself surprised by the many different descriptions of where reflective practice
takes place. The other surprising
thing was how much of the activity

Formal

takes place with others and how

With others

much of it occurs within both
formal and informal spaces. The

Informal
Locations and
spaces for
reflection
Formal

figure adjacent demonstrates the
main themes which emerged from

Alone
Informal

the analysis. As with previous
diagrams of themes in this chapter
the weighting of the border

Figure 16: Locations and spaces for reflection

indicates the relative presence of each theme. It is possible to see that reflective practice is
most often tied to formal settings more than informal ones and that it generally occurs with
others.

I will begin the description with a discussion of what formal and informal means within the
context of this analysis. I will then outline what the theme of with others represents within
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the analysis and how this is described by participants. I will also describe the formal and
informal spaces discussed by participants. The rest of the section will outline the rest of the
themes by presenting how reflective practice is undertaken alone and that this occurs mainly
through informal means.
What does formal and informal mean in this context?
In the analysis the terms informal and formal emerged in relation to where the activities of
reflective practice occur most for participants. Participants themselves did not use this
terminology; however, in their discussion about where reflection occurs, they often
indicated whether it was at work, before or after work, or in the evenings. Moreover
participants would also describe the conditions under which reflective practice occurs. As I
read the accounts the terms informal and formal seemed to fit well with how participants
distinguished the practice in their personal and professional lives. The terms also fit with the
professional language of social work generally.

The terms informal and formal are part of a social work discourse in Australia that is tied to
complicated notions of professionalism (O’Connor et al., 1998), the history of the Australian
welfare state (Jamrozik, 2009), and theories and critiques of bureaucracy (Jones & May, 1992)
and managerialism (Hough & Briskman, 2003; Ife, 1997). Professionalism in this respect
refers to primarily to practitioner autonomy (McDonald, 2011) and ‚many workers daily
experience challenges to their assertion of professional status‛ (O'Connor et al., 1998, p. 157).
Welfare state history and critiques of bureaucracy and managerialism provide explanations
for the changing face of welfare delivery and social services that forms a policy backdrop to
social work practice. It is somewhat beyond the scope here to trace the exact genealogies for
each of these ideas and their respective critiques. Neither is it possible in this space to
specify how they combine to provide the discursive frame through which to understand the
use of the terms informal and formal. What can be said is that the terms informal and formal
may be linked to social work understandings about organisations, which is informed largely
by these bodies of formal knowledge. Moreover, these ideas have informed a particular
critique of contemporary organisations within which Australian social work practice largely
occurs. This critique translates for some into a distinction based on setting. Below is an
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example of this kind of critique where the participant offers a distinction between agency
settings and how this might affect reflection:
We need to be doing it [reflective practice] < and a lot through our work and especially being
through a government agency [such as] the [named a child protection agency] < I don’t
know, I don’t work in the agency but they possibl[y] discourage that kind of reflecting and
assessing o*f+ the agency and what they’re doing < So I think there’s a lot more opportunity to
reflect in a non-government agency < I don’t think a government agency really wants to be
told that they’re doing something wrong (Participant twelve, student).
For others this critique captures their experience of negotiating tricky workplace
compliances, as this participant notes:
< and so you take that on-board and you look at how other people have handled the situation,
and what the policy and – *think about what the+ compliances are around that < and so you
take that on-board and you look at how other people have handled the situation, and what the
policy *is+ < because compliances always come into every practice that you do at the
department<so you’ve got to be really disciplined, and you’ve got to get out of the office and
you’ve got to go and see your clients, because there is a *also+ a [requirement] that you need to
see your clients < (Participant nine, practitioner).

Social work knowledge has long been informed in Australia by sociology as one of its feeder
disciplines (Chenoweth & McAuliffe, 2014). The term informal and formal can also be traced
back to this body of knowledge. Sociology, especially of a critical kind informs much of the
critique in the bodies of knowledge discussed above (Agger, 2006). Thus in sociological
terms informal and formal denote a particular way of thinking about the organisation of work
and practice (Watson & Korczynski, 2011) that may also be traced back to Weber’s theory of
bureaucracy. Watson (2001, cited in Watson & Korczynski, 2011, p. 118) suggests that the
terms were meant to describe two different sides of organisational life and even though this
may have fallen out of favour within sociology of work, it is still used within social work as
a way of understanding organisations (Gardner, 2006).

In this sense, then, formal encompasses all the ‚ < roles, rules and procedures that we see
represented in rule books, organisation charts and formalised sets of operating procedures
< ‚ (Watson & Korczynski, 2011, p. 118) and this includes locations and spaces such as
offices, formal meeting rooms, classrooms and lecture halls, and online spaces such as

218
Blackboard or Webct94. In addition, formal in this context is also referring to discussion and
talk that is about practice situations or learning, and that which is located within these
formal arenas and is thus driven by the rationality of the workplace (Watson & Korczynski,
2011). In contrast informal spaces may be seen as those in which social workers share tacit
knowledge and sometimes build resilience to negotiate tricky aspects of modern
organisational practice (Carson, King, & Papatraianou, 2011). This aspect of informal spaces
as significant learning spaces has also been discussed by Boud and Middleton (2003) who
suggest that there are three main aspects to this kind of learning. The first is procedural with
regards to knowing how to use systems and meet administrative requirements. The second
aspect is political and relational and relates to building and maintaining relationships with
others in the organisation and team. The third aspect involves ‚<dealing with the atypical‛
(Boud & Middleton, 2003, p. 198). All three of these aspects of informal learning rely on
communication and relationships amongst workers and much of this communication is
what was described by participants here as reflective practice. Moreover the experience and
resilience of individual workers (Carson et al., 2011) and the resilience of organisations is
greatly enhanced by relationship building, especially in times of external threat or change
(Gittell, 2008).

Thus, these exchanges happen in corridors, in cars going to visits, in coffee shops; and for
students it might be sitting on lawns; and sometimes over the phone. Informal might also be
outside of work hours, evenings, early mornings, or travelling to and from work, for
example. Lastly, while it is helpful for analytical purposes to attempt to separate these two
different senses of organisational life and work it is nevertheless likely that they work
together and that some reflection occurs in the boundaries between them. This point is
discussed more below. For now, I will begin with the theme with others.

Blackboard is a learning management system (LMS) that integrates ‚< a wide range of pedagogical and course
administration tools. These systems have the capacity to create virtual learning environments < They are <
ubiquitous at universities around the world < ‚(Coates, James, & Baldwin, 2005, p. 19). Students in this sample
of participants whether on campus or distance have a significant proportion of their materials delivered through
the LMS of the university.
94
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With others
For participants, reflection occurs within the presence of others. The others can be
colleagues, team leaders, supervisors, and instructors or educators. Reflection occurs in
meetings, with team leaders and colleagues, with students and in classroom discussion. This
talk takes the form of thinking aloud about a work situation, case, problem or practice to
account, make sense of it, or interpret the actions of the self or others. This reflective talk is
an aid to clinical and practice judgement (White & Stancombe, 2003) to formulating strategy,
and building knowledge for practice (Connolly & Harms, 2012). However, it primarily
occurs within the context of the routines of work and organisational norms for that
particular setting. How a participant described reflecting with others in a hospital setting
involved different practices of when and where this occurred compared to how it was
described by someone working in the context of child protection. The common thread
amongst the participant description is the way in which opportunities for using reflection
were most often organised into the routines of work. This could be viewed as a way of
dealing with the uncertain aspects of social work practice (Francis, Cheers, Lonne, Wendt, &
Schiller, 2012). It was also a way of ensuring it occurs:
Well reflection in my current role has changed. < you have to make reflection fit practically in
terms of timing and how – just how to make it all fit. And how to make it purposeful as well
because the clocks ticking all the time and it’s not generally seen as a –- It’s not an outcome,
there’s no product necessarily. Well there is < there might be < Part of my role is to facilitate
[child protection team meetings] with workers whether internally, externally and it’s a role
that I take really, really very seriously and < and I guess organisationally I can – I can justify
that. Not that I should have to but I can justify that because it is a product and it is <
(Participant four, practitioner).
Another practitioner also discussed building reflection into the interdisciplinary team
meetings in her workplace. This meeting structure already existed within the context of that
particular workplace:
And < I’ve really kind of pushed that further within my own workplace because we have
family meetings very regularly and family meetings are either for – in my particular practice
context they’re [to talk about treatment issues/options] < So and that – and we have very
highly emotional families when they come to that and then I was finding what was happening
in these meetings*is+ < They’re fairly frequent in that environment < we’d sort of all walk
out and we’d all kind of go our separate ways and I’d be thinking guys we – we all need to take
a moment here and just sort of reflect on what’s happened here < so I’ve instituted a debriefing
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session after each family meeting. It’s just that opportunity to check back in (Participant five,
practitioner).
Thus, for the participants in this study, most reflective practice occurs with others in formal
settings, around meeting tables, in conference rooms. It occurs in formal meetings where
practitioners are expected to display their thinking and recount practice situations with and
for others.

Participants also discussed supervision as another place that reflection occurs. Supervision
can be with a professional supervisor outside of workplace arrangements or with a team
leader or supervisor within the organisation. Again the main picture here is these
encounters occur in office spaces or meeting rooms, across desks or tables and are part of the
formal arrangements of work. There were a few exceptions where participants had sourced
their own supervision arrangements outside of work for their own professional reasons.
Even in these instances supervision was in relation to practice development. Thus, it can be
seen as a formal arrangement, which is why I am including it in the discussion here.

Supervision is often tied to reflective practice (Connolly & Harms, 2012; Noble & Irwin,
2009). Supervision was described as generally one-on-one for practitioners and educators
but many of these participants discussed participating in supervision as placement students
in groups as well as having individual sessions. Participants suggested that this one-on-one
supervision was important to their practice development. The following points were made
by participant three:
< there was just some issues that had been plaguing me in my employment from day dot that
I just – I knew they were issues, [I] didn’t know what to do about them and- Yeah and it wasn’t
just me, it was also that I didn’t have supervisors who knew how to do anything other than
encourage me to reflect and then say ‚Now go and fix yourself‛ and not having that level of
skill that I required to say – there is no blame, how are we going to help you move from this to
this to becoming more professional ... Anyway finally I got it [supervision] after about seven
or eight years and yeah *I+ went from leaps and bounds as a professional < just hugely
improved my practice (Participant three, practitioner).
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There was a key difference between practitioners and educators on the one hand and
students on the other with regard to this aspect of the analysis. While practitioners and
educators discussed reflecting about practice with others as a routine part of their work, this
was not the case for students in terms of their study. For students in this inquiry, reflection
was generally seen as an individual matter that took place within the context of assessment.
The other main area students discussed with regard to reflection was in group assignments
where reflection processes are explicitly built in to the assessment. It should be noted that
none of the students in this study had yet attended a placement, which would presumably
impact on the opportunities they would have access to with regard to reflecting as described
by practitioners and educators. Consequently, students in the study did not discuss
reflection in the context of placement learning. They did discuss reflection as being
something they did with their student colleagues and others outside of the formal class and
Blackboard settings. This primarily occurs in informal settings such as pubs, sitting around
between classes, in coffee shops or over social media such as Facebook95. One example from a
student in the study was a discussion of the residential96 was an important opportunity for
this student to discuss things with class mates:
< I mean the discussion boards are good on Blackboard when you’re in individual units and
there’s also some of the social work or the older social work students have set up a Facebook
page which is, it’s sort of alright < but when you go to the residentials that’s good because you
can get a lot out then and you talk to people who when you say something they’re oh yeah and
because such and such, but when you say it to other people *they don’t understand what you
mean] ... I mean, sometimes I can have a bit of a vent (Participant seven, student)

This brings the discussion to the point of considering the informal spaces where reflection
occurs with others. While I am characterising these as informal spaces they might be also
considered as occupying space between the formal and informal. Bruhn (2009, p. 206), in a
helpful discussion of the functionality of ethical grey areas within organisations, discusses
how boundaries and borders can be ‚<physical, social, psychological, emotional, and they
can be policies, procedures, rules, or formal and informal agreements.‛ When participants

Facebook is a social networking site that was created in the United States to enable college graduates to stay in
touch. It is now used by people all round the world for a range of social reasons (BBC., n. d.)
96 ‘Residential’ at this particular school means the on-campus attendance requirement as specified by the
Australian Social Work Education and Accreditation Standards (ASWEAS) (Australian Association of Social
Work, 2013a).
95
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outlined their use of reflective practices they often described it occurring within these kinds
of borders where they retained the ability to negotiate between the rules, processes and the
compliances to meet the uncertain grey moral dilemmas of practice. Conversations such as
these are those that might happen in doorways, while standing in offices, on the way out of
meetings, in the lunchroom, and in corridors. Some of these moments of talk also occur in
cars on the way to visits, or after visits on the way back to the office, or when travelling to
appointments.
< I mean I guess when you do that kind of deconstruction at work it often [happens] in the car
conversations, doesn’t it? The asking of questions – even in the lunchroom somebody [said] that
kid really pushes my buttons the other day, [its] just that opportunity to go I know it’s not
great but < but you got to take them *those moments+ and ask what is it about that child that
pushes your buttons? [To ask] what’s going on for you in that? (Participant four,
practitioner).

One educator gave an example that could be seen as working this border between formal
and informal in order to enact a dialogue with a small number of male students in a class
dealing with interpersonal violence about how the material might impact or position them.
This resulted in a powerful class for the male students but also for the rest of the class as
well:
< Well the women didn’t know that I’d had the conversation with the men, but it came up in
the last class when one of the men said, oh – because you know, I’d asked for feedback and they
said, oh I just wanted to flag this that this was an incredibly powerful experience and it sort of
says something about the care that you take in your teaching that makes a difference. And the
women were like, oh wow, well that’s interesting you did that < So that’s how we navigate
this trickiness is that we think and we reflect, and we consider the things and
"intersectionality" was our theoretical framework, we think about intersections, and then we
have a conversation, we invite a dialogue<(Participant six, educator).
Thus, reflective practice occurs in formal meetings, in offices, meeting and conference rooms
and is centred on demonstrating thinking and reflection for the purposes of making
decisions, reviewing social work practices or service user situations. Reflective practice also
occurs in informal spaces where it serves to address the informal learning as well as
communicative functions of the workplace. Reflective practice with others can also be seen
as an important source of support and relationship building between workers in facing the
difficult, uncertain and problematic aspects of practice (Wendt, Schiller, Cheers, Francis, &
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Lonne, 2012). In the next section I will briefly consider the locations and spaces where
participants reflected alone.
Reflecting alone
This was a minor but nevertheless significant theme in the analysis and is quite a contrast to
the previous theme with regard to whether this reflective activity occurs in formal or
informal spaces. Reflecting alone was usually discussed as occurring outside of work hours.
It could involve walking or driving to and from work, or relaxing in the evening. One
participant thought it would be helpful if workplaces allowed more of it to occur during the
course of the day:
I find that sometimes reflecting, just having that time to reflect, doesn’t always work well when
you’re sitting in an office. So I think it would be good if more work places allowed [or] valued
reflective practice more, so that you could go for a walk and walk < or you could go and sit
somewhere where you can breathe and because being reflective about being in a relaxed space to
be able to allow your mind to think about things that you haven’t had time to necessarily
consider *before+< (Participant one, educator).
These are important strategies for resilience (Grant & Kinman, 2011), which is important for
offsetting the exhaustion often associated with burnout (Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001).
Quite a number of participants expressed the value of time alone to review and think about
the day or their practice in some way.
< I go home and I spend a lot of time < I go home and it’s me and my dog, I spend a lot of
time thinking, almost replaying what are standout things for me or what I feel my brain needs
to think over more, generally with a red wine in hand (Participant eleven, practitioner).
A small number of participants also described writing a personal journal as another route to
reflection and this was an activity they did on their own. Thus, most of the individual
reflection described by participants in this study was conducted by themselves and in
primarily informal spaces such as walking, on the way to and from work, or through the
crafting of a personal journal.

Minor bridge 4 Conclusion
The location and spaces where social workers conduct reflective practices are generally
formal in nature. The practice occurs in the company of colleagues, supervisors or team
leaders, in offices and in meeting and conference rooms. Social worker practitioners and
educators also discussed the importance of informal spaces for reflective processes and
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learning. The main difference between practitioners and educators and students emerged
with regard to how this reflection is utilised by social workers. Students, at least in this
study, experienced it as an assessment process that is primarily conducted alone and
through writing. Thus, for students, the activity is primarily a formal one. Students engaged
in reflection on their learning mainly through informal mechanisms such as discussion with
classmates and others outside formal arenas such as classrooms or Blackboard forums
unless it was explicitly required in an assessment. This may change as these particular
students experience placement where the requirement to engage in verbal and written
reflection will increase. Both educators and practitioners recalled learning to reflect with
others through their placements and then later in their roles within organisations as they
became more experienced post qualification. It was found that for some participants
reflection, at least in some areas of professional practice, had become embedded in the
organisational routine structures and norms. This is a line of inquiry that requires further
research and the finding is merely suggestive from this sample of participants.

How is reflective practice utilised in learning, teaching and practicing
social work?
This line of inquiry in the research set out to understand how students, educators and
practitioners learn, teach and practice reflective practice in contemporary Australian social
work education and practice. Two different levels of analysis were conducted with the data.
The first analysis identified themes associated with the values, attitudes and beliefs of
participants. The second considered the means-end, rationale, functions and locations which
participants identified as important to the practice.

The findings indicate that social workers place a high value on the ability to be reflective,
that it has wide appeal and is considered the hallmark of a ‘good’ social work professional.
Students, educators and practitioners use reflective practice for different but complementary
purposes but it is primarily utilised by most participants as part of their problem-solving
and interpretative activities in practice. This is particularly the case with practitioners. It is
interesting to note that practitioners with one exception did not discuss using reflective

225
practice with clients. Students, in addition, utilised reflective practice to integrate new
material and to accommodate this to their existing experience. Educators incorporated both
kinds of activities but demonstrated a greater emphasis on theoretical integration and
explanation. The main reflective practice model in use amongst participants appeared to be
closer to that outlined by Donald Schon (1983) where reflection is utilised to build
practitioner expertise in problem-solving in practice. The critical reflection model was
primarily evident only in accounts from educators. The other area of significance is that
reflective practice is primarily conducted with others and through formal spaces according to
these participants. Despite this predominance there were also indications that informal
spaces are significant sites of sense-making through reflection with others. There were
differences between the students in this study and the practitioners and educators in this
regard with students more likely to engage in reflection in informal spaces unless required
to do so in assessment. Thus, from this study, it is fair to claim that reflective practice
remains an important aspect of contemporary social work practice in Australia, at least for
the participants in this study. In the next chapter I will consider the research as a whole and
outline the implications this has for teaching and learning reflective practice in social work
education.
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Inte rlude 7
Interpreting data and representing others
It is true that the generation of data is no problem. The issue becomes what to do with the
data once you have it. The interview stage of the study was undertaken last in the sequence
of the research. It meant that when it came time to conduct the interviews and subsequent
data analysis I had to contend with my own familiarity with the topic. Likewise the
interview schedule had been created years before the interviews were actually undertaken.
It had basically sat there waiting for the interview stage to commence. When I turned my
attention to it fortunately I found it was still relevant but it was also indicative of my
understanding back when it had first been written. Nevertheless it came time to do
interviews, the interview schedule stood up quite well. I stayed with the original phrase
reflective practice resisting the temptation to change it to reflect the findings of previous
stages. I am glad I did now as it sparked comment from participants about the differences
between reflecting and being critical. .

Contending with my own familiarity with the topic also made me really conscious in the
interviews of trying not to lead the participants in any particular direction. I also noticed that
I’ve gone through stages about the topic, going in and out of a critique over the years of the
various models that I’ve engaged with. By the time of the interviews I had worked some of
this out and had achieved a bit of a middle ground position. It also meant that I was less
reactive than I might’ve been if I had conducted interviews earlier during a critique phase. I
found it enjoyable to hearing ideas about its use in practice and for educators and students.

Interpreting the data had its own challenges. I became really conscious about that first step
of coding. All enjoyment fled, at least for a little while. I felt a bit like I was standing on the
edge of a precipice being told to take a leap out but still wanting a safety net. And I told
myself all the right things ‚there’s no right or wrong, there are just better or worse
interpretations‛. Regardless it still feels like you can get it wrong. Once I got underway the
analysis took on a life of its own and was challenging in that enjoyable way that jigsaw
puzzles are challenging. Also the issues to contend with had changed. Now it was more
about how do I restrain the analysis? I mean it would be possible to go on forever.

I have to say that after spending years by myself (figuratively speaking) with only literature
and archival documents to contend with, interviewing others was wonderful. Absurdly it
felt like real research and even though rationally I know the rest of the thesis is real research
this felt more real somehow. Finding participants, managing consent forms, the audio
equipment, transcription services, collating and sorting out the data was absurdly
comforting and enjoyable. Despite having undertaken and been part of many research
projects before somehow this felt different. I felt like an apprentice being able to make my
own widget for the first time.
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Cha pter 8
T r a c k 4 – I n wh a t wa y s c a n r e f l e c t i v e p r a c t i c e b e
understood in social work education and practice in
Australia?
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a
permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical
like in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them (Michel Foucault What is
enlightenment? 1984).

Introduction
This is the final track of the album. It brings together the findings of the three studies and
addresses the overarching research question about the ways in which reflective practice is
understood in social work. In another sense this chapter also brings together the central
melodies of this extended rhapsody on reflective practice as I attempt to, metaphorically
speaking, interweave the protest music of critique with the call and response melody of
gospel and interpretation. Both of these are underpinned somewhat by the complex
arrangements that characterise post-structuralism to incorporate the melody of progressive
rock. This part of the thesis aims to bring these melodies together to form the backdrop to
this last track.

The research overall has occurred within a broad hermeneutic framework and this accounts
for why the overarching question of the study is aimed at understanding. Figure 17 below
(also presented in chapter one) illustrates this hermeneutic framework:
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Figure 17: Graphic of the whole study

This research has demonstrated, through the findings from the three studies, my own
reflections, and dialogue with published and other literature, that reflective practice can be
understood as:


A capability;



A form of critical thinking;



A discipline response to the changing contexts of social work practice;



A way of understanding and theorising from practice.

I will address each of these as verses and my recommendations are presented as bridges. An
ultimate goal in undertaking this research has been to seek ways to improve the outcomes
for social work students in teaching and learning. In light of this the final verse of this track
presents the implications of my findings for social work pedagogy.

Verse 1: Reflective practice as a capability
This research has demonstrated that the ability to reflect is a capability all ‘normal’ humans
can develop. It is a capability that allows people to understand the conditions in which they
find themselves as well as their own impact on those conditions. Moreover, the use of this
capability has become an essential aspect of professional practice in social work. While it
may be that it is a normal capability, this does not mean that all people use the capacity to
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reflect in the same way and about the same things. Nor does it mean that there are not
individual differences in the development and use of the capability.

It was found in this research that there still exists considerable confusion in social work
about terms for the different ways the capability might be described. The main source of this
confusion can be attributed to the way in which the social work profession uses knowledge
drawn from a range of different disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and
political science. All disciplines consider the capability through their own conceptual
apparatus. The main terms adopted to describe this capability within social work education
and practice are reflection, reflective practice, reflectivity, reflexivity, and critical reflection.
All these terms have come to mean slightly different things and may be traced
genealogically back to a specific discipline, a task beyond the scope of this particular
research. Nevertheless what this research has established is that the terms adopted will vary,
even within social work, according to who is speaking about it. It was found that educators
are more likely to use the terms reflexivity and critical reflection, practitioners and students
are more likely to use the terms reflective practice and reflection. Despite this confusion
there is widespread agreement amongst participants in this research, and in the professional
literature, that the capability of reflection is important and valuable to professional practice.

Bridge
Based on this research I offer the following recommendations with regard to the use of terms
about this capability:


Reflexivity should be adopted as the term used to describe the ‘normal’ capability
human beings possess to consider the social conditions in which they find themselves
and the impact of these conditions on them. This includes the ability to consider their
impact on said conditions, in addition to that of others.



The term reflective practice should be reserved for the use of reflexivity in service to
professional practice. Reflective practice therefore describes the capability as it is
utilised for problem-solving, building understanding from and about practice
situations, the use of self and for improving and learning from practice.
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The term critical reflection should be reoriented to become a descriptor for the many
different kinds of systematic reflection available for consideration of contemporary
social conditions, how these have emerged and the possibilities of changing or
moving beyond them. The kinds of systematic reflection are critique, interpretation,
deconstruction, problematisation, evaluation, and genealogy, all of which have their own
distinct forms and grammars (Tully, 1989).

These forms of systematic reflection can be explicitly taught to students. Critical reflection,
understood this way can then be distinguished from reflective practice because each form of
systematic reflection orients reasoning about problems in a different way. For the remainder
of the chapter I will use these terms in this way.

Verse 2: Critical thinking and reflexivity
Critical thinking is a crucial ingredient for the extension of reflexivity into professional
practice. This research has explored the learning, use and teaching of reflexivity and has
established that being able to think critically is an important aspect of what participants
describe as reflective practice and/or reflexivity. There is an issue however. Due the
adoption of particular approaches to knowledge within Australian social work the term
critical has acquired a specific meaning within the contemporary period. There is a tendency
to describe critical thinking within social work as theoretical thinking that incorporates key
assumptions drawn from different kinds of critical theory. The two kinds of thinking are not
synonymous. In contrast the literature establishing reflective judgement for professional
practice describes the need for critical thinking skills such as deductive and inductive
thinking, bias detection, and hypothesis creation and testing, assess and evaluate evidence,
propositions, argument and claims to truth. It is through this process that different ways to
think about knowledge and truth become available for students. Development of more
complex epistemological reasoning that contributes to reflexivity depends on the
development of this critical thinking ‚mindware‛ (Stanovich, 2011). This development is
crucial to the ability of social workers to engage with the ill-structured problems that
characterise professional practice.
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Critical theories, in contrast, are themselves based on complex epistemological arguments
and are forms of critique aimed at uncovering deficits and engaging in struggles with
existing political and social arrangements. Critical theories thus may be conceptualised as
public political claims made with regard to questions of gender, social inequality, ethnicity
and culture, sexuality and ability, ecology, social and human rights (Tully, 2008). Such
claims are themselves extended arguments, and as such they should be open to testing and
evaluation (Tully, 1999). Further, the main assumptions Australian social work has drawn
from these theoretical perspectives are the links between the personal and political, the
existence of inequality and oppression and the centrality of understanding and resisting
dominant power relations for enacting social change.

Without instruction in techniques of critical thinking skills, modelled as forms of public
reasoning, students will tend to adopt prevailing theoretical ideas as forms of certain
knowledge and use this to structure their understanding and to produce feelings of certainty
(White & Stancombe, 2003). The introduction of theoretical positions without engaging also
in instruction in basic critical thinking early and all through the curriculum may undermine
student development of reflexivity for engaging in both reflective practice and critical
reflection.

Bridge
My recommendations for increasing the reflexive capability of social workers through
education are as follows:


The social work profession invest effort into continuing professional development of
social work practitioners and educators in the use and instruction of critical thinking
skills.



The Australian Association of Social Workers in their Australian Social Work
Education and Accreditation Standards clearly outline definitions of critical thinking
skills, in addition to the kinds of knowledge essential for Australian social work
courses.
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Verse 3: A disciplinary response to the changing contexts of social work
practice
This research has demonstrated that the development of reflective practice models arose in
relation to changes in welfare state arrangements. Social work as a discipline was very
vulnerable to these changes because it is in large part a child of the welfare state. Increased
rates of change in these arrangements intensified the need for reflexivity and this in turn
increased the focus on the practitioner-self and the regulation of social worker conduct. The
research also established that while the changes to welfare state arrangements began in
earnest across the 1980s, adaption of early models of reflective practice only occurred in the
late 1990s. By the early part of the 2000s, a particular model had assumed prominence
through the dispersion of some of its key ideas within the formal documentation of the
national accrediting body, the Australian Association of Social Workers, in addition to key
Australian authored textbook materials.

This research has established that the main model adopted and adapted for social work in
Australia embeds a critique of positivism (Fook & Gardner, 2007). This critique accords with
already existing ideas about social work practice as being an art, rather than a science. In
addition to this critique, this model is explicitly informed by two kinds of critical reflection:
critique and deconstruction. Critique orients the thinking of those using the model to an
interrogation of the gap between the conditions of the present (the real) and those of future
ends (the ideal) on the basis of an already existing set of assumptions about the use of power,
the nature of social justice and the need for equality. This is a fairly standard Kantian form
of reason which has been adapted to the contemporary period by Jurgen Habermas (Owen,
1999) into a form of critical theory. This kind of approach is well known in social work as it
underpins and informs radical or critical perspectives. The deconstruction aspect of the
model attends primarily to the way language is utilised to support and explain power
relations and binary oppositions that ‚< create the basis for political hierarchy and social
domination (male/female, freeman/slave, propertied/landless, Christian/other,
citizen/inhuman), power differentials that motivate the repression‛ (Holland, n. d. ). Both
are forms of critical reflection.
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While this model provides a powerful lens with which to understand contemporary
conditions of practice it does have its limits. One key limit is that the model adopts a
juridical97 view of power based in social contract theory. While this may be appropriate in
some cases where the analysis is aimed at considering rights and duties, it is less helpful in
identifying the practices of subjection that are concerned with conduct. If reflective practice
is meant as a form of resistance to neoliberal practices, then the current critical reflection
model will not assist with analysis in this sense. It is akin to using a different language.
Different forms of critical reflection such as problematisation and genealogy are better
placed to outline and trace non-juridical practices that might contribute to political
subjectification. Examination of these intensifying subjectification processes in professional
practice would be an important route to resisting them and thus acting differently.

Bridge
The following recommendations are made based on these findings:


Curriculums of social work courses could consider offering a range of different
models that may be utilised to engage in reflective practice.



When teaching reflective practice models to students, educators, practitioners and
field educators it is important to make plain the kinds of critical reflection processes
embedded within the models. This will assist in teaching critical reflection as an
orientation to thinking about different the kinds of problems that emerge in practice.



The educators and field educators engage in professional development in different
kinds of critical reflection in order to be able to demonstrate these diverse orientations
to thinking. The aspiration here is that this may widen the current disciplinary
repertoires of critical reflection beyond Kantian/Habermasian critique and Derridean
deconstruction.

Classical liberalism – associated with Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau - conceived of power as the right to death
derived from the kinds of power exercised by monarchs (James & Wilson, 2011, 3:25). Enlightenment theorists
considered this to be an illegitimate use of power. These ideas underpin modern post-Enlightenment social
contract theory and ultimately the discourse of human rights (Heywood, 1992). The term used to describe this
kind of power is juridical or it is sometimes referred to as sovereign power (Dean, 1999). Thus juridical power is
associated with rights, duties and the law. There are other ways that power can be exercised usually through
norms and the right to life, later discussed by Foucault as bio-politics (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1978).
97
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Verse 4: Reflection as way of understanding and theorising from practice
This research has identified that reflexivity is a way for social workers to deal with new,
troubling, or novel situations. Additionally reflexivity is considered to be a way of
preventing too much habitual action within practice and thus increasing social worker
responsiveness to clients and co-workers. This research has demonstrated that the
development of routines can be seen as a normal aspect of practice because they potentially
free up the cognitive resources required for engaging in the critical thinking and problem
solving associated with reflective practice. This research has also established that reflective
practice is part of dealing with non-routine aspects of professional social work practice.

Theorising from practice is a disciplinary phrase that describes the development of practice
wisdom. This wisdom is sometimes codified into textbooks and papers but it is still more
likely to be passed orally through talk and in the observations of practice itself. Engagement
in reflective practice has come to be seen as a way of building practice wisdom and learning
from the activities of practice. There is a high premium placed on development of practice
wisdom within the social work profession in Australia. Moreover, there exists a fairly
dominant view within social work that practice is the key route to acquiring and learning
from practice wisdom. Within education settings, field education is an important part of this
process. This aspect of social work education in Australia has thus been an important site of
pedagogical interest and development within the profession. Somewhat less attention has
been paid to the development of curricula materials that might support the acquisition of
underpinning capabilities that support the development of practice wisdom prior to field
placement.

For example, there are differences in how the learning takes place within the university
curriculum and how it might take place within the ‚situated curriculum‛ (Gherardi,
Nicolini, & Odella, 1998) of field education or, indeed, the workplace. These differences
emerged clearly in this research. For instance, reflective practice assessment at university is
primarily in written form and remains, for the most part, highly individualised. In contrast,
in the situated curriculum of workplaces and field education, reflective practice is more
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likely to occur with others and through discussion. While students often engage in public
reflection in small groups, these forms of reflective practice are rarely assessed. On field
placement student thinking about practice forms the basis of supervision and is open to
scrutiny and assessment for the entire period. These are significant differences in how
reflexivity translates into forms of reflective practice and critical reflection.

Bridge
The following recommendations are made on the basis of these findings:


Assessment in curriculums prior to field placement should embed opportunities for
students to acquire the skills of reflecting out-loud with others.



Curriculum developers in social work should consider what aspects of the curriculum
might support student development of reflexivity and embed this prior to field
placement.

Conclusion
In this research I set out to problematise reflective practice and I have attempted to do so
using three different forms of critical reflection: interpretation, archaeology and critique. I
have done so in the spirit of taking up Foucault’s challenge, outlined in the quote at the
beginning of this ‘track’. I have used my own reflexive capability to examine what I first
experienced as a limit imposed by my professions’ adoption of certain kinds of models of
critical reflection. When I began this research I sensed this merely as a form of disquiet with
the models I had myself learnt so well and was attempting to teach and model to students.
As the research has progressed it has become clear that there are various ways to approach
reflexivity and that its use in social work practice is valued and important for dealing with
the contexts social workers contend with. The role of reflective practice in learning from
field placement has also become apparent and more research on this before, during and after
field practicums is an area for further exploration. Moreover, I have come to a greater
appreciation of the many different kinds of critical reflection available to our profession in
developing our understanding of contemporary conditions. My hope now is that through
undertaking this hermeneutic journey this research will contribute in a modest way to
widening the repertoire of critical reflection available to our profession and that this will
assist us in testing the limits of our present with a view to going beyond them.
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A p p e n d i x A – Ou t l i n e o f r e f l e c t i v e p r a c t i c e mo d e l s
Models of reflective practice
Introduction
This is an outline of a number of models for reflective practice that are currently in circulation
within the contemporary social work field in Australia. It was beyond the scope of the
research to include every possible model available to social work educators in Australia and
thus not every model that is currently in circulation has been included here. I have confined
my discussion to those models that emerged through conduct of the archaeology and where
relevant to the subject positions identified. These were important ‘surfaces’ where reflective
practice emerged. An example of such a 'surface' would be field education.

I have placed the Schon model first as most of the other models refer to this in the course of
their development. I have outlined the models according to the way they are described by
their authors. I then offer an assessment of the main forms of critical reflection that the models
appear to be utilising through their approach to reflective practice. Hence this survey
represents a modest attempt at mapping the kinds of critical reflection that may be informing
a few of the reflective practice models currently circulating in contemporary social work in
Australia.

Schon’s reflective practice model (Schon, 1983, 1987)
Schon’s model was developed through his engagement in considering knowledge in relation
to professional practice and owes an explicit debt to the work of John Dewey. The need for
reflection is precipitated by an encounter with a ‚puzzling, or troubling, or interesting
phenomenon<‛ (Schon, 1983, p. 50). Reflection-in-action is considered central to the artistry
of professional practice and is a ‚repertoire of expectations, images and techniques‛ (Schon,
1983, p. 60) which increasingly disappears from view as being learnt processes in a formal
sense. In Schon’s view reflection-in-action is practice which is informed by tacit knowledge
understood as knowing that is embodied practice (Hiles, 2014). This knowledge is informed
by practice situated within the body that then allows our conscious attention to encompass
other aspects of our surroundings to provide guides to action. Contrary to how tacit
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knowledge is discussed in some parts of the literature on reflective practice as implicit or
intuitive knowledge (Fook, 1999; Redmond, 2004), it is the embodied dimension of practice
that is difficult to articulate and is thus implicit. We can say that the attention paid to our
surroundings due to novel, surprising, puzzling or interesting aspects is made possible by
this tacit knowledge, and thus this attention is accessible for reflection processes (Peck,
2006).

Schon’s examples for the development of reflective practice rely mainly on participation in
discussion with others (Schon, 1983, 1987). These others are ones who can assist with
bringing any tacit dimensions and actions to the conscious awareness of the practitioner.
This accords with Peck’s (2006) discussion of the way in which apprenticing assists with
acquisition of the embodied aspects of the practice. Lave and Wenger (1991) discuss these as
communities of practice and thus Jordan (2010, p. 392) too emphasises the social nature of
reflection-in-action in her discussion of the acquisition of the skill in a nursing context. This
is a key part of Schon’s work that has been taken forward into subsequent models based in
social work. The model includes the following aspects:


A rejection of positivist notions of formal theory for professional practice (Schon,
1983).



Acknowledgement that there is a gap between what we say we do (espoused theory)
and what is actually done (theory-in-use) (Argyris & Schon, 1974).



Reflective practice involves reconciling this gap and modifying the theory in use. This
can occur through discussion with a reflective coach or with others (Schon, 1987).



Reflection-in-action is said to occur as the action is unfolding in relation to novel,
surprising or troubling occurrences outside of the routine habitual aspects of practice
that have been acquired through experience.



Reflection-on-action occurs post hoc to explain the events or phenomena. Note: It is
not necessarily associated to the fallacy of relating events to causes after the event has
occurred.
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Discussion with others facilitates post hoc reflection-on-action but it may not facilitate
access to the tacit dimension as this is the aspect of practice considered implicit in
human knowing (Polanyi 1958, cited in Peck, 2006).



Participation in doing practice enables aspects of practice to become part of the
embodied tacit dimension of experience. The acquisition of this allows for attention to
be directed to reflection-in-action.

This model utilises forms of critical reflection that might be most characterised as an
interpretive (Tully, 1989). By this I mean the model is aimed at understanding the meaning
of experience in the context of practice. Moreover the model may be situated within a
pragmatist tradition as it can be traced back to Dewey (Koopman, 2013).

The Fook and Gardner model of critical reflection (2007)
This model is the most cited in Australian social work literature. Aimed at, and developed
firstly with practitioners or senior masters-level students with significant practice experience
(Pease & Fook, 1999), the model has since been adapted to classrooms (Bay & Macfarlane,
2010; Morley, 2011) and workplaces (Fook, Gardner, & Ebook Library., 2012).This model is
largely informed by Schon’s model, outlined above, with the addition of critical theory
(Fook, 2002; Mezirow, 1990) and deconstructive techniques derived from postmodern
theory (Fook & Askeland, 2006; Fook & Gardner, 2007). The model has the following
characteristics:


It is generally undertaken in small groups of no more than eight to twelve
participants who are in professional practice over three sessions.



Participants are asked to prepare a critical incident98 (Butterfield et al., 2005), or a
description of practice where an event has troubled, surprised, or is considered,
novel, or out of routine. This is usually written by participants before the first session.



Group participants take turns outlining their critical incident.

The original critical incident technique has been adapted by Fook (2002) to serve as a practice tool and as ‚< a
device and process reconstructing personal practice along more critically empowering lines.‛ (p. 98). Fook
further suggests, contrary to the specific parameters set out by Flanagan (Butterfield, Borgen, Amundson, &
Maglio, 2005), that a critical incident can be ‚ < any happening which is significant to a person for whatever
reason.‛ (Fook, 2002, p. 98).
98
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Reflective dialogue on these critical incidents is facilitated using a questioning process
designed to elicit responses that uncover the following aspects from the participant
about the incident:



Assumptions



Power relations



Language practices



Values, beliefs and attitudes



Own personal experience and/or biographical aspects that might impact on the
interpretation of events described in the critical incident.



New forms of practice for the future.



Direct involvement in discussion by facilitators is preferred.



These insights are discussed by the group with everyone taking turns to present their
incident or practice for discussion.



A culture of open dialogue and support is required for the process to be successful
(Fook & Askeland, 2007)



There is a need to clarify with the group that there is a difference between groups of a
therapeutic nature and this more educative/supervisory critical reflection process
(Fook & Askeland, 2007). Having said that the authors acknowledge it is not
uncommon for personal issues to be raised within these settings and to become linked
to practice experiences.

The authors maintain an emphasis on building practice knowledge from attention to the
implicit aspects of practice and the gap between what practitioners think they believe or are
doing in practice and what they are actually doing. This is one of the key links to Schon’s
model and the stated issue of espoused theory and theory-in-use. This language from Schon
is also utilised in the model and discussion. In this respect the model is oriented to
interrogating the gap between the ideal and real in social work practice through forms of
communicative critique (Owen, 1999). We can therefore situate the model within forms of
critical reflection that owe a debt to Kant via Habermas (Owen, 1999) with its emphasis the
use of reason for the purposes of testing claims to knowledge, sincerity, and authenticity in
the spheres of social relations, that is morality and law.
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Thus this model is a form of communicative action that is broadly juridical, meaning that it
still relies on a liberal framework for its force as it is by notions of the subject being both the
object and subject of power relations (James & Wilson, 2011). Moreover, despite the use of
postmodern phrases and ideas about discourse, power, and deconstruction attributed in
large part to the work of Foucault (Fook, 2002; Fook & Gardner, 2007) the model does not
meet the conditions for the forms of critical reflection associated with Foucauldian
archaeology or genealogy (Tully, 1989). Rather, it is a reflective practice model that utilises
forms of critical reflection that are interpretive, critical and deconstructive.

Redmond’s reflective practice model (Redmond, 2004)
Heavily based on Schon’s reflective practice model, this example of reflective practice is also
significantly influenced by Habermas (1968, cited in Redmond, 2004), Mezirow (1991) and
Brookfield (1999), all of whom can be situated within the terrain of critical theory in social
theory and education respectively. This model was designed explicitly for a teaching
environment aimed at assisting health and social care students to work productively and
equitably with service users. The focus of the model is therefore about creating an
environment ‚where students could achieve increasing levels of critically reflective
learning.‛ (Redmond, 2004, p. 55). By this Redmond means engaging in forms of critical
reflection that are informed by critical theory.
The model has five main phases99. These correspond to the same steps or processes outlined
in models of reflective learning and critical reflection outlined by Dewey (1933), Argyris and
Schon (1974), Mezirow (1991); Habermas (1981, cited in Redmond, 2004) and Brookfield
(Brookfield & Preskill, 1999). I have indicated the corresponding influences within brackets
with Redmond’s phases indicated in italics:
1. Introduction to reflection (Habitual action (Dewey); unresolved dilemma (Mezirow);
technical practices (Habermas); habitual working processes (Brookfield) and tacit
knowledge (Argyris and Schon).
2. Exposure to new ideas/cases (New data to inform situation (Dewey); trigger event
(Mezirow, Brookfield); exposure to new ideologies (Habermas) and inconsistencies in
practice exposed (Argyris and Schon).
3. Simple model rotation, which means to change their view of the service user through
the use of mirroring (intellectualisation of problem (Dewey); perspective
99

Redmond refers to them as phases rather than steps so I am following her lead here (Redmond, 2004).
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transformation (Mezirow); reassessment of previous meanings (Habermas);
discomfort and exploration of old working practices (Brookfield) and knowledge-onaction (Argryis and Schon)
4. Full model rotation, which means to consider both original ideas, the ideas from step
three and any other perspective generated by looking at other aspects of the situation
or case (testing of new hypothesis (Dewey); emancipatory learning (Mezirow);
emancipatory learning domain (Habermas); development of alternative perspectives
(Brookfield) and reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action – double-loop testing
(Argryis and Schon)
5. Meta-reflection, which means to reflect on the reflection itself (Redmond, 2004, p. 63)
(reflection and evaluation of hypothesis (Dewey); reflection on transformation
(Mezirow); emancipatory learning with self-reflection (Habermas); integration of new
approaches (Brookfield) and critical reflection (Argryis and Schon).
This model may be considered to use a combination of different kinds of critical reflection (J.
Tully, 1989) as it incorporates methods of critique, interpretation, and evaluation. This
model also incorporates a psychodynamic step in its third phase called mirroring which has
links to another UK model of reflective practice developed by Gillian Ruch100 (2000, 2002;
2007; Ruch et al., 2010). The Redmond model does not appear to have been substantially
taken up in the Australian social work education scene as a model for teaching reflective
practice, although it is cited in literature associated with the Fook and Gardner model
(Hickson, 2013). This is why it has been included here.

Placement learning model by Cleak & Wilson (2007)
This model is based on Kolb’s (1984) experiential learning model incorporating learning
theory from Piaget, Lewin and Dewey (Schenck & Cruickshank, 2015). The model includes
four modes of learning which are concrete experience (CE); reflective observation (RO); abstract
conceptualisation (AC) and active experimentation (AE) (H. M. Cleak & Wilson, 2007). I have
included it here because Cleak and Wilson is a key text for Social Work field placement
students across Australia. The table over the page sets out the characteristics of each mode:
Table 13: Kolb's modes of learning
Mode of Learning
Concrete experience
(CE)
Reflective observation
(RO)

Abstract

100

Aspects
Uses senses to participate in situations; develops emotional rapport with others; uses intuition to
explore situations; explores the here and now; and concerned with practical outcomes.
Accurately recalls observations and perceptions about individuals and transactions; distinguishes
between trivial and essential information; keeps and open mind; is impartial in information gathering;
with-holds judgements until all possible sources of data are accounted for; and emphases reflection over
action.
Identifies relationships between concepts; draws conclusions from the analysis of data; develops

This model is not included in this survey as it did not substantially emerge as one utilised in Australia.
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Mode of Learning
conceptualisation
(AC)
Active
experimentation (AE)

Aspects
tentative explanations; develops generalisations and principles from the information; and develops a
plan or proposal to address the identified issues
Tests ideas and concepts already developed; attempts new activities in testing the ideas; tests
hypotheses by active experimentation; Identifies outcomes that have immediate applications; and
emphasises practical application instead of reflective understanding.

These four modes represent different strategies for learning that people use over time and
which develop into preferences based on decisions made in relation to new learning
experiences. Kolb’s experiential learning theory (KELT) was then developed into a Learning
Style Questionnaire (LSQ) by Honey and Mumford (1992) for use as a training package. It is
this that has been adapted by Cleak and Wilson (2007, pp. 18-22) for the purposes of field
placement. Thus, the model a combination of KELT, solutions focussed therapy adapted for
practice teaching (Bucknell, 2000), supervision processes drawn from Kadushin (1976) and
reflection based broadly on the reflection-on-action aspect of Schon’s (1983) model. This is
represented in the figure below:

Kolb experiential learning theory (KELT) (1984)

Schon

Solution
focussed
therapy

Kadushin Supervision processes
Field Placement Learning

Figure 18: Representation of the Cleak and Wilson model of reflective learning

In the text these aspects are discussed in a number of different chapters. For example chapter
6 includes a discussion of critical reflection for teaching and learning, however this
examination is not linked particularly to the techniques for reflection that are outlined in
chapter 8. The chapter on critical reflection also describes different kinds of reflection in
relation to a reference to Taylor (2004) for which there is unfortunately no end-text citation.
The use of Taylor ( 2004 cited in Cleak & Wilson, 2007, p. 53) is interesting because it is this
source that introduces links to broader notions of reflection beyond the instrumental. Indeed
the critical in critical reflection is ‚< a belief that supervision should be linked to an
emancipatory and empowering process that maximises a working partnership‛ (Cleak &
Wilson, 2007, p. 50) and that reflection assists with ‚<narrowing the gap between theory
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and practice‛ (p. 51). In chapter 8 of this text there is also a discussion of various techniques
which can be used to engage in learning whilst on placement. All of them offer practices that
would aid the development of reflective practice. Not all of these techniques are relevant to
this discussion, however so I have focussed on the technique that explicitly included using a
critical incident and a series of reflective questions for students to undertake. These
questions are outlined below outline a series of questions to aid in reflecting on critical
incidents on field placement:
Table 14: Questions devised by Cleak and Wilson to aid reflexivity
1.

What images do you recall?

2.

What sounds, smells and tactile sensations do you recall?

3.

Which people or comments or practice stands out in your mind?

Next consider the affective domain – reflect on how you felt:
4.

What was the high or low spot of the incident?

5.

Were you surprised, angered, elated, curious, confused or depressed by anything in the
experience? Describe your mood and feelings.

6.

What do you think others were feeling?

Now interpret the events
7.

What have you learned from the incident?

8.

From this experience, what can you conclude about your understanding of and skills in
assessment or analysis?

9.

What was your key insight or learning?

10. How does this relate to your framework for practice?
Finally consider your decisions:
11. What skills and areas of understanding do you need to develop further as a result of your
reflection?
12. What would this require?
13. What methods does the experience reinforce as valuable for future practice?

These reflective practice techniques can be seen as oriented in a technical and practical sense
(Ruch, 2000) to practice. This is because the techniques are aimed at increasing the selfawareness skills of students with regard to their own repertoires of knowledge and methods
for social work practice. In terms of a taxonomy of different kinds of critical reflection this
reflective practice model is broadly evaluative and interpretative (Ruch, 2000; J. Tully, 1989).
The model is also task focussed in its orientation towards uncovering and addressing gaps
in knowledge and skills that might emerge for the person engaging in the technique.
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The circular process of reflective practice (Connolly & Harms, 2012)
This reflective practice model is informed by the work of Social Work academic Michael
Sheppard (1998) and can be described as a practice-led framework. Practice-led in this
context means that what social workers do is driven by the exigencies of practice and this is
contrasted by Harms and Connolly (2012, p. 165) to practice which is theory driven.
Attention therefore is firmly on the worker-in-situation and the action and needs of the
practice situation. Connolly and Harms also incorporate Fook’s (1999) notion of reflectivity
as ‚ < the actions and interpretations, social and cultural background and personal history,
emotional aspects of experience and personally held assumptions and values that influence
the situation‛ (p. 199). Lastly, they also incorporate an acknowledgement that ‚*T+he
knowledgeability of human actors is always bounded on the one hand by the unconscious
and on the other by the unacknowledged conditions/unintended consequences of action‛
(Giddens, 1984, cited in Connolly & Harms, 2012, p. 165). The authors see
reflection/reflexivity/critical reflection as in service to ‚< understanding and improving the
use of self in professional practice.‛ (Connolly & Harms, 2012, p. 165). As with other models
it is practice situations which form part of any eliciting triggers for reflection. This is seen as
a dynamic process that operates between the worker and situation and involves the
background utilisation of professional ethical standards, knowledge and interpretive lenses.
For these authors supervision is crucial to this process and is also important to building
practice knowledge for the social worker. Supervision is therefore a key reflective space and
this is where the model links with that of Schon’s (1983) more closely.

Action

Reflection: critical
analysis of client
and worker-insituation

Reflexive response:
changes situation
(Client/worker-insituation)

Figure 19: Connolly and Harms model of reflective practice
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Critical reflection in this model is about considering power relations in the interaction with
clients. Reflexive in this model refers to the triggering situations in practice and these
authors link this reflexivity in two distinct ways: one is in relation to social conditions
described by work in sociology through Bourdieu and Giddens (Connolly & Harms, 2012).
This is interesting as it is not clear from the explanation which aspects of these authors work
is being referred to. Is it Bourdieu’s notion of reflexivity as related to habitus (Archer, 2010;
Bourdieu, 1999) for example? Is it Giddens’ ideas about the modernity (Beck et al., 1994) and
the impact of this on individual need for reflexivity about social conditions? In a subsequent
paragraph the term reflexivity is then linked to transference and counter-transference,
concepts more attributable to theories in the psychodynamic tradition.

Lastly critical is treated as synonymous with critical social work which is informed by
feminist, anti-oppressive and anti-racist ideas (Connolly & Harms, 2012). This collection of
theories are grouped through their linking of personal troubles and public issues (Infed.org,
2012). In this respect, therefore, this model meets the conditions of critical reflection but is
primarily interpretive in its format. This is because the primary focus for engaging in
reflective practice/critical reflection within this model is to build meaning and sense from
practice situations for service to wider professional goals.

Conclusion
This survey has outlined a number of the reflective practice models available to Australian
Social Work educators, practitioners and students. I have not included all possible models
within the survey, instead confining my discussion to models that emerged from my
conduct of the archaeology and the initial literature review for the research. Each model
utilises different forms of critical reflection and many include more than one kind in their
orientation of thinking towards practice.
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Appendix B - Journal article
Watts, L. (2015). An Autoethnographic Exploration of Learning and Teaching Reflective
Practice. Social Work Education, 34(4), 363-376. doi: 10.1080/02615479.2015.1016903
Abtract
Learning and demonstrating reflective skills for practice is a key requirement for students
and practitioners in Social Work in Australia. Yet teaching and assessing reflective practice
continues to present a number of practical and ethical issues for educators. This paper will
discuss reflective practice in the context of an autoethnographic study that researched
learning to be a social worker and educator. The findings from the study suggest that
educators should be cautious about the extent to which educational activities direct attention
to student selves for the purposes of building skills in reflective practice. The conclusions
suggest that the moral order of the discipline, the hidden curriculum and the course culture
in addition to the actual activities can have a significant impact on the extent to which
reflective practice assessments deliver learning benefits to students.
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A p p e n d i x C - A p o s s i b l e mo d e l

Reflective Practice
Developing
judgement

Psychological
capital/emotional
regulation

Critical thinking

Figure 20: Representation of different aspects of reflective practice
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Appendix H - Interview guides for participants
Social Work Practitioners/Social Work Educators
Preamble
Thank you for agreeing to be part of this study. The interview will take about 40 minutes
and with your permission I would like to record the interview as well as take notes. A
transcript of the interview will be returned for you to read before it is used in any data
analysis process and you will be asked to give your consent for it to be used in the study.
You are welcome to withdraw your consent at any time.


Can you tell me something about your experience as a social worker? What is your
current role?



When did you undertake your studies in social work? Was reflective practice part of
the curriculum when you were studying as an undergraduate?



What do you understand about reflective practice?



What can you tell me about your experience of learning reflective practice?



Do you use reflection in your current role? Can you give examples of where you
have used reflective practice in your work?



Have you supervised social work students? If so, does reflective practice play a role
in your supervision of students? Can you give some examples?



Have you any suggestions for teaching reflective practice to students? Can you give
examples?



Have you ever tried to teach reflective practice and been unsuccessful? What
happened? What leads you to think it wasn’t successful?
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What do you think the barriers to reflective practice are for practitioners?



Do you think reflective practice is useful to learning how to practice in social work?
In what way?

Social work students
Preamble
Thanks for agreeing to be part of this study. The interview will take about 40 minutes and
with your permission I would like to record the interview as well as take notes. A transcript
of the interview will be returned for you to read before it is used in any data analysis process
and you will be asked to give your consent for it to be used in the study. You are welcome to
withdraw your consent at any time.


Can you tell me something about your experience as a social work student?



What year are you currently in your undergraduate degree?



Is reflective practice part of the curriculum? How much of your studies so far have
included reflective practice and writing?



What do you understand about reflective practice? What can you tell me about your
experience of learning reflective practice? Can you give examples of assessment that
asked for reflective writing or practice?





What helps you undertake reflective practice and writing?



Are there any barriers to learning reflective practice or writing?

Why does social work use reflective practice and writing? In your view what is reflective
practice and writing for? Are there other ways to accomplish these goals? What are they?

310

A p p e n d i x I - Ex a mp l e s o f t h e d a t a a n a l y s i s p r o c e s s

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

Appendix J - A Wordle generated from initial coding data analysis

Figure 21: Wordle from initial codes

324

Figure 22: Wordle created from codes about barriers to reflection

